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ABSTRACT 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was established in 
2004. The Agency provides advice and recommendations, data analysis, and supports awareness 
raising and cooperation by the EU bodies and Member States in the field of cybersecurity. ENISA 
uses its expertise to improve cooperation between Member States, and between actors from the 
public and private sectors, as well as to support capacity building. 
 
The present study involves the evaluation of ENISA over the 2013-2016 period, assessing the 
Agency’s performance, governance and organisational structure, and positioning with respect to 
other EU and national bodies. It assesses ENISA’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats (SWOTs) with regard to the new cybersecurity and digital privacy landscape. It also 
provides options to modify the mandate of the Agency to better respond to new, emerging needs 
and assesses their financial implications.  
 
The findings of the evaluation study show that ENISA has made some important achievements 
towards increasing NIS in the EU. However, a fragmented approach to cybersecurity across the 
EU and issues internal to the Agency, including limited financial resources, hinder ENISA’s ability 
to respond to the ever growing needs of stakeholders in a context of technological developments 
and evolving cybersecurity threats.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This is the executive summary to the “Study on the Evaluation of the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA)”.  
 
Objectives  
ENISA is the EU agency for network and information security. It was established in 2004 by 
Regulation (EC) No 460/2004. Since then, ENISA’s mandate has been reviewed once and the 
Agency’s mandate has been extended several times. The latest changes were implemented with 
Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (hereafter “the Regulation”). Article 32 (1) of the Regulation 
requires the Commission to “commission an evaluation to assess, in particular, the impact, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency ad its working practices. The evaluation shall also 
address the possible need to modify the mandate of the Agency and the financial implications of 
any such modification”. 
 
The study involves the evaluation of ENISA over the 2013-2016 period, assessing the Agency’s 
performance, governance and organisation structure, and positioning with respect to other EU 
and national bodies. Furthermore, the study assesses ENISA’s strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOTs) with regard to the new cybersecurity and digital privacy 
landscape. It provides options to modify the mandate of the Agency to better respond to the new 
needs and assesses their financial implications.  
 
Methodological approach 
The evaluation study aims to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,  coherence and 
complementarity, and EU added value of ENISA. It contains responses to 46 evaluation questions 
based on the European Commission’s Roadmap for the evaluation of ENISA1. The evaluation 
conclusions are drawn from both primary and secondary data collection and analytical tasks which 
feed into the development of the answers to the evaluation questions. The evaluation involved 
extensive data collection, including the consultation of various stakeholders groups (such as 
ENISA staff and management, ENISA’s Management Board, national Computer Emergency 
Response Teams and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CERTs/CSIRTs), EU 
institutions, private stakeholders). Primary data was collected through different tools: in-depth 
interviews, two surveys, an open public consultation and a workshop. The evaluation is 
underpinned by an evaluation matrix, which links the evaluation questions to the data sources, 
indicators and analytical strategies that were used to answer them, thus making it clear how the 
conclusions have been reached.  
 
The evaluation was carried out between November 2016 and July 2017 by Ramboll Management 
Consulting and CARSA, and involved three external experts covering the policy, legal and 
technical aspects of cybersecurity.  
 
Findings and conclusions  
An assessment of ENISA’s performance, governance and operational structure and positioning for 
the period 2013-2016 according to the evaluation criteria is presented in the following table. The 
key findings that have led to this assessment are presented below.  
Table 1: Assessment of ENISA against the evaluation criteria 
Evaluation criterion Overall assessment 
Relevance Achieved to a large extent 
Effectiveness Partially achieved 
Efficiency Achieved to a large extent 
Coherence Partially achieved 
EU-added value Partially achieved  
 
                                               
1 European Commission (2016): Evaluation Roadmap – Evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) 
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Relevance: In the context of technological developments and evolving threats, there is a 
significant need for increased network and information security (NIS) in the EU. The recent 
additions to the legislative framework, such as the NIS Directive2 underline this. Member States 
and EU bodies rely on expertise on the evolution of NIS, capacities need to be built in the 
Member States to understand and respond to threats, and stakeholders need to cooperate across 
thematic fields and across institutions. Considering this context, the objectives set out in ENISA’s 
mandate proved to be relevant over the period under evaluation and continue to be of high 
relevance today.  
 
While the mandate defines the Agency’s objectives in broad terms, leaving room for ENISA’s 
Management Board to set priorities based on latest developments in order to respond to 
changing needs and evolving threats, ENISA’s activities do not fully meet the needs of all its 
stakeholders: 
 ENISA’s work programme is dominated by the interests of the Member States, and yet it is 
necessary to consider the longer-term perspective and the activities of other stakeholders in 
the cybersecurity area (such as other EU agencies or the private sector) to ensure continued 
relevance of the Agency 
 ENISA’s stakeholders strongly differ in their needs, making it difficult to meet them all. Some 
Member States (such as Germany, France or Sweden) have significant capacity and resources 
in the area of cybersecurity and rely on ENISA only for specific services. Other Member States 
(from Eastern and Southern Europe) are less experienced and rely more strongly on the 
expertise and capacity of ENISA. The Commission has their own needs and expectations with 
regard to the services that ENISA can provide to the different DGs. Additionally, industry 
stakeholders, including a high number of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are important 
actors in NIS and could also benefit from ENISA’s activities 
 
Effectiveness: In general, ENISA implements its tasks and achieves its set targets. ENISA has 
made a contribution to increased NIS in Europe through the four tasks presented in the table 
below, though there is room for improvement in relation to each.   
 
Community building Capacity building 
Achievements Areas for improvement Achievements Areas for improvement 
 Important 
contribution to 
enhanced cooperation 
between Member 
States and related 
NIS stakeholders, in 
particular between 
CERTs/CSIRTs 
- Cooperation could be 
strengthened between 
ENISA and the 
Commission and other 
EU agencies, and with 
the private sector 
 
 Contribution to 
enhanced capacities 
in the Member 
States, most notably 
in Member States 
with limited 
capabilities and 
resources in the area 
of cybersecurity  
 Important activities 
include the Cyber 
Europe Exercises and 
trainings for 
CERTs/CSIRTs 
- Capacity building with 
the private sector could 
be increased 
                                               
2 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level 
of security of network and information systems across the Union 
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Expertise provision Supporting development and implementation of 
policies 
Achievements Areas for improvement Achievements Areas for improvement 
 Important 
contribution by 
supporting 
CERTs/CSIRTs  
- ENISA has not 
managed to become 
recognised as a centre 
of expertise or a 
reference point for 
other stakeholders, 
such as EU institutions 
or the private sector 
- High reliance on 
procurement of 
external expertise and 
limited resources 
available in-house 
 ENISA has assisted 
the Member States 
and the Commission 
in developing and 
implementing policies  
- ENISA is not 
consistently being 
involved by the 
Commission in all NIS-
related activities 
 
ENISA’s contribution to NIS in Europe is limited by several key factors, including:  
 The broad mandate under which a variety of tasks is to be covered, leaving limited scope to 
work on its own initiative and other than upon request 
 The Agency’s difficulties in attracting and retaining cybersecurity experts as staff members, 
due to various reasons including weak human resources procedures during the period under 
review  
 The limited visibility of ENISA – the Agency is not sufficiently known across the EU and has 
not been able to establish a brand, unlike other EU agencies  
 
Efficiency: ENISA has among the lowest budgets and levels of human resources compared to 
other EU agencies. In order to complete the various tasks set out in its mandate, ENISA has to 
be very efficient in the implementation of its budget and carefully consider where resources and 
working hours can be spent. The Agency develops a high number of publications every year and 
implements many other activities. Despite its small budget, the Agency has been able to 
contribute to targeted objectives and impacts, showing efficiency in the use of its budget.  
 
In terms of efficiency, ENISA faces two main challenges: 
 A number of administrative requirements set by the Commission which are the same for all 
EU agencies but weigh more heavily on smaller agencies 
 A location split between Athens and Heraklion, requiring additional efforts of coordination and 
generating additional costs  
 
Coherence: ENISA’s activities are generally coherent with the policies and activities of its 
stakeholders, but there is a need for a more coordinated approach to cybersecurity at EU level. 
The potential for cooperation between ENISA and the European Commission, as well as other EU 
bodies, is not fully utilised. For example, the division of responsibilities between ENISA and 
CERT-EU should be clarified.  
 
ENISA’s activities are largely coherent with the work done at national level in the area of 
cybersecurity. Coherence is particularly strong between the CERTs/CSIRTs and ENISA. Some 
overlaps between ENISA’s activities and those of Member States with strong cybersecurity 
expertise were identified, but Member States with less capacity and resources in the area of 
cybersecurity still benefit from its activities. 
 
EU-added value: ENISA’s added value lies primarily in the Agency’s ability to enhance 
cooperation, mainly between Member States but also with related NIS communities. There is no 
other actor at EU level that supports the cooperation of the same variety of stakeholders on NIS. 
The added value of ENISA differs between Member States, depending on their cybersecurity 
capacities and resources. The Agency’s activities of providing expertise and capacity building 
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represent important added value for Member States with few national resources dedicated to 
cybersecurity. This is less the case for Member States with more cybersecurity capacities. 
 
Consequently, a discontinuation of ENISA would impact Member States differently. While Member 
States with strong cybersecurity capacities will be able to replace the services provided by ENISA 
at least to some extent, this will not be the case for Member States with fewer resources. The 
latter Member States rely more on ENISA’s services in terms of capacity building, access to 
expertise and support in the implementation of policy and legislation. Cybersecurity crosses 
borders, so there is a need to build capacity to avoid weaker links that can impact on 
cybersecurity in the EU as a whole, as well as a need to provide a cross-EU response. It will not 
be possible to ensure the same degree of community building and cooperation across the 
Member States without a decentralised EU agency for cybersecurity; the picture would be more 
fragmented where bilateral or regional cooperation stepped in to fill a void left by ENISA. 
Therefore, coordination at EU level is needed. 
A potential discontinuation of ENISA would be a lost opportunity for all Member States. Most 
stakeholders were of the opinion that ENISA could take on a more important role in the EU 
cybersecurity landscape in the future, ensuring a common response capacity. This potential for 
the Agency to capitalise on future opportunities would be lost should it be discontinued.   
 
SWOT analysis: Based on an analysis of the context – namely the evolution, since the last 
revision of ENISA's mandate in 2013, of the cybersecurity and digital privacy landscape - the 
evaluation study provides an assessment of the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA, and 
the opportunities and threats in the new cybersecurity and digital privacy landscape. These are 
presented in the figure below.  
Table 2: ENISA’s SWOTs 
 
In conclusion, the following key issues have been identified as requiring action to improve 
ENISA’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and added value in the future and 
ultimately help it contribute to increased NIS in the EU: Weak institutional and legal framework 
for cybersecurity in the EU – Cybersecurity is primarily seen as an area of national competence, 
while in reality it is an issue that transcends borders 
 Fragmentation of cybersecurity policy at EU level – The fragmentation of cybersecurity policy 
is due to a number of EU-level actors in the area of cybersecurity and insufficient coordination 
between them. One important factor here is the division of responsibilities between ENISA 
and CERT-EU.  
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 Limitations for ENISA due to its size – ENISA has difficulties to make an impact in the vast 
field of NIS as it has only limited human and financial resources to meet a broad mandate. 
 Limited visibility – ENISA has not managed to develop a strong brand name and is not seen 
as a point of reference at European level for cybersecurity.  
 Not perceived as a proactive, visionary Agency - ENISA’s broad mandate makes it reactive to 
fulfilling the needs of as many stakeholders as possible, but this means that it loses focus. 
ENISA is not able to use its own knowledge to set work priorities due to the Member State 
dominance of the work programme. 
 A mandate that is not aligned with cybersecurity needs – Cybersecurity threats have become 
a permanent issue in the EU and ENISA has been allocated long-term responsibilities (e.g. 
under the NIS Directive) which call for a permanent mandate.  
 ENISA does not sufficiently respond to the needs of all its stakeholders – Under the current 
governance structure, the needs of the private sector are not sufficiently heard and thus are 
not adequately reflected in the Agency’s work programmes.   
 ENISA should expand its activities to better respond to stakeholder needs – There is a 
request by stakeholders (although not unanimous) to ensure a coherent ICT certification and 
standardisation system in the EU. Member States with fewer resources and expertise require 
additional support in receiving information on and assessing cybersecurity threats in order to 
respond to attacks.  
 
Despite these issues, there is significant potential for ENISA, if sufficiently mandated and 
supported in terms of financial and human resources, to make a contribution to increased NIS in 
the EU. There is a clear need for cooperation and coordination across different stakeholders and 
ENISA as a decentralised EU agency is in the position to ensure a coordinated approach to cyber 
threats in the EU.  
 
Options for the future of the Agency 
 
Based on the key issues presented above – as derived from the findings and conclusions of the 
study - four options to review the current mandate of ENISA were developed. They are presented 
in Table 3 below, highlighting the specific factors for change that could be implemented under 
each of the options. 
Table 3: Options for the future of ENISA 
Option Factor for change 
Option 0: Baseline, maintain the status quo 
 
This option concerns an extension of the current 
mandate in terms of scope and objectives, though 
the provisions from the NIS Directive, the eIDAS 
Regulation3 and Telecoms Framework Directive4 
would need to be taken into account. 
Revise ENISA’s mandate to make its new tasks 
as per recent/upcoming legislation more 
specific: 
 Involvement in Cooperation Group as required 
under the NIS Directive 
 CSIRT Network Secretariat 
 Electronic communication code, recital 92 
(Telecoms Framework Directive) 
 eIDAS 
Option 1: Expiry of ENISA’s mandate 
(terminating ENISA) 
 
This option would involve closing ENISA and not 
creating another EU-level institution, but relying on 
existing institutions/organisations to implement 
engagements under, for example, the NIS Directive 
and bilateral or regional ties at Member State level. 
N/A 
Option 2: Enhanced ENISA (Keep ENISA with 
changes to its mandate) 
Strengthen ENISA’s operational role: 
 Provide periodic threat intelligence and ad hoc 
                                               
3 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC 
4 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) 
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This option concerns making significant revisions to 
ENISA’s mandate to address the key issues identified 
in the study, thereby building on its current role and 
ensuring that the new mandate is better adapted to 
the evolving cybersecurity landscape. 
alerts 
 Support the Blueprint for response to large scale 
cybersecurity incidents and crises at EU level 
 Provide emergency cybersecurity response 
Strengthen ENISA’s role in policy development 
and implementation: 
 Render the consultation of ENISA by the 
Commission in cybersecurity matters obligatory 
 Formally involve ENISA in the Connecting Europe 
Facility 
 Establish regular meetings between ENISA and 
other agencies/international organisations 
Make ENISA’s mandate permanent 
Strengthen ENISA’s governance structure:  
 Increase the role of the Permanent Stakeholders’ 
Group (PSG) 
 Allow ENISA more flexibility in the determination 
of its work priorities 
Include a role for ENISA in EU-level 
standardisation and certification: 
 Support the EU ICT Security Certification 
Framework 
 Support ICT security standardisation 
Strengthen ENISA’s position relative to 
research and innovation: 
 Take part in programming implementation 
 OR Take part in programming in an advisory role 
 OR Benefit from EU research and development 
funding 
Increase ENISA’s visibility: 
 Establish a liaison office in Brussels 
 Create a dedicated communications team within 
ENISA 
Option 3: European Agency with full operational 
capabilities  (Establish a European Centre of 
Cybersecurity) 
 
This option concerns developing ENISA into a new 
body at EU level that would cover the entire cycle 
cybersecurity lifecycle and deal with prevention, 
detection and response to cyber incidents. 
Create an EU cybersecurity umbrella: 
 Such an umbrella would encompass ENISA and 
CERT-EU 
Create a virtual European CSIRT: 
 Coordinate CSIRT Network operations 
 Produce real time situational awareness and 
dynamic threat intelligence feeds 
 Maintain and provide own cybersecurity incident 
response capacity to public and private sector 
All factors related to Option 2 could be fulfilled under 
Option 3. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This is the final report for the “Study on the Evaluation of the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA)”. The study was implemented between November 
2016 and July 2017.  
 
The study aims to support the Commission in evaluating the impact, effectiveness, efficiency, 
relevance, coherence and value added of ENISA and its working practices, and prepare the 
ground for a possible revision of the mandate of the Agency. The Commission is evaluating 
ENISA based on Article 32 (1) of ENISA’s Regulation (Regulation No 526/2013 concerning the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 460/2004) which requires the Commission to “commission an evaluation to assess, in 
particular, the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency ad its working practices. The 
evaluation shall also address the possible need to modify the mandate of the Agency and the 
financial implications of any such modification.”  
 
As such, the study contains both a summative dimension, looking back at the achievements of 
the 2013-2016 period, as well as a more formative, forward-looking aspect, as further described 
below: 
 Summative dimension: This aspect of the study assesses the results achieved by the Agency 
having regard to its objectives, mandate and tasks as set out in the ENISA Regulation. 
 Formative dimension: This forward-looking assessment is based on the evaluation of the 
current positioning of ENISA with respect to other EU and national bodies in meeting the 
needs of its constituency and the new challenges engendered by the evolving cybersecurity 
and digital privacy landscape. The study provides recommendations on the possible need to 
modify the mandate of the Agency and assesses the financial implications of such 
modifications. 
 
This introductory section presents the structure and content of this report and provides a brief 
overview about ENISA and the Agency’s work, including its intervention logic.  
 
1.1 Structure and content of the report 
 
This report is structured in four main parts. The introduction is followed by information about the 
methodology applied to implement the study. The third part of the report presents the findings of 
the study, which are structured according to the evaluation criteria, i.e. relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and EU-added value, and concludes with an analysis of ENISA’s strength, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats, a so-called SWOT analysis. The fourth and final part of 
the study presents conclusions on ENISA’s key achievements and the most pressing issues at 
strategic level and at the level of the Agency, before going on to discuss potential options for the 
future. The specific factors for change of the options are discussed, including an assessment of 
the costs of their implementation, their added value and coherence.  
 
Part Heading 
1 Introduction 
2 Methodology 
3 Findings 
4 Conclusions and recommendations 
  
The report includes the following appendices: 
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Appendix  Heading 
1 Evaluation question matrix 
2 Bibliography 
3 Survey questionnaires 
4 Positioning exercise 
5 Comprehensive SWOT table 
 
1.2 About ENISA 
 
ENISA is the EU agency for network and information security. It was established in 2004 by 
Regulation (EC) No 460/2004. Since then, ENISA’s mandate has been reviewed once and 
extended several times. The latest changes were implemented with Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 
(hereafter “the Regulation”). The Agency is located in Greece with its seat in Heraklion on Crete 
and an operational office in Athens. 
 
1.2.1 ENISA’s mission tasks and activities 
The Agency's activities consist in providing advice and recommendations, data analysis, as well 
as supporting awareness raising and cooperation by the EU bodies and Member States. Building 
on national and Community efforts, the Agency is a centre of expertise in this field. ENISA uses 
its expertise to improve cooperation between Member States, and between actions from the 
public and private sectors, as well as to support capacity building. 
 
ENISA’s Strategic Objectives (from 20155) are presented in the figure below. 
Figure 1: Strategic Objectives of ENISA 
 
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting based on ENISA website 
 
In order to achieve its Strategic Objectives, ENISA delivers four key tasks in accordance with the 
Regulation, namely: 
 Advising and assisting the Commission and the Member States on information security and in 
their dialogue with industry to address security-related problems in hardware and software 
products. 
 Collecting and analysing data on security incidents in Europe and emerging risks. 
 Promoting risk assessment and risk management methods to enhance our capability to deal 
with information security threats. 
                                               
5 There was a shift from work streams to strategic objectives in 2015. 
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 Raising awareness and strengthening co-operation between different actors in the information 
security field, notably by developing public / private partnerships with industry in this field. 
 
In addition, ENISA undertakes European Network and Information Security (NIS) Good Practice 
Brokerage activities, which are based on the concept of the exchange of good practices between 
EU Member States at the area of NIS on a pan-European scale. ENISA acts as a broker in the 
European NIS ‘marketplace’ to facilitate the exchange of good practices by: 
 
 supporting co-operative meetings with Member States and other stakeholders; 
 assisting in the exchange of experts between Member States; 
 supporting the exchange of good practice material;  
 contributing with its expertise to co-operative projects. 
 
ENISA mainly conducts the previously mentioned tasks through four activity areas: Computer 
Emergency Response Teams/ Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CERTs/CSIRTs), 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) and Resilience, Identity & Trust and Risk 
Management. 
 
1.2.2 ENISA’s organisational structure 
The organisational structure of ENISA is laid down in the Regulation which states that the Agency 
comprises an Executive Director and staff, a Management Board, an Executive Board and a 
Permanent Stakeholders’ Group (PSG). Each of these is described in further detail below. 
 
The Executive Director is appointed by the Management Board and is responsible for managing 
the Agency and performs his/her duties independently. He/she also establishes ad hoc working 
groups, in consultation with the PSG, which are composed of experts. The ad hoc working 
groups are addressing specific technical and scientific matters.  
 
The Management Board is composed of representatives of the Member States and the 
Commission. Tasks of the Management Board include the establishment of the budget, 
verification of its execution, adoption of the appropriate financial rules, establishment of 
transparent working procedures for decision-making by the Agency, approval of the Agency’s 
work programme, adoption of its own rules of procedure and Agency’s internal rules of operation, 
appointment and removal of Executive Director. The Management Board will adopt the Agency’s 
internal rules of operation on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. The Management Board 
ensures that the Agency carries out its tasks under conditions which enable it to serve in 
accordance with the founding Regulation 
 
The PSG is set up by the Management Board, acting on a proposal by the Executive Director, for 
a term of office of 2.5 years. For the period 2015-2017, the PSG is composed of “nominated 
members” and of members appointed “ad personam”, representing in total 23 members from all 
over Europe. The 20 members appointed "ad personam" constitute a multidisciplinary group from 
industry, academia, and consumer organisations and have been selected upon the basis of their 
own specific expertise and personal merits. Three “nominated members” represent national 
regulatory authorities, data protection and law enforcement authorities. The role of PSG is to 
advise the Executive Director on the development of the Agency’s work programme, and on 
ensuring the communication with the relevant stakeholders on all related issues. 
 
In line with the operational and horizontal objectives of the Agency, ENISA’s organisational 
structure was reorganised in December 2013, as depicted in the figure below. 
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Figure 2: Organisational chart of ENISA (2013 to late 2016) 
 
Source: ENISA website, Structure and Organisation 
 
ENISA’s organisational structure was changed in late 2016 to include an “Executive Director’s 
Office” and the units within the core operations and administrative departments were 
reorganised; the split between operations and administration (which from end 2016 also covers 
“stakeholder relations”) was maintained. The previous structure of ENISA has been presented 
here in line with the scope of this evaluation (2013-2016). 
 
1.2.3 ENISA’s stakeholders 
Engaging with, working with and assisting its stakeholders, is a key factor for ENISA’s success 
and the overall mission of contributing to the security of the EU internal market. Therefore 
maintaining relationships with these stakeholders through formal and informal channels is one of 
the main tasks of ENISA. ENISA has importantly set up and continues to maintain a formal group 
of liaison officers, called the Network of National Liaison Officers (NLOs). This network 
should be highlighted since, though not formally based on the ENISA Regulation, it is of great 
value to ENISA as the NLOs serve as ENISA’s key points of reference in the Member States on 
specific issues. ENISA also gains access to a network of national contacts through individual 
NLOs, reinforcing the activity of the Agency in the Member States and its network consists of (at 
least) one NLO per Member State. Typically an NLO works in the field of NIS, either in the public 
sector (ministry), or the IT/telecom sector. In coordination with the Managing Board 
representative, it may be decided to appoint multiple NLOs for one country – particularly when 
the country is large or when there are multiple distinct communities (private, public, etc.). 
 
In addition, ENISA has established relations with a wider stakeholder group. These include 
industry organisations, end user organisations, EU bodies, International Organisations, research 
and academia, third countries, etc. This open and growing network of stakeholders is essential to 
the Agency’s goals in identifying emerging risks and forging new insights to help Member States 
and private sector organisations through access to NIS experts. Figure 3 shows a map of ENISA’s 
stakeholders who together strengthen to Agency’s capacity to prepare for challenges in a 
proactive and increasingly professional manner by building novel public and private sector 
partnerships.  
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Figure 3: ENISA’s stakeholder map  
 
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting based on ENISA website, Structure and Organisation, Stakeholders Relations 
 
1.2.4 Intervention logic 
The figure below presents the intervention logic for ENISA as an organisation based on the 
Regulation, which shows how its four key areas of activity are intended to deliver the Agency´s 
Strategic Objectives and impacts. This intervention logic is a systematic and reasoned description 
of the casual links between the Agency’s activities, outputs, outcomes, results and impacts, as 
well as the key external factors affecting the implementation, results and impact of ENISA’s 
activities. It helps to understand the objectives of the Agency as a whole and its specific tasks. 
 
This study has used the intervention logic as a basis to assess ENISA’s effectiveness in achieving 
targeted results and impacts based on the implemented activities.   
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Figure 4: Intervention Logic of ENISA as an organisation 
 
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting based on Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the evaluation study was to support the Commission in evaluating the impact, 
effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and value added of ENISA and its working practices, 
and prepare the ground for a possible revision of the mandate of the Agency. To do so, four 
different analytical tasks were implemented. As part of the summative (backward-looking) part of 
the study, the performance of ENISA (i) and its governance and organisational structure (ii) were 
assessed, and ENISA’s positioning with regard to other EU agencies and bodies and national 
authorities was also analysed (iii). As part of the formative (forward-looking) dimension of the 
study, ENISA’s SWOTs in a new context have been identified.  
 
This part of the study presents an overview of the methodology employed for the evaluation of 
ENISA, by detailing the data collection activities and analytical tasks that have been implemented. 
The study answers a set of 46 evaluation questions based on the Commission’s evaluation 
roadmap for ENISA6. A complete evaluation question matrix is presented in Appendix 1.  
 
The methods chosen to evaluate ENISA in accordance with the requirements of this study and to 
respond to the evaluation questions are presented in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Methodology of the study 
 
 
Each of the tasks is described in further detail below. 
 
2.1 Preparatory tasks 
The preparatory tasks were used to set up the methodology and tools for the study and ensure a 
common understanding of the scope and objective of the evaluation between the European 
                                               
6 European Commission (2016): Evaluation Roadmap – Evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) 
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Commission and the study team. For this purpose, five familiarisation interviews were 
conducted with members of the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (DG CNECT) and DG for Informatics (DIGIT), and with the Computer Emergency 
Response Team for the EU institutions, CERT-EU. Preliminary desk research allowed for the 
identification of the policy, legal and academic documents of relevance to the study. Based on the 
understanding gained of ENISA and the purpose of the evaluation, the methodological approach 
was refined, including a finalisation of the evaluation question matrix and data collection tools 
were developed.   
 
2.2 Data collection tasks 
The data collection included a desk review of relevant literature and the consultation of different 
stakeholders. In-depths interviews with a wide range of ENISA’s stakeholders, staff and 
management were conducted, surveys specifically targeted at ENISA’s staff and management and 
at CERTs/CSIRTs were implemented, and an open public consultation allowed all EU citizens and 
organisations to contribute to the study. At the end of the data collection and after some analysis, 
a workshop was held with ENISA’s stakeholders in order to validate the findings and preliminary 
conclusions. Through these various means, a wide range of stakeholders were consulted, ensuring 
the representativeness of the findings presented in chapter 3. 
 
2.2.1 Desk research 
The study is based on a variety of secondary sources which fed into all of the analytical tasks. 
These sources include legal sources on relevant EU legislation, EU strategies and policy 
documents, reports published by ENISA on programming and reporting, previous evaluations 
conducted for the Agency and a number of key papers and reports on the issue of cybersecurity in 
Europe.  
 
A full list of documents is provided in Appendix 2.   
 
2.2.2 Consulted stakeholders 
The data collection among stakeholders included the following activities: in-depth interviews, an 
open public consultation, a survey among ENISA’s staff and management as well as direct 
stakeholders (members of the Management and Executive Board of the Agency, NLOs and the 
PSG), a survey among CERTs/CSIRTs and a stakeholder workshop. Table 4 below presents an 
overview of the different formats used to involve stakeholders in the study.  
Table 4: Format and purpose of stakeholder consultation tools 
Consultation 
tool 
Format Purpose 
Interviews  
(49 interviews 
conducted) 
In-depth interviews over the 
phone or in person 
 
 Gather information on ENISA’s performance (ENISA’s 
staff and management, its direct stakeholders and the 
European Commission and Parliament) 
 Collect data on ENISA’s governance structure (staff and 
management, direct stakeholders) 
 Gather views on ENISA’s SWOTs (all stakeholders) 
 Collect information to understand ENISA’s positioning 
(other EU agencies and bodies) 
Survey to 
ENISA staff 
and direct 
stakeholders  
(88 
participants) 
Online survey to ENISA’s 
staff, the Management and 
Executive Board of the 
Agency, NLOs and the PSG.  
Current, as well as former, 
Management Board members 
and NLOs were contacted. 
A total of 199 stakeholders 
were invited to participate. 
 Gathering views on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
ENISA’s governance, organisational set-up and working 
practices 
Survey to 
CERTs/CSIRTs  
(34 
participants) 
Online survey sent out to 
CSIRT Network, including 
CSIRT representatives from all 
28 Member States and CERT-
 Gathering views on cooperation and coordination 
between ENISA and the CERTs/CSIRTs 
 Providing input to assess the coherence and 
complementarity between ENISA’s activities and those 
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EU. of the CERTs/CSIRTs  
Open public 
consultation  
(90 
participants) 
Questionnaire available online 
between 18 January and 12 
April 2017 
 Contribution to the assessment of ENISA’s 
performance, the analysis of SWOTs, and to the 
development of recommendations for the future 
Workshop  
(43 
participants) 
Implemented following the 
analytical tasks.  
Held on the premises of the 
Commission in Brussels on the 
22nd of March 2017. 
Presentation of preliminary 
findings, conclusions and 
options. 
 Gathering participants’ views on the results of the 
evaluation and to discuss possible options for the 
future of cybersecurity in Europe 
 Validation of findings 
 
Through the different data collection tools more than 300 stakeholder contributions were received 
from across various groups as presented in Table 5 below (individual stakeholders may have 
contributed to the evaluation through different data collection tools).    
Table 5: Stakeholders reached per data collection tool 
Target group Type of stakeholder Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
survey 
respondents 
Number of 
participants 
to the Open 
public 
consultation 
Number of 
workshop 
participants7 
Direct 
stakeholders 
Members of ENISA’s 
Management Board and 
Executive Board 
8 19 10 12 
PSG  2 13 3 5 
NLOs 2 12 1  
ENISA’s 
users and 
advisors 
European Commission 6    
European Parliament 3    
Other EU agencies and 
bodies 
5   4 
CERTs/CSIRTs 3 34  2 
National cybersecurity 
authorities 
1  98 5 
Industry representatives 
(private enterprises or 
business associations) 
4  269 9 
Civil society organisations 
or individuals 
2  2610 2 
Research or academic 
institutions 
  10 2 
Consultants   5  
Authorities from third 
countries 
1    
ENISA staff and management 12 44  2 
Total  49 122 90 43 
 
Across the data collection tools (interviews, open public consultation, workshop), Management 
Board members of at least 19 Member States were involved in the study.11 These cover a spectrum 
of smaller and larger Member States and of different regions.  
 
In addition to the data collection tools presented in the tables above, seven interviews were 
conducted with national authorities and policy-makers in the latter stage of the evaluation, 
focussing on the forward looking part of the study and seeking to further operationalise the options 
under consideration for the future of the Agency. These include Member State representatives and 
their alternates to ENISA’s Management Board, members of ENISA’s Executive Board, 
                                               
7 Participants from the Commission have not been included in the list of participants and are thus not included below. 
8 Including a position paper received from France 
9 Including one position paper from a UK based business association 
10 This includes 20 respondents who indicated to answer in their personal capacity. 
11 The contributions to the surveys were anonymous. It cannot be verified which Member States were covered.  
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CERTs/CSIRTs and national cyber security authorities, as well as management staff from ENISA, 
representatives of DG CNECT and from the private sector.   
 
Further information on the data collection methods can be found in Appendix 3 including the 
questionnaires used to the two surveys. 
 
2.3 Analytical tasks 
The study involved four analytical tasks which were used to reach conclusions and 
recommendations for the revision of ENISA’s mandate and to suggest potential improvements, as 
presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: Analytical tasks and their purpose 
Analytical task Purpose 
Assessment of ENISA’s performance  Assessment of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, 
coherence and EU added value of the work undertaken by 
ENISA and its working practices over the 2013-2016 period 
 Review of ENISA’s intervention logic to establish the extent 
to which ENISA’s activities and outputs have contributed to 
the expected results and impacts 
 Assessment of whether ENISA has been able to establish 
itself as an EU-wide centre of expertise and reference point 
for stakeholders  
 Assessment of the degree to which the Agency’s priorities, 
as set out in its work programmes, are in line with the 
needs of the time and the degree of the Agency’s flexibility 
to respond to unforeseen needs  
Assessment of the governance and 
organisational structure of ENISA 
 Assessment of how the current, governance, internal 
organisational structure of ENISA, location and human 
resources policies and practices contribute to efficiency in 
and effectiveness of the work of the Agency 
 Benchmarking exercise comparing ENISA’s governance and 
organisational structure to that of other EU agencies and 
organisations 
Assessment of the positioning of 
ENISA in the current context 
 Assessment of how ENISA is positioned vis-à-vis a sample 
of other EU and national bodies working on cybersecurity 
and digital privacy on the basis of the services offered and 
the needs expressed by the Agency's stakeholders 
 Mapping of the services provided by ENISA and of a 
selection of other EU and national bodies against identified 
needs to highlight existing complementarities and potential 
overlaps between the offered services 
 Development of a positioning map  
Identification and assessment of 
ENISA’s SWOTs in a new context 
 Identification and assessment of ENISA’s strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (i.e. current status / 
position) in the context of the new and evolving 
cybersecurity challenges and digital privacy landscape and 
ENISA’s current mandate 
 . 
 Based on all data collection tasks and builds on the analysis 
conducted as part of the other analytical tasks 
 Involvement of a panel of cybersecurity experts covering 
the policy, legal and technical aspects of the area in this 
task 
 
The analytical tasks included a benchmarking and a positioning exercise. The sample of EU 
agencies and bodies selected for these two exercises is presented below.  
 
The EU agencies and bodies covered under the benchmarking exercise are presented in Table 7 
below. Organisations were selected based on similarities in their work areas and activities with 
those of ENISA, or in their size to ENISA in terms of number of staff and budget. 
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Table 7: Organisations selected for the benchmarking 
Organisation Reason for selection 
Europol – European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) Similarities in the work areas and activities  
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA) 
Availability of data 
Office of the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic (BEREC office) 
Similarities in the work areas and activities 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) 
Similarity in the activities 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Training (CEPOL) 
Similarity in the activities and similarity in terms 
of staff number and budget 
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) Similarity in terms of staff number and budget 
 
For the positioning exercise, ENISA’s activities were mapped across four tasks: enhancing 
cooperation, develop and maintain a high level of expertise, enhancing capacity building and 
developing and implementing policies. Sub-categories of these were developed to understand the 
more specific tasks that were implemented. The complete mapping of ENISA’s services and the full 
positioning exercise is attached in Appendix 4. The services were then compared to the sample of 
other EU and national bodies presented in Table 8 below. These organisations were contacted to 
provide information on their activities. The completeness of the responses received from these 
organisations varied and in a few cases no responses were received despite numerous follow ups 
per email and over the phone. As a consequence, parts of the positioning exercise only rely on 
desk research.  
Table 8: Organisations covered under the positioning exercise 
Organisation Status 
CERT-EU Input received 
Commission Joint Research Centre (DG JRC) Science 
Hub 
Input received 
EC3 Assessment made based on desk review 
Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Input received with no assessments of overlaps 
or complementarity 
French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) Assessment made based on desk review 
Spanish National Institute for Cybersecurity 
(INCIBE) 
Input received with no assessments of overlaps 
or complementarity 
 
The aim of the positioning exercise was to compare ENISA to organisations implementing 
similar activities in order to assess ENISA’s coherence and identify any potential overlap. 
Therefore, EU bodies and agencies, and organisations from Member States where the expected 
potential for overlap was high were selected. Results from the annual evaluations of ENISA in 2014 
and 2015 showed that this was the case for Member States’ cybersecurity organisation with 
comparably high human and financial resources and experience in the field of cybersecurity. The 
selected national organisations were not intended to be representative of all Member States. The 
needs of Member States with fewer resources and experience in cybersecurity were assessed 
through different means of data collection and analysis.  
 
As a first step in the analytical process, the data gathered through the in-depth interviews, the 
surveys and open public consultation in relation to the operationalised evaluation questions (see 
the evaluation matrix in Appendix 1) was analysed, comparing and contrasting the views of 
different stakeholder types from the same data source. 
 
In a second step, the desk-based analysis was triangulated with the data collected through the 
different stakeholder consultations, allowing for responses to be drafted in relation to the 
evaluation questions. On this basis, substantiated conclusions were drawn. The conclusions 
provide an overall judgement of the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, EU added 
value and impact of ENISA and with regard to the future needs and challenges. The preparation of 
conclusions and, subsequently, the recommendations is based on four pillars: 
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 Transparent use of all evidence collected 
 Validation of conclusions, notably through the stakeholder workshop and an expert panel 
 Recommendations flowing directly from conclusions 
 Validation of recommendation and their expected impacts, notably through the stakeholder 
workshop and an expert panel. 
 
2.4 Developing conclusions and recommendations 
 
Against the responses to the evaluation questions reached through the analytical tasks, the most 
pressing issues at the strategic level and at the level of the Agency were identified and options for 
the future of ENISA developed. Efforts were made to ensure that a clear and direct link was made 
between the conclusions and recommendations, enabling the tracking of the reasoning from the 
analysis carried out in relation to the evaluation questions through to the options for the future. By 
so doing, it is ensured that the extent to which the recommendations are based on opinion, 
analysis and objectively verifiable evidence is clear. 
 
An estimation of the costs related to each of the factors for change under a given option derived 
from the results of the evaluation was developed. The assessment was made on the basis of 
existing standard costings for the period under review (e.g. for full-time equivalents (FTEs), given 
activities) and took into account additional start-up costs, where relevant. Furthermore, the EU 
added value and coherence of the suggested tasks was assessed.  
 
2.5 Challenges and limitations 
The evaluation study presented a number of challenges, often relating to the availability of data. 
In the following, the main challenges are outlined, together with an explanation of how they were 
dealt with in the evaluation process. 
Table 9: Challenges in the evaluation process 
Challenge Solution / Mitigation strategy 
Benchmarking For the benchmarking exercise other EU 
agencies and bodies were asked to 
provide data on their set-up (e.g. 
numbers of staff, vacancies) and on 
their outputs (e.g. numbers of 
publications). The completeness of 
responses received from the selected 
bodies varied and in a few cases no 
responses were received. Consequently, 
only limited data was available for the 
benchmarking exercise and not all 
foreseen comparisons could be made. It 
has not been possible to compare: 
 percentage of administrative staff 
and the percentage of operational 
staff 
 turnover of the senior management 
 number of management and 
executive board meetings (only 
compared for three agencies) 
 approach to the use of procurement 
or external expert groups 
 budget used for procurement of 
study 
 budget allocation to publications 
 number and costs of publications, 
trainings, awareness raising events 
In response to the difficulties experienced in 
collecting the quantitative data originally 
intended, additional efforts were made to 
reach out to further agencies and, where 
possible, additional secondary data sources 
were employed in order to compare ENISA 
against. The main sources were the European 
Commission: Draft General Budget of the 
European Union for the financial year 2016 - 
Working Document Part III and Court of 
Auditors (2016): Summary of results from the 
Court’s annual audits of the European Agencies 
and other bodies for the financial year 2015; 
additionally annual reports of the relevant 
agencies were used. 
 
Despite these efforts, it was not possible to 
compare ENISA to the other agencies with 
regard to achieved outputs (such as 
publications, trainings, events).  
 
Moreover, while the scope of the evaluation is 
2013-2016, the data which was judged most 
complete and comparable was used for the 
analysis. Therefore, there are some variations 
in the years reported on. 
Positioning These organisations selected for the 
positioning exercise were contacted to 
provide information on their activities 
(through an interview and by completing 
a data sheet). The completeness of the 
responses received from these 
Data collected through the interviews and desk 
based research on the activities of the selected 
national and EU organisations was conducted 
to respond to the limited data received directly 
from the organisations covering the concrete 
points under the positioning exercise. 
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Challenge Solution / Mitigation strategy 
organisations varied and in a few cases 
no responses were received despite 
numerous follow ups per email and over 
the phone.  
Consequently, some of the assessments 
presented in the positioning exercise are based 
on desk research and the interviews but have 
not been triangulated with input from the 
organisations themselves in the form of the 
foreseen data sheet. The concerned 
organisations were not directly asked about 
their positioning at the detailed level of the 
data sheet. Therefore they may have a 
different understanding of their overlaps and 
complementarities with ENISA.  
Assessing 
outputs and 
results 
For the response to several evaluation 
questions, the use of the Agency’s key 
performance indicators (KPIs) and was 
foreseen (for example for evaluation 
question 31 (EQ31)). ENISA has not 
been able to provide the requested data 
to implement the foreseen assessments.  
 
The key impact indicators (KIIs) of the 
Agency set in the annual work 
programmes and reported upon in the 
annual activity reports change from one 
year to the next. This limited the 
possibility to implement a comparison of 
the Agency’s outputs and results over 
the entire period of 2013-2016.  
Without the quantitative data on outputs and 
results the evaluation relied on the qualitative 
feedback collected through interviews, surveys 
and the open public consultation. 
Where available data from the evaluations of 
ENISA’s activities in 2014 and 2015 has been 
introduced to the study.  
Vested 
interests of 
stakeholders 
As outlined in this section of 
methodology, the study relied to a large 
extent on stakeholder contributions. 
These stakeholders (in particular 
ENISA’s staff and management and the 
direct stakeholders) may have vested 
interests in the future of the Agency. 
Therefore, a critical assessment of 
contributions needs to be made.   
The analysis included triangulation of the data 
across different stakeholder groups and across 
the data collection tools. For example, the 
surveys and the interviews which primarily 
covered views from ENISA’s staff, 
management and direct stakeholders were 
considered against the open public 
consultation results and the workshop where a 
broader scope of stakeholders have been 
reached.  
Assessment of 
the costs 
related to the 
options 
The assessment of the cost of the 
options identified needed to be based on 
a number of assumptions. 
In order to establish as realistic assumptions 
as possible, the options were operationalised 
and a variety of stakeholders were consulted 
(i.e. Commission, ENISA, industry, Member 
State representatives) and external sources 
employed where relevant. 
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3. FINDINGS  
This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation study. It presents responses to the evaluation 
questions listed in Appendix 1. The findings are based on the different data collection tools 
employed, as described in chapter 2.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows:  
 The first section presents an overview of the key findings of the study 
 The second section presents the detailed findings and conclusions of the study, including the 
results of the three of the analytical tasks, namely the assessment of ENISA’s performance; 
the assessment of ENISA’s governance and organisational structure, and the assessment of 
ENISA’s positioning.  
 Finally, the third section presents the results of the SWOT analysis.  
 
These three sections are structured according to the evaluation questions. In order to assist the 
(busier) reader, a concluding sentence has been highlighted at the top of each paragraph and the 
findings that support it are presented below it. Moreover, to allow readers to get a quick 
understanding of the main conclusions, a box summarising the main conclusions for each question 
can be found at the end of each subsection. Section 3.2 is structured according to the evaluation 
criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value. Here conclusions can 
be found for each of the evaluation criteria, as well as for the evaluation questions at a more 
detailed level.  
 
The conclusions on each of the evaluation criteria include a short comparison of the assessment 
made for the 2013-2016 with that of ENISA in 2009 and 2010 based on an evaluation of all EU 
agencies including ENISA in 200912 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 
201013).  
 
As important stakeholders of ENISA’s work and in the decision making on the future of the Agency, 
Member States’ opinions have been highlighted throughout the report. It should be noted that, 
based on the different data collection tools, different types of Member State representatives have 
been consulted (see also section 2.2.2). In the context of the interviews, “Member States” include 
the members of ENISA’s Executive and Management Board (8 members were interviewed), as well 
as one consulted national cybersecurity agency. “Member States” in the survey are 19 members of 
ENISA’s Management and Executive Boards. In the context of the open public consultation, 
reference is made to “national authorities” which include members of ENISA’s Management and 
Executive Boards (10 members), as well as representatives of national cybersecurity authorities 
(8).  
 
Please note that ENISA’s “direct stakeholders” include ENISA’s Management and Executive Board 
representatives, members of the PSG and NLOs. The European Parliament, CERTs/CSIRTs, the 
Commission, other agencies and industry representatives are referred to as “(potential) users and 
advisors” throughout the report.  
 
The findings of previous evaluations of ENISA’s activities have shown that there is a division 
between the needs of Member States based on their capacity and resources invested in 
cybersecurity. Throughout the report, a reference is made to Member States with more experience 
and resources which mainly include France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK but also cover 
                                               
12 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
13 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
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Spain, Italy and the Nordic countries to some extent. Member States with fewer resources include 
the Easter and Southern European Member States. 
 
3.1 Key findings 
 
A number of key issues emerge from the detailed findings presented below, including: 
Table 10: Key findings 
 
 ENISA’s objectives are of high relevance in the current context  
 ENISA’s governance and organisational structure are generally 
conducive to an effective and efficient Agency. 
 ENISA has contributed to enhanced cooperation between Member 
States and NIS stakeholders, community building across Member 
States, cooperation between CERTs/CSIRTs, and capacity in Member 
States (notably for Member States with fewer resources for 
cybersecurity). It has done so through a series of activities, most 
noteworthy of which are the Cyber Europe Exercises. 
 ENISA works efficiently, implements a high number of activities and 
develops a large amount of publications with the resources available. 
 ENISA’s activities are largely coherent with work at national level, 
notably that of Member States with fewer capacities and resources in 
cybersecurity, and complementary to the work of CERTs/CSIRTs. 
 
 ENISA lacks visibility and has not managed to become recognised as a 
centre of expertise or a reference point for stakeholders. 
 Limited resources hamper ENISA’s ability to (1) respond to a wide 
variety of needs, (2) be effective in all areas covered by its broad 
mandate as it is forced to prioritise, and (3) to recruit and retain staff. 
 ENISA’s split location in Athens and Heraklion affects its efficiency 
through additional travel and coordination costs. 
 ENISA’s work programme is dominated by the interests of Member 
States, meaning that it does not sufficiently address the needs of other 
stakeholder types. Moreover, the differing needs of Member States and 
lack of a common line lead to work priorities representing the lowest 
common denominator. 
 ENISA lacks technical expertise, according to stakeholders, with a high 
reliance on external expertise over in-house expertise 
 ENISA had weak human resource procedures leading to difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining staff. 
 The approach to cybersecurity in the EU is not sufficiently coordinated, 
with few formal coordination procedures in place to ensure synergies 
between ENISA’s activities with the policies and activities of its 
stakeholders; insufficiently exploited cooperation between the 
Commission and ENISA; and risks of overlap between ENISA and 
CERT-EU and between ENISA and Member States with strong 
cybersecurity expertise in particular.  
 
   
 
 
 
23 
 
3.2 Assessment of ENISA’s performance, governance organisational structure and 
positioning  
 
This section assesses the impact, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added 
value of the work undertaken by ENISA from 2013 to 2016 and of ENISA’s governance and 
organisational structure. The purpose is to evaluate the implementation of the work programmes 
and to assess how the whole set of activities run by ENISA (including opinions, guidelines, 
trainings, recommendations or reports) has contributed to fulfilling its role, as described in Article 
1 of the ENISA Regulation. The section presents the extent to which ENISA has become "an EU-
wide centre of expertise and a reference point for EU institutions, Members States and the wider 
stakeholders' community, in providing guidance, advice and assistance on issues related to 
network and information security". Moreover, the section assesses how effectively the current 
governance, internal organisational structure of ENISA (Management Board, Executive Board, 
Executive Director and staff and PSG) and human resources policies and practices contribute to 
efficiencies and effectiveness in the work of the Agency. The purpose is to provide an assessment 
of the internal organisational structure including an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the current arrangements related to the location of ENISA's offices. This part of the evaluation 
also includes an assessment of how effectively the Agency sets its work priorities, as well as the 
degree of flexibility it has at its disposal to tackle any upcoming issues. Finally, ENISA’s working 
relationship with the Commission, other EU institutions and bodies and stakeholders are also 
analysed, including the extent to which stakeholders are aware of and involved in ENISA's work. 
 
This section relates primarily to the first dimension of this evaluation, namely the retrospective 
aspects. It responds to the evaluation questions, structured according to the evaluation criteria of 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value.  
 
Please note that for each of the evaluation criteria an “overarching” question has been identified 
and has been responded to in the concluding section for each criterion.  
 
3.2.1 Relevance 
 
The evaluation criterion of relevance looks at the relationship between the needs and problems in 
society and the objectives of a given intervention, in this case the existence of a European agency 
of network and internet security.14 The first sub-section below responds to this question by 
assessing the relevance of ENISA’s objectives. As the evaluation questions presented in the 
Evaluation Roadmap focus on the relevance of ENISA’s tasks, the subsequent sub-sections 
consider the relevance of the activities implemented by ENISA rather than its objectives.  
 
The following evaluation questions are covered in this section: 
Table 11: Evaluation questions covered under the relevance criterion 
Main evaluation question Other evaluation questions 
EQ33: Are the objectives set 
out in the mandate of ENISA 
still appropriate given the 
current cybersecurity and 
digital privacy needs, 
regulatory and policy 
framework needs? 15 
Retrospective 
 
EQ29: How far are the Agency's tasks and resources aligned with key EU political 
priorities? 
 
EQ4: How appropriate is the balance of activities in relation to different 
cybersecurity and digital privacy topics considering the evolving needs of the main 
stakeholders? 
EQ30: Which Agency tasks are absolutely essential to deliver on these priorities? 
 
EQ31: Which Agency tasks are necessary to continue implementing existing and 
                                               
14 Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 110 final 
15 For the response to this evaluation question, the use of the Agency’s KPIs related to stakeholder engagement was foreseen. In the 
end, the data foreseen was not available  (This concerns KPIs related to the uptake of the Agencies’ expertise in policy documents or by 
industry and KPIs related to the Agencies’ contribution to policy development through events). 
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evolving obligations under the Treaties and EU legislative framework? 
 
EQ32: Are there some Agency tasks that have become redundant / negative 
priorities? If so, which are they?  
 
EQ34: Have some of the initially non-core activities of the Agency become part of 
its core-business? What was the rationale in such cases? 
 
3.2.1.1 Relevance of the objectives set in ENISA’s mandate 
 
EQ 33: Are the objectives set out in the mandate of ENISA still appropriate given the 
current cybersecurity and digital privacy needs, regulatory and policy framework needs? 
The five objectives listed in ENISA’s mandate were over the period 2013-2016 and are still today 
of continued relevance considering the needs of ENISA’s stakeholders (Member States, including 
CERTs/CSIRTs, the Commission and other EU institutions and the private sector) and the 
regulatory and policy context. The development of the cyber threat landscape over the past years 
shows a continued need for a response at EU level. The objective of ENISA to provide expertise is 
relevant as it sets the foundation for ENISA to pursue any of the other objectives. Assistance to 
the development of policies responds to the Commission’s needs to receive sector-specific 
knowledge, and the assistance to the implementation of policy and legislation responds to the 
Commission and Member States’ needs in the context of the Directive concerning measures for a 
high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (hereafter NIS 
Directive)16. Strengthening Member States’ capabilities and preparedness and stimulating 
cooperation between Member States and with private stakeholders are objectives of high 
relevance considering the need for combined efforts to address cyber threats across the EU.  
 
An additional objective that ENISA’s mandate could have covered is the operational support to 
Member States through more detailed analysis of threats and incidents to provide enhanced advice 
to these stakeholders.   
 
ENISA’s mandate defines five objectives for the work of the Agency17: 
 The Agency shall develop and maintain a high level of expertise. 
 The Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in developing 
policies in network and information security. 
 The Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the Member 
States in implementing the policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory requirements of 
network and information security under existing and future legal acts of the Union, thus 
contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
 The Agency shall assist the Union and the Member States in enhancing and strengthening their 
capability and preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to network and information 
security problems and incidents. 
 The Agency shall use its expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between actors from the 
public and private sectors. 
 
A perceived increase in the number and variety of cyber threats over the past years, 
underlines the continued relevance of all of ENISA’s objectives. ENISA’s direct stakeholders 
and the other groups of stakeholders interviewed agree that with the fast pace of technological 
development and the increase in devices connected to the internet, the variety of cyber threats 
has been growing in the past years. New technologies enter the market within a few months, 
leading to new NIS risks. Consequently, all groups of consulted stakeholders see a continued 
relevance for cybersecurity efforts at EU and Member State level. The evaluations of ENISA’s 2014 
and 2015 core operational activities also found a clear need to address cybersecurity challenges in 
                                               
16 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level 
of security of network and information systems across the Union. 
17 Regulation (EU) No 526/2013, Article 2 
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the EU and the Member States. Although differences in the needs of ENISA’s stakeholders were 
identified, the objectives of ENISA’s work during 2014 and 2015 were found to be relevant to 
respond to the needs of Member States and stakeholders across the EU.  
 
The objectives listed in ENISA’s mandate are broadly defined. To some extent this has allowed the 
Agency in the past to encompass a variety of activities. Changes in the activities of ENISA based 
on the annual work programmes show that the way the objectives have been defined allows for 
flexibility to focus on different needs from one year to another. At the same time, this leads to a 
discontinuation of activities and limited possibilities to create strong expertise in more specific 
areas. ENISA’s resources do not allow the Agency to fully meet its objectives (as discussed in 
section 3.2.3.3).  
 
Most interviewees in the present study (including the Member States) considered ENISA’s 
objectives to be of continued relevance. While there are differences in the objectives which are 
considered to be most relevant, all of them were mentioned to be very important by at least one 
of the stakeholder groups. 
  
Developing and maintaining a high level of expertise is a relevant objective that lays the 
foundation for achieving ENISA’s other objectives. The objective was considered by a 
majority of interviewees (including some but not all interviewees from the Member States) as a 
relevant objective. It was seen as the foundation for achieving ENISA’s other objectives as 
expertise is required to understand cybersecurity threats, which is needed to prepare 
recommendations for the development and implementation of policies, as well as to foster 
cooperation between the Member States on relevant issues. Both the Member States and the 
Commission were described as relying on the expertise of ENISA.   
 
In contrast, a few interviewees (including an interviewee from the Member States) noted that 
ENISA’s objective to create and maintain a high level of expertise was not the most important one, 
as there is considerable expertise at Member State level. This suggests a difference between the 
needs of Member States depending on their capacity and the financial resources available to them 
in the area of cybersecurity, showing that those with less focus on this area are more dependent 
on ENISA’s input and therefore expect the Agency to increase its expertise.  
 
The objective to assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in developing 
policies in NIS continues to be relevant as ENISA can provide added value with technical 
input. The objective was found to be important by all types of interviewed stakeholders. They 
generally saw a need for ENISA to provide technical advice to the Commission to ensure that 
legislation matches technical needs, for example regarding norms and standards for cybersecurity. 
This included interviewed Commission staff who considered the expertise that can be provided by 
an EU cybersecurity agency to be of high relevance to their activities. Under this objective, 
stakeholders expected ENISA to systematically be involved and assist the Commission when 
drafting legislation or policies.  
 
The objective to provide assistance to the Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies and the Member States in implementing policies and legislation is of particular 
relevance considering ENISA’s role under the NIS Directive. Under the recent changes to 
the legislative framework, most importantly the NIS Directive, ENISA is foreseen to fulfil the 
function of supporting the implementation of legislation. The objective was mentioned comparably 
less often by interviewed stakeholders as one of their needs. Still, several interviewees (mainly 
ENISA staff and management but also representatives from other groups including the Member 
States) considered this objective to be relevant. ENISA’s role in the context of the NIS Directive, 
namely to ensure its implementation, was considered very relevant by these interviewees. 
Industry representatives and representatives from EU institutions and bodies stated that there is a 
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need in the Member States for a body that ensures harmonisation and alignment of practices 
between the countries, as the Commission was not considered to be able to fully ensure this.  
 
With its objective to assist the Union and the Member States in enhancing and 
strengthening their capability and preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to NIS 
problems and incidents, ENISA responds to a clear need in the Member States. The 
objective was considered to be of continued relevance by interviewed Member State and 
Commission representatives. Several Member States saw the enhancing of capabilities as a core 
objective, noting that there is a need for an agency to help small Member States who do not have 
the same capacities as larger ones. In the context of increased cyber threats, it was considered 
very important that the network of CERTs/CSIRTs is able to share relevant information and to 
consider a coordinated approach. Interviewees underlined that, to achieve this, all members of the 
network would need to have a certain capacity level. This underlines the relevance of ENISA’s 
objective to enhance and strengthen capabilities and preparedness across Member States and 
stakeholders. 
 
The fifth objective of ENISA, to use its expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between 
actors from the public and private sectors, is of continued relevance as trust needs to be 
built between stakeholders to ensure their cooperation on threats that often concern 
more than one of them at a time. The objective was considered relevant by interviewees from 
the Member States and the Commission. Also ENISA staff and management considered the need 
for enhanced cooperation to be significant. Member State respondents specifically underlined their 
need for cooperation between the countries to build a community with sufficient trust to ensure 
that exchanges of information are taking place. Members of ENISA’s staff noted that the need had 
further developed over the past years. While initially ENISA had to convince stakeholders, in 
particular the Member States, that there was a need for more advanced cooperation, the Agency’s 
objective is now to actually implement such cooperation. The need to build trust was also 
mentioned by respondents from the Commission who considered cooperation between the public 
and the private sector to be relevant to respond to current cybersecurity threats.  
 
In summary, all present objectives were found to be of continued relevance but some 
stakeholders saw a need for additional objectives. Most mentioned that there was a need for 
operational support from ENISA. Some of the Member States saw a need to change the Agency’s 
mandate to give it a role as an analytical centre analysing threats and incidents in detail to provide 
better advice to stakeholders. A few respondents (ENISA staff and Member States) also suggested 
that there is a need for enhanced cooperation in the field of law enforcement. The Agency could 
have a role in ensuring that criminal investigations on cybersecurity are more concerted and 
resources are pooled across the countries. As this is a role already covered by Europol, it can be 
assessed that changes to ENISA’s mandate should be limited to suggesting further cooperation 
between the two agencies. Another example of an unmet need is support to private stakeholders, 
including small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). A few interviewees from the private sector 
suggested that they could benefit from ENISA’s risk assessments capacities and training on how to 
respond to incidents.  
 
With regard to digital privacy issues, several interviewees noted that ENISA’s objectives should 
remain in the area of cybersecurity as this is where the needs of the Agency’s stakeholders are. 
During the interviews, only two respondents (European Parliament and private sector) suggested 
that they saw a need for ENISA to cover privacy concerns.  
 
 
3.2.1.2 Alignment of ENISA’s tasks and resources with key EU political priorities 
 
EQ 29: How far are the Agency's tasks [and resources] aligned with key EU political 
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priorities? 
ENISA’s mandate and tasks are strongly aligned with key EU political priorities, most importantly 
the NIS Directive and the new tasks it foresees for the Agency. In general, cybersecurity is 
considered to be a topic of high importance and a majority of stakeholders across all spectrums 
considers ENISA’s tasks to be well aligned with political priorities and stakeholder needs. However, 
Member States’ needs differ and the Agency is not able to respond to all needs to the same 
extent.  
The adequacy of ENISA’s human and financial resources is assessed under EQ16 in section 
3.2.3.3.   
 
As presented in section 1.2.1 above and in line with the Agency’s objectives, ENISA’s tasks can be 
summarised as covering the following four activities: 
 Expertise provision 
 Supporting the Commission in policy development  
 Supporting Member States in the implementation of legislation 
 Community building 
 Capacity building. 
 
ENISA’s tasks are aligned with EU priorities in the area of network and information 
security as presented in relevant EU initiatives. NIS has been on the agenda for EU policy 
makers since the 2001 Communication of the European Commission on NIS18. The following year – 
the ePrivacy Directive19 was adopted, binding providers of electronic communications services to 
ensure the security of their services and maintain the confidentiality of client information. Back in 
2010, when the Europe 2020 strategy was adopted, a Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) became 
one of the seven strategic goals for the EU future20. The DAE's main objective was to develop a 
digital single market in order to generate smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in Europe. The 
third pillar of the DAE is specifically addressing Trust & Security issues21 and serves as an umbrella 
for all EU conducted and coordinated activities in the field of NIS. The 2016 Communication on 
Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative 
Cybersecurity Industry22 sets out a strategy for the future of cybersecurity in Europe. Most 
recently, the NIS Directive was adopted by the European Parliament on 6 July 2016. The Directive 
entered into force in August 2016, giving ENISA new tasks that were not foreseen as part of its 
mandate, including assisting the Cooperation Group in the execution of its tasks and taking on the 
role of the CSIRT Network Secretariat. ENISA’s tasks to foster cooperation, develop and maintain 
expertise in the EU, increase capacities and support the development and implementation of 
policy, are generally aligned with the EU priorities set out in the initiatives listed above. Moreover, 
the way in which ENISA’s tasks are described is sufficiently broad in scope to allow for the 
changing EU political context to be taken into account. In particular, the new tasks foreseen for 
the Agency as part of the NIS Directive fall well within ENISA’s current mandate – its role relative 
to the Cooperation Group involves assisting the Union institutions in the implementation of the 
policy, while its role as the Secretariat for the CSIRT Network will involve further fostering 
cooperation among CERTs/CSIRTs. 
 
NIS continues to be a key political priority of the EU to which ENISA is expected to 
respond. In its communication of 5 July 201623, the European Commission encourages Member 
States to make the most of NIS coordination mechanisms. According to the NIS Directive, ENISA 
                                               
18 COM(2001)298, Network and Information Security : proposal for a European Policy approach 
19 Directive 2009/136/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 25 November 2009 
20 COM (2010) 2020 final, Communication From The Commission Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; 
Brussels, 3.3.2010 
21
Digital Agenda for Europe, Pillar III: Trust &Security <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security> 
22 COM (2016)410, Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry 
23 European Commission , Commission signs agreement with industry on cybersecurity and steps up efforts to tackle cyber-threats, 
Press release, Brussels, 5 July 2016 
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will have a stronger role to support this coordination. Stakeholders across all interviewed groups 
agreed that NIS was one of the key EU political priorities, mainly considering the increasing 
frequency, variety and intensity of cyber threats and suggested that ENISA should be part of the 
response to these.  
 
Overall, ENISA’s tasks are considered to be well aligned with the priorities of its 
stakeholders. This was noted by a majority of interview respondents, in particular ENISA’s direct 
stakeholders. They highlighted ENISA’s work on ensuring interaction and exchange between the 
Member States, increasing capacity in the Member States and raising awareness of cybersecurity 
issues. With regard to specific tasks, ENISA’s expected work under the NIS Directive was 
highlighted as an example of where ENISA’s tasks are particularly well aligned with the political 
priorities. Exercises and the Threat Landscape reports24 are examples of where ENISA is meeting 
the needs of its stakeholders.  
 
Satisfaction with ENISA’s activities can also be seen in the responses to the survey of CERTs and 
CSIRTs as presented in Figure 6 below. Survey respondents were in most part satisfied with the 
extent to which ENISA covered the needs of CERTs/CSIRTs over the 2013-2016 period. A large 
majority of respondents (28 out of 34) thought ENISA covered the needs of CERTs/CSIRTs to a 
high or to some extent during that period, while six out of 34 thought it did so to a limited extent.  
Figure 6: To what extent did ENISA cover CERTs/CSIRTs’ needs over the 2013-2016 period? 
 
Source: CERTs/CSIRTs survey 
 
Stakeholders suggest that ENISA’s tasks respond to the key policy priorities due to the 
strong influence of the Member States on the mandate. The 201425 and 201526 annual 
evaluations of ENISA showed that ENISA’s activities during these years were clearly linked to the 
Agency’s legal mandate. There were no cases falling outside the scope of the mandate. 
Interviewees in the present study (Member States, ENISA staff and EU institutions and bodies) 
mentioned the delivery of tasks according to its mandate as one of the reasons why ENISA’s work 
is well aligned with political priorities. As the work programme itself is set by the Commission and 
the Member States, it is aligned to their intentions and needs. ENISA staff and management 
suggested that they were well prepared to respond to changing priorities and the needs of the 
Agency’s constituency.  
 
There are differences with regard to stakeholders’ needs in the context of the key EU 
political priorities. Between the Member States there is disagreement on the extent to which 
ENISA should cover specific topics, such as certification27 or whether ENISA should develop 
operational capacities which could include responsibilities in the area of detection and response to 
cybersecurity threats. While some Member States would welcome ENISA’s support in this area, 
others have developed their own capacities. In general, Member States with less capacity and 
fewer resources in the cybersecurity area (e.g. Eastern and Southern European countries) tend to 
be in favour of further support by ENISA while Member States with more resources and experience 
                                               
24 ENISA publishes every year a report summarising the most prevalent cyber-threats, entitled Threat Landscape 
25 Ramboll Management Consulting (2015) External Evaluation Of ENISA, focussing on ENISA’s 2014 activities. 
26 Ramboll Management Consulting (2016) External Evaluation Of ENISA, focussing on ENISA’s 2015 activities. Ramboll Management 
Consulting (2015) External Evaluation of ENISA, focussing on ENISA’s 2014 activities. 
27 “Certification” means the implementation of common security certification frameworks for Information and Communication 
Technologies against harmonized principles a/o standards. Many stakeholders see a role for ENISA in the development of these 
standards and the application of a certification scheme for the public and/or private sector.  
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(e.g. Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden) do not see the necessity for ENISA to cover 
these issues.   
 
3.2.1.3 Balance between cybersecurity and digital privacy topics 
 
EQ4: How appropriate is the balance of activities in relation to different cybersecurity 
and digital privacy topics considering the evolving needs of the main stakeholders? 
When only considering the identified needs of ENISA’s main stakeholders, the Agency should focus 
on the cybersecurity area and disregard digital privacy topics. However, the evaluation identified 
some potential benefits of giving responsibilities to ENISA to ensure greater coordination between 
the cybersecurity and digital privacy areas. 
 
In the preamble to the Regulation, the objectives linked to cybersecurity and digital privacy topics 
are presented on an equal footing (“The Agency should contribute to a high level of network and 
information security, to better protection of privacy and personal data…”). However, protection of 
privacy and personal data are not listed among the objectives listed in the Regulation itself. This 
leaves room for some discussion on the extent to which ENISA should respond to privacy issues 
and how these activities should be balanced with the cybersecurity tasks it performs. This fact is 
also reflected in stakeholders’ feedback on this issue.  
 
The main needs of ENISA’s stakeholders lie in the area of cybersecurity; digital privacy 
topics are not considered to be a priority. A number of interviewees (mainly from EU 
institutions and bodies) noted that they were not aware of any activities of ENISA in the area of 
privacy protection but also did not consider this to be a relevant issue in its work. Furthermore, 
most of ENISA’s direct stakeholders explicitly stated that ENISA should not be covering digital 
privacy topics, arguing that the Agency should focus its limited resources on cybersecurity topics 
and that there were other bodies which were better equipped to cover the privacy area such as the 
European Parliament, DG JRC or the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).  
 
Stakeholders saw potential benefits for ENISA, its stakeholders and society at large if 
the Agency were to act as a broker, supporting cooperation across the digital privacy 
and cybersecurity issues. Several interviewees from the group of users and advisors pointed to 
intersections between cybersecurity (e.g. the security of electronic communication) and digital 
privacy. In these areas ENISA could provide its expertise and share solutions that relate to 
security and privacy at the same time. One of the interviewees suggested that in the Member 
States there was a gap between cybersecurity and data protection, suggesting that national 
representatives working in these two areas would not necessarily be cooperating in all Member 
States and that ENISA could be the one to start such cooperation.  
 
3.2.1.4 Essential tasks to deliver on key EU political priorities 
 
EQ30: Which Agency tasks are absolutely essential to deliver on these priorities? 
Among the four tasks of ENISA (capacity building, expertise, community building and policy 
implementation and development), community building stands out as being absolutely essential. 
ENISA’s stakeholders considered the Agency to be best placed to foster cooperation across the 
Member States and with other stakeholders. 
 
Different groups of stakeholders see different priorities for ENISA which makes it 
difficult to rank ENISA’s tasks according to their relevance. In particular ENISA’s direct 
stakeholders and the representatives of national CERTs/CSIRTs consider capacity building to be 
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essential. They underlined the need to ensure that Member States grow their expertise based on 
ENISA’s support. Specifically the cyber exercises28 were mentioned as a highly relevant activity.  
 
Among EU-level institutions and other stakeholders, such as industry, community building and the 
provision of expertise were considered to be essential. With tasks covering expertise, ENISA is 
expected to anticipate and support the EU as a whole in facing emerging NIS challenges by making 
information on cybersecurity available and accessible to the EU. Stock taking of practices and 
experiences across the EU and best practices disseminated to Member States and the industry 
were considered to be of high relevance. Several Commission DGs highlighted the capability of 
ENISA to provide thematic expertise in their relevant sectors.  
 
ENISA’s work to establish and facilitate dialogue between the Member States’ authorities and with 
industry stakeholders and academics is considered essential. This work of community building is 
expected to foster collaboration allowing Member States to better respond to cyber threats.   
 
Finally, across the different stakeholder groups, some interviewees suggested that ENISA’s policy 
work was essential. These stakeholders suggested that ENISA had a key role in supporting policy 
implementation. Some also mentioned that they expected ENISA to provide input to policy 
development based on their expertise, but saw a need for the Agency to improve the 
dissemination of their knowledge and their visibility to take on this role.  
 
The key current demands or needs according to the different types of stakeholders are 
summarised in Table 12 below.  
Table 12: Key current demands or needs according to the different types of stakeholders 
Stakeholder type Key demands for ENISA 
European Commission Community building 
Expertise provision 
Supporting policy development / implementation 
Member States with strong 
capacities and more resources 
Community building 
Supporting policy development at EU level 
Member States with fewer 
resources and capacities 
Capacity building 
Supporting policy development at EU level 
Supporting policy implementation at national level 
Community building 
Expertise provision 
CERTs/CSIRTs Capacity building 
Industry Community building 
Expertise provision 
Supporting policy development / implementation 
 
Among the four tasks, the one that stands out as most essential is that concerning 
community building. When interviewees were asked what the consequences of a discontinuation 
of ENISA would be (see section 3.2.5.3), respondents across all stakeholder groups saw a huge 
need for continuation of cooperation across the Member States (in particular between the 
CERTs/CSIRTs) and also with other stakeholders and considered ENISA as best placed to ensure 
this.  
 
3.2.1.5 Necessary tasks to implement existing and evolving obligations 
 
EQ31: Which Agency tasks are necessary to continue implementing existing [and 
evolving] obligations under the Treaties and EU legislative framework?  
The evaluation findings show that different specific activities within ENISA’s four tasks (capacity, 
expertise, community and policy) are considered necessary to continue responding to the Agency’s 
                                               
28 ENISA leads a wide range of activities in the field of cyber exercises. They are related with to activities on increasing capacities in 
cyber crisis management. Most mentioned were the Cyber Europe Exercises.  
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existing and evolving obligations. ENISA’s obligations under the EU legislative framework can 
cover a wide array of tasks which respond to stakeholders’ current needs. Some suggestions of 
services that could have been provided by ENISA were made (including the provision of real-time 
cybersecurity information and further guidelines and benchmarks for the public and the private 
sector), but stakeholders would not be willing to pay for additional products or services.  
 
Evolving obligations under the Treaties and the EU legislative framework are discussed in sections 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  
 
ENISA’s obligations under the Treaties and the EU legislative framework cover a broad 
area and primarily depend on what the Member States are expecting from ENISA and 
what is included in the Agency’s annual work programmes. ENISA’s direct stakeholders 
describe the Agency’s existing obligations as stemming from its unique position as a neutral player 
in the field of cybersecurity, serving Member States and the EU institutions. According to these 
stakeholders, ENISA’s obligations include an objective to ensure harmonisation across the Member 
States to align their cybersecurity capabilities and capacities. Furthermore, they mention specific 
legislation requiring ENISA’s attention, such as the NIS Directive and the General Data Protection 
Regulation29. ENISA’s obligations based on Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 are perceived as being 
broad and rather flexible, requiring the Member States to define what they are expecting from the 
Agency.  
 
Across the four main tasks of the Agency, there are a number of specific activities that 
are considered to be relevant by stakeholders. Among the respondents to the open public 
consultation, the products and services most frequently listed as being “relevant” or “very 
relevant” to respondents’ work or activities were reports and research publications (82% or 51 out 
of 62 respondents), guidelines and recommendations, including publications on standards (81% or 
50 respondents) and events (65% or 40 respondents). In contrast, 48% of respondents (30) 
indicated that Article 14 requests were not at all relevant to their work or activities. These requests 
can however only be used by Member States and the Commission. Respondents from national 
authorities considered most often selected guidelines and recommendations (9 out of 15), reports 
and research publications (6 out of 15), and the Cyber Europe Exercise (8 out of 15) as “very 
relevant”. Article 14 requests were considered to be “not relevant” by five national authority 
respondents. 
                                               
29 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation) 
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Figure 7:  Relevance of products/services to respondents’ work/activities (n=62) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
In the context of the open public consultation, respondents were asked if there were any other 
products or services they would have liked ENISA to provide the cybersecurity community with 
over 2013-2016. Out of 62 respondents, 65% (40) answered “no”, while 35% of respondents (22) 
answered “yes” which were primarily constituted of private enterprise or business association 
respondents. Only two respondents from national authorities responded “yes” to the question. 
These respondents were asked to further specify what kind of services they would have liked 
ENISA to provide. Their responses can be categorised into three broad topic areas, namely: 
operational capacities, cross-country cooperation (across Member States and with non-EU 
countries) and the provision of policy advice and guidelines. With regard to products and/or 
services related to ENISA’s operational capacities, respondents would have liked ENISA to provide 
near real-time cybersecurity warnings and consider developing a panel of security operation 
services to address cross-country cyber incidents. With regard to products and/ or services related 
to cooperation across Member States, respondents would have liked ENISA to encourage 
information sharing to support the adoption of new regulations and incident handling procedures 
as well as supporting cybersecurity capacity building. Respondents would have also liked ENISA to 
make visible the kind of expertise and knowledge available in Member States. With regard to 
products and/or services related to cooperation with stakeholders outside the EU, respondents 
would have liked ENISA to work together with the public and private sector to act as a contact 
point for cybersecurity organisations from outside the EU allowing it to also promote European 
security technology in foreign markets and provide cybersecurity capacity building in third 
countries. Finally, with regard to products and/or services related to policy and guidelines, 
respondents would have liked ENISA to provide benchmarks and best practices to help establish 
the framework for an EU cybersecurity strategy. These could cover for example, cybersecurity 
priorities for research and development and securing critical infrastructure. It was also suggested 
that ENISA could contribute by creating horizontal policy documents and guidelines across for 
exchange across EU bodies. 
 
Open public consultation respondents were further asked whether they would be willing to pay for 
additional services if they were provided by ENISA. Only 14% of respondents (3) who would have 
liked ENISA to provide further services over the 2013-2016 period indicated they would be willing 
to pay a fee in the future for the additional products or services they would have liked ENISA to 
offer during 2013-2016.  
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Figure 8: Respondents willing to pay a fee to obtain additional products/services from ENISA over 2013-
2016? (n=22) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
3.2.1.6 Tasks that potentially have become redundant 
 
EQ32: Are there some Agency tasks that have become redundant / negative priorities? 
If so, which are they?  
The evaluation has not identified any redundant tasks implemented by ENISA. The assessment of 
the relevance of ENISA’s tasks strongly depends on stakeholders’ differing needs. The 
Management Board seems to set the right priorities, though some stakeholders would like ENISA 
to be able to act more on their own initiative.   
 
Based on the stakeholder consultation, no tasks of ENISA have been identified as being 
redundant or a negative priority. Interviewees across all groups stated that there was no 
redundant work done by ENISA. In particular in the context of a very restricted budget, ENISA 
would ensure that only relevant tasks were being implemented. The Management Board was 
mentioned as an important mechanism to ensure the relevance of all of ENISA’s tasks. Similarly, 
from the open public consultation, no task or activity of ENISA emerged as being potentially 
redundant.   
 
The only activity that was mentioned by more than one interviewee as something ENISA should 
not focus on was the work in the area of privacy which two interviewed stakeholders considered to 
be outside the Agency’s key competences. Other responses to the question on redundant tasks, on 
the one hand, showed that needs differ between the Member States based on their national 
capacity and resources. Interviewees mainly referred to tasks that could be made more relevant 
by implementing some improvements rather than suggesting that these tasks be completely 
abandoned. Although no redundant tasks were identified, some interviewees suggested that ENISA 
should be able to act more on its own initiative and could intervene more strongly to set priorities 
when the members of the Management Board have opposing opinions or when suggested tasks 
only respond to Member States’ needs and leave out those of other stakeholders.  
 
3.2.1.7 Non-core activities becoming part of the core-business 
 
EQ34: Have some of the initially non-core activities of the Agency become part of its 
core-business? What was the rationale in such cases? 
There are activities which have moved from non-core to the core-business of the Agency, such as 
specific training activities or the topic of critical infrastructures. These changes can be assigned to 
technological developments and changes in the needs of the Member States based on legislation, 
their capacities and preferences. 
 
Over time, some of ENISA’s activities have moved from non-core to being part of the 
core-business, but the development can also be noted in the opposite direction. ENISA’s 
direct stakeholders and ENISA staff mentioned examples of changes in ENISA’s core activities, 
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such as in the area of capacity building and training. These were initially key tasks of the Agency 
which became less of a focus with growing levels of expertise in certain Member States, but more 
recently have become a priority once again with the implementation of the NIS Directive. Another 
example provided relates to critical infrastructures which Member States with strong cybersecurity 
expertise initially preferred covering themselves, but more recently they have welcomed ENISA’s 
support in this area. According to ENISA staff, awareness raising has been less prioritised over the 
years, mostly as Member States have taken on part of the activities themselves, for example in 
the planning and implementation of the Cybersecurity Month.  
 
The priorities set among the Agency’s tasks depend on the demand from the Member 
States and the technological evolution. With ENISA’s broad mandate it is possible to change 
priorities with regard to specific tasks from one year to another. The priorities set depend on the 
one hand on technical developments which require ENISA to set their focus on a specific area, 
such as with the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT). On the other hand, the Member States 
can, through their position in the Management Board, decide what ENISA should be focussing on 
(see section 3.2.2.5 for more information of ENISA’s effectiveness at setting its work priorities). 
Where ENISA helps them to put in place a specific initiative, the Member States might be able to 
implement the work themselves after some time. With changing legislation, the Member States 
might require support from ENISA in a new area.  
 
3.2.1.8 Conclusion on relevance 
 
Conclusion – Relevance 
The baseline situation (established based on an evaluation of all EU agencies including ENISA in 
200930 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 201031) shows an increasing 
dependence on NIS across ENISA’s stakeholders and increasing expectations on what the Agency 
should be delivering. The impact assessment of 2010 concluded that the tasks listed in the 
Regulation on ENISA were insufficient to provide the Agency with the necessary flexibility and 
adaptability to respond to the continuously evolving NIS environment.  
 
The assessment of ENISA’s relevance over the period 2013-2016 concludes on the continued 
relevance of NIS. It points to the fact that ENISA has a broad mandate which allows it to take on 
new topics as they emerge. However, at the same time, the Agency has difficulties meeting all of 
its objectives resulting from its broad mandate due to limited resources; it is often forced to 
prioritise (see section 3.2.2).  
 
In the context of technological developments and evolving threats, over the period 2013-2016 
there was a significant need for increased NIS in the EU. This continues to be the case today. The 
recent additions to the legislative framework, such as the NIS Directive and the Commission’s 
communication on Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive 
and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry32 underline this. Member States and EU bodies rely on 
expertise on the evolution of NIS, capacities need to be built in the Member States to understand 
and respond to threats, and stakeholders need to cooperate across thematic fields and across 
institutions. Based on its mandate, ENISA is intended to respond to these needs. 
 
Considering this context, the objectives set out in ENISA’s mandate continue to be of high 
                                               
30 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
31 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
32 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and 
Innovative Cybersecurity Industry COM(2016) 410 final 
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relevance today.  
These objectives also leave room for ENISA’s Management Board to set priorities based on latest 
developments in order to respond to changing needs and evolving threats.  
 
While ENISA’s mandate remains relevant, its activities do not fully meet the needs of all t 
stakeholders for two main reasons:  
 ENISA relies on its the Member States and the European Commission to provide clear guidance 
via the Management Board on where its contribution is most needed. Its work programme is 
dominated by the interests of Member States, and yet it is necessary to consider the longer-
term perspective and the activities of other stakeholders in the cybersecurity area (such as 
other EU agencies) to ensure continued relevance of the Agency.  
 ENISA’s stakeholders strongly differ in their needs, making it difficult to meet them all. Some 
Member States (such as Germany, France or Sweden) have significant capacity and resources 
in the area of cybersecurity and rely on ENISA only for specific services. Other Member States 
(from Eastern and Southern Europe) are less experienced and rely more strongly on the 
expertise and capacity of ENISA. The Commission has their own needs and expectations with 
regard to the services that ENISA can provide the different DGs with. Additionally, industry 
stakeholders, including a high number of SMEs are important actors in NIS and could also 
benefit from ENISA’s activities. 
 
ENISA could respond better to stakeholders’ needs by providing operational support to Member 
States through analysis of threats and incidents to provide enhanced advice to these stakeholders 
and support response cooperation.   
 
Among ENISA’s direct stakeholders, cybersecurity needs prevail over digital privacy needs.  
 
 
3.2.2 Effectiveness  
 
This section covers the evaluation criteria effectiveness. The effectiveness analysis considers how 
successful EU action, in this case the activities of ENISA, have been in achieving or progressing 
towards its objectives33. It also includes an assessment of the effectiveness of ENISA’s governance 
and internal organisational structure.  
 
The following evaluation questions are covered in this section: 
                                               
33 Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 110 final 
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Table 13: Evaluation questions covered under the effectiveness criterion 
Main evaluation question Other evaluation questions 
EQ1 To what extent has the 
Agency achieved its 
objectives and implemented 
the tasks set out in its 
mandate?  
Retrospective 
 
EQ2: What have been the benefits of acting at agency level both from the 
operational and strategic perspective? 
 
EQ3: To what extent has ENISA contributed to the overall EU goal of increasing 
network and information security in Europe? What more could be done? 
 
 
EQ5: To what extent has ENISA become an EU-wide centre of expertise and a 
reference point for stakeholders34 in providing guidance, advice and assistance on 
issues related to network and information security? 
 
EQ6: How effectively has the Agency managed to set its work priorities? 
 
EQ7: How effectively does the Agency tackle important upcoming, unplanned 
issues deriving by demands of its constituencies and/or EU policy priorities? 
 
EQ8: Does the Agency consistently perform the same tasks with the same quality 
level over time? 
 
EQ11: How do the current governance, the internal organisational structure and 
the human resources policies and practices of ENISA contribute to effectiveness in 
the work of the agency? 
 
EQ12: How effective has ENISA been in building a strong and trustful relationship 
with its stakeholders when executing its mandate? 
 
EQ13: What is the impact of the current arrangements related to the location of 
ENISA's offices on the overall capability of the Agency of meeting its objectives? 
 
EQ19: To what extent are the internal mechanisms for programming, monitoring, 
reporting and evaluating ENISA adequate for ensuring accountability and 
appropriate assessment of the overall performance of the Agency while minimising 
the administrative burden of the Agency and its stakeholders (established 
procedures, layers of hierarchy, division of work between teams or units, IT 
systems, etc.)? 
 
EQ20: To what extent has ENISA succeeded in building up the in-house capacities 
for handling various tasks entrusted to it? Are the "make or buy" choices made 
according to efficiency criteria? 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Implementation of tasks and achievement of objectives  
 
EQ1 To what extent has the Agency achieved its objectives and implemented the tasks 
set out in its mandate? 
ENISA successfully implements the tasks set by its annual work programmes and achieves 
targeted KIIs. However, ENISA has difficulties covering the entire spectrum of the broad mandate 
in each of the work programmes due to limited resources. Consequently, ENISA makes a more 
significant contribution to some of its objectives, in particular enhancing cooperation and ensuring 
capacity building in the Member States. The objectives to develop and maintain expertise and to 
support the development and implementation of policy are attained to a smaller extent. The 
activities of the Agency that benefit the private sector directly are limited. The Cyber Europe 
Exercises, support to CERTs/CSIRTs, its publications and the Cybersecurity month are some of 
ENISA’s main achievements.  
 
There is a generally positive, but not excellent, perception of ENISA’s work over the 
period 2013-2016. Respondents to the open public consultation were asked to give an overall 
assessment of ENISA for the period. Overall, 74% of respondents to the open public consultation 
(48 out of 65) had a positive (very good or good) view of ENISA. The overall assessment of ENISA 
                                               
34 The stakeholders include EU institutions, Members States and the wider stakeholders community 
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was more positive among national authorities, while respondents from the private sector were 
more likely to indicate their overall assessment as being “fair”.  
Figure 9: Overall assessment of ENISA for the period 2013-2016, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
ENISA attempts to implement all its tasks. For some of the activities, there is mixed 
feedback on their degree of quality. Based on its mandate and the annual work programmes, 
ENISA implements the tasks assigned to it. The main outputs of the Agency’s activities are 
publications as presented in Table 14 below. Reports are available for download on ENISA’s 
website and statistics of downloads show that downloads of publications have been consistently 
high over the four years under review.35  
Table 14: Achieved outputs36 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of publications  54 45 52 64 
Number of downloads 856,017 766,385 808,923 901,464 
Number of training sessions not available 11 10 11 
Number of participants per 
training  
not available 190 170 150 
Number of exercises 1 1 1 2 
Number of participants per 
exercise 
30-50 600-800 40-50 900-1100 
Source: information provided by ENISA 
 
ENISA’s training sessions are targeted at CERTs/CSIRTs. In 2015, CERTs/CSIRTs from seven 
Member States received training, involving various private and public organisations.37 
 
Feedback on the quality of the Agency’s outputs is varied. A number of interviewees from all 
stakeholder groups suggested that the degree of usefulness and quality of ENISA’s 
reports/publications was not always satisfactory. Feedback on trainings from CERTs/CSIRTs 
                                               
35 An assessment of further outputs has not been made as output indicators change from one year to the next and thus do not allow to 
make comparisons over the years.  
36 This data was provided by ENISA.  
37 ENISA (2016): Activity report 2015 
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received during interviews and the workshop was generally positive, while the views on the Cyber 
Europe exercises were more mixed. Some stakeholders considered their participation in the 
exercises to be beneficial, whereas others were concerned about the high number of participants 
making the exercises more complex and slower. The quality of ENISA’s outputs is further 
discussed in section 3.2.2.7.   
 
ENISA generally achieves short term KIIs but it is more difficult to establish its 
contribution to long term objectives. ENISA sets KIIs for the monitoring of the implementation 
of the work programmes. In general, these have been achieved according to the annual reports in 
2013, 2014 and 2015. Only for a few long term targets set for 2015 the annual report of that year 
noted that it was too early to judge the degree of achievement. The annual evaluation of 2015 
stated that there is a clear pattern in terms of progress, where targets under ENISA’s control (such 
a high quality, community building, good practice dissemination) are largely achieved. The 
progress towards more long term objectives looks more uncertain (preparedness to respond to 
crisis, increase in capacity etc.), as this is highly dependent on contextual factors as well as public 
and private stakeholders’ engagement and investment. Still, ENISA does achieve some of its 
targeted objectives and the large majority of stakeholders agree that ENISA makes a contribution 
to increased NIS across Europe.  
 
ENISA achieves its objectives but to varying degrees across the different activities. All 
respondents to the open public consultation indicated that ENISA had achieved at least some of its 
targeted objectives to some extent or to a great extent. Respondents were asked to evaluate the 
extent to which they felt ENISA had achieved the objectives set out in its mandate during the 
period of 2013-2016. The assessment made by 65 respondents is presented in Figure 10 below. 
The objective of “developing and maintaining a high level of expertise in cybersecurity” was 
selected as being achieved to a great extent or to some extent by the highest number of 
respondents (86% or 56 respondents), followed by “supporting cooperation in the cybersecurity 
community, e.g. through public-private cooperation, information sharing, enhancing community 
building, coordinating the Cyber Europe Exercise” (79% or 51 respondents). “Supporting the 
implementation of EU policy” was selected by all of the respondents from national authorities as 
being achieved either to some or to a high extent. National authorities generally indicated that 
ENISA had achieved all its objectives “to some” or “to a large extent” with few respondents 
selecting “to a limited extent” (3 out of 15 for “supporting the development of EU policy” and 4 out 
of 15 for “supporting Member states to strengthen their capacity and preparedness”).  
Figure 10: Extent to which ENISA has achieved its objectives over 2013-2016, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
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All respondents to the open public consultation were asked to list what they thought were the main 
achievements of ENISA over the 2013-2016 period. In total, 55 responses were received. The 
following points were mentioned by several respondents:  
 The coordination of the Cyber Europe Exercise  
 The provision of support to CERTs/CSIRTs through training and workshops fostering 
coordination and exchange. 
 ENISA’s publications (guidelines and recommendations, threat landscape reports, strategies for 
incident reporting and crisis management etc.) that were considered as useful to create and 
update national security frameworks, as well as for reference to policy makers and cyber 
practitioners.  
 Assisting with the promotion of the NIS Directive  
 Efforts to increase awareness on cybersecurity via the cybersecurity month. 
 
National authority respondents believed another main achievement was the support ENISA 
provided to Member States in particular fostering cooperation by sharing of expertise among 
Member States, information sharing on Art. 13, and support for the implementation of the 
Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal 
market (eIDAS Regulation)38. Private enterprises and business associations also commended 
ENISA’s work in fostering public-private cooperation and increasing better cross-sector 
engagement, providing a degree of “coordination and harmonisation that might have otherwise 
been missing”. They also felt that another main achievement was that ENISA had established itself 
as a “relevant, neutral reference point of cyber expertise in Europe with demonstrated EU added 
value”. As well as being a source of knowledge that is easily accessible and easy to use covering a 
wide range of cybersecurity topics.  
 
As concluded in the evaluations of the Agency’s activities, ENISA´s 2014 and 2015 activities have 
made important contributions to enhancing cooperation both between Member States of the EU 
and between related NIS stakeholders. The assessment was made based on survey findings which 
pointed to the fact that the support from ENISA has contributed to a great extent to enhancing 
community building in Europe and beyond, increased cooperation of operational communities and 
improved workflow and communication among stakeholders. Interview results supported these 
findings, with stakeholders stressing the positive role that ENISA has in bringing people together 
to discus and cooperation.39 In extension of this finding, it is assessed that ENISA has contributed 
to a great extent to enhancing community building in Europe and beyond.  
 
ENISA´s activities contributed to some extent to capacity building, and to varying degrees 
depending on the stakeholder type. In this regard, the evaluation of ENISA’s 2015 activities finds 
that ENISA's support has allowed for the development of sound and implementable strategies to 
ensure preparedness, response and recovery in the Member States and contributed to developing 
capacities in prevention, detection, analysis and response at national level. The findings further 
suggest that ENISA has assisted in enhancing the capacity of Member States (most notably 
Member States with fewer resources and capacities) in particular through: the pivotal role it plays 
in bringing different actors together and building networks; the dissemination of good practices; 
and the organisation of training sessions (e.g. for CERTs/CSIRTs) on a technical level. The 
evaluation concluded that the support provided by ENISA was perceived as complementary to that 
of other public interventions, clearly pointing to a role for ENISA in relation to capacity building.40 
The contribution to capacities of the private sector of ENISA’s activities is more uncertain 
according to the annual evaluations and the interviews conducted in the context of the present 
evaluation. The 2015 evaluation of ENISA’s activities concluded that there was still a long road 
                                               
38 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC 
39 Ramboll (2016): External evaluation of ENISA – 2015, Final report 
40 Ramboll (2016): External evaluation of ENISA – 2015, Final report 
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ahead before an EU-level crisis management process was put in place in the cybersecurity area 
mainly due to a lack of trust among stakeholders, weaknesses and differences in national 
capabilities and insufficient exchanges of information in “real life”. This conclusion was also 
reflected in the interviews for the present evaluation.  
 
ENISA’s contribution to the development and maintenance of a high level of expertise of EU actors 
is limited. On the one hand, evidence from the previous evaluations and the interviews confirm 
that ENISA´s activities do provide some stakeholders (e.g. critical information infrastructures 
(CIIs), CERTs/CSRITs) with advice and assistance. On the other hand, evidence suggests that 
these activities have not contributed as significantly as intended towards the adoption of methods 
towards new technologies and enabling the exploitation of the opportunities in emerging 
technologies.  
 
The contribution towards implementing and developing policies was considered to be the least 
achieved objective by the interviewed stakeholders. While efforts have been made to prepare for 
the implementation of the NIS Directive, the Agency is not consistently being involved in all NIS 
related activities of the Commission. Interviewees from the different Commission DGs indicated 
that ENISA could be more involved in their process of developing policies. In turn, ENISA’s staff 
and management noted that they were not always fully aware of all Commission activities related 
to cybersecurity, most notably considering initiatives of DGs other than DG CNECT.   
 
Obstacles to achieving the targeted objectives stem from a broad mandate. When 
assessing the achievements of the Agency, it becomes clear that a lot of efforts are being made 
but they are spread over a wide field of responsibility. The fact that cybersecurity is such a broad 
topic and that ENISA’s stakeholder community is so diverse compounds the issue.  
 
Within the NIS community there is a wide spectrum of expectations towards ENISA across the 
various stakeholders but with the limited resources at its disposal, ENISA has to set priorities. This 
means that the Agency is not able to implement all tasks set out in the mandate to the same 
extent. In the development of the annual work programmes some tasks are prioritised over 
others. Generally, ENISA implements all the tasks set out in the annual work programmes. 
 
3.2.2.2 Benefits of acting at agency level 
 
EQ2: What have been the benefits of acting at agency level both from the operational 
and strategic perspective? 
ENISA has filled a gap by acting as a neutral, independent broker at EU level. It has helped to 
bring stakeholders of various types and from various sectors together and acted as a bridge 
between the strategic and operational worlds, thereby contributing to its ultimate goal of 
increasing network and information security in Europe. That being said, its work programme is 
heavily influenced by Member State interests and there is scope to increase the Agency’s impact. 
 
Acting at agency level provides for independence and neutrality. A number of interviewees 
across all groups stressed the neutral position of ENISA as an Agency as one of its key strengths – 
it was seen as providing advice that is not influenced by industry or political interests. This was 
particularly appreciated by respondents to the open public consultation from private enterprises 
and business associations, noting that having established itself as a “relevant, neutral point of 
cyber expertise in Europe” was one of ENISA’s main achievements. The findings of the 2015 
evaluation also supported this with the case studies conducted confirming that ENISA´s activities 
in 2015 were generally relevant to both the public and private sector on national level, in particular 
since ENISA is an important neutral source of information, in a field where many reports would be 
written, for example, by providers themselves wanting to sell their own solutions. 
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ENISA has acted as a bridge between the strategic and operational worlds. From an 
operational perspective, ENISA managed to cover the needs of national CERTs/CSIRTS. A large 
majority of respondents to the CERT/CSIRT survey (28 out of 34) thought that ENISA covered the 
needs of CERTs/CSIRTs to a high or to some extent during the 2013-2016 period. 
Figure 11: Extent to which ENISA covered CERTs/CSIRTs’ needs over the 2013-2016 period 
 
Source: CERT/CSIRT survey 
 
From a strategic perspective, ENISA is considered important in its ability to bridge the 
policy/operational divide through the provision of policy support and the creation of a network of 
stakeholders from various organisations and sectors. Interviewees from different stakeholder 
groups perceived the NIS Directive as an opportunity for ENISA to expand this role. 
 
As an Agency governed by a Management Board made up primarily of Member States, 
ENISA’s work priorities are heavily influenced by the interests of Member States. 
Interviewees from the group “users and advisors” and ENISA staff pointed to the fact that Member 
States were key in determining ENISA’s work priorities, sometimes at the expense of the needs 
and interests of e.g. industry, certain types of Member States (see section 3.2.2.5).   
 
3.2.2.3 Contribution to increasing network and information security in Europe 
 
EQ3: To what extent has ENISA contributed to the overall EU goal of increasing network 
and information security in Europe? What more could be done? 
The evaluation finds that ENISA has clearly contributed to increasing network and information 
security in Europe through its various activities and their outputs and results. However, the Agency 
is limited in its contribution to this goal due to its mandate, its resources and a lack of visibility. A 
number of suggestions were made on how ENISA could further contribute to NIS in Europe, 
however these rely on additional resources being at its disposal. 
 
According to the intervention logic (presented in Appendix 1) based on Regulation (EU) No 
526/2013, ENISA’s work is intended to contribute to a high level of network and information 
security. The Regulation understands network and information security as “the ability of a network 
or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or 
malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of 
stored or transmitted data and the related services offered by or accessible via those networks and 
systems” (Article 1.3).  
 
ENISA has made a clear contribution to the overall goal of increasing network and 
information security in Europe. As presented in section 3.2.2.1, ENISA has generally been 
successful in the implementation of its tasks and the achievement of the KIIs set by the 
Management Board. The two previous evaluations showed that ENISA clearly contributes to 
ensuring a high level of NIS in the EU (including by sharing good practices in NIS, as shown in the 
stakeholder survey carried out by the 2015 evaluation), which should be seen as a strong 
achievement. A survey conducted among members of ENISA’s Management Board, NLOs, the PSG 
and a small sample of industry stakeholders in the context of the 2014 evaluation, found that 74% 
of respondents (42 out of 58) agreed or strongly agreed that ENISA contributed to ensuring a high 
level of NIS within the EU. A strong majority of interviewees in the present study also agreed that 
ENISA contributed to this overall goal. A number of activities were mentioned through which this 
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contribution was made, including ENISA’s work on developing networks, the exercises and training 
activities, awareness raising activities and the provision of the Agency’s expertise.  
 
A more concrete example of the impact of ENISA’s work can be found in the survey of 
CERTs/CSIRTs, in which respondents were asked about the importance of ENISA’s capacity 
building activities (e.g. training, National Cybersecurity Strategy support, identification of good 
practices) in 2013-2016. Respondents were very positive as to its importance for CERTs/CSIRTs’ 
development. As can be seen in Figure 12 below, almost all respondents (33 out of 34) thought 
that such capacity building activities were either very important or important.  
Figure 12: Importance of ENISA’s capacity building activities (e.g. training, National Cybersecurity 
Strategy support, identification of good practices) in 2013-2016 for CERTs/CSIRTs’ development 
 
Source: CERT/CSRIT survey 
 
There are limits to what ENISA can achieve with regard to increasing NIS in Europe. 
Stakeholders mentioned limitations to the Agency’s effectiveness. These include a lack of visibility, 
making it difficult to reach the targeted stakeholders with their publications and expertise, and a 
general underestimation of the relevance of cybersecurity issues by different stakeholders across 
the EU.   
A number of interviewees from the group of “users and advisors” noted that they would not be 
able to respond to questions regarding ENISA’s impact. This suggests that there is limited visibility 
of ENISA’s successes.  
 
3.2.2.4 EU-wide centre of expertise and reference point for stakeholders 
 
EQ5: To what extent has ENISA become an EU-wide centre of expertise and a reference 
point for stakeholders in providing guidance, advice and assistance on issues related to 
network and information security? 
With the exception of very few stakeholders, ENISA was not described as a centre of expertise or 
as a reference point for stakeholders in the NIS area. The Agency is more considered as a valuable 
partner for ensuring coordination across the EU. Its guidelines and reports are used by many 
stakeholders, but are appreciated for their availability and for coming from an EU Agency rather 
than purely for the presented expertise. ENISA’s low visibility and perceived limited technical 
expertise were named as the reasons for this. 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that ENISA is being considered as a reference point by 
its various stakeholders and is recognised for its expertise across the EU. In the interviews 
only a few stakeholders said that they would consider ENISA to be a centre of expertise. However, 
Member States and representatives from the EU institutions mostly saw ENISA as a valuable 
partner at EU level supporting coordination and capacity building. They did not consider ENISA as 
a source of expert knowledge. Among private sector stakeholders, ENISA has limited visibility and 
has not become known as a reference point for advice or assistance, as shown by the evaluations 
of ENISA’s activities in 2014 and 2015, as well as confirmed by the interviews.  
 
Moreover, among the respondents to the open public consultation, the regularity of interaction 
with ENISA and use of the Agency’s products and services varies between the stakeholders. While 
51% (33 out of 65) interacted with ENISA’s products and services a few or only two times per 
year, 46% of respondents (30) interacted with ENISA on a weekly or a monthly basis. A 
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comparison across the three groups of respondents shows that national authorities interact with 
ENISA or use its products and services more regularly than respondents from the group of private 
enterprises and business associations or other respondents (see Figure 16). Among national 
authority respondents, 47% interact on a weekly basis, while the largest proportion (50%) of 
private enterprise and business association respondents do so a few times per year and 35 % of 
other respondents interact one to two times per year. 
Figure 13: Frequency of interact with ENISA or usage ENISA’s products and services, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
From a list of eight of ENISA’s products and services, the most frequently mentioned as having 
been used by respondents to the open public consultation in the period 2013-2016 were 
ENISA’s “Guidelines & recommendations, including on standards” (90% or 56 respondents) and 
the “Reports (e.g. NIS Threat Landscape) & Research Publications” (86% or 53 respondents). 
This reflects some interest by the stakeholders in the publications of ENISA. Responses were 
very similar across the three respondent groups: national authorities, private enterprises and 
business associations and other. Products and services less frequently mentioned as being used 
were “Article 14 requests" (which are only available to Member States and the EU institutions), 
“training material or toolkit” (in particular rarely indicated by private enterprises or business 
associations as being used) and “training or workshop opportunities” were least indicated as 
being used by ‘other’ respondents. 
 
The most frequently given reasons for using ENISA’s products were “The products and services 
are provided by an EU-level body” (83% or 52 respondents), “The products and services are 
free of charge” (67% or 42 respondents) and “The products and services can be trusted” (63% 
or 40 respondents). Respondents were asked to select out of a list of eight options. This 
suggests that the expertise presented in ENISA’s publications and services is recognised, but is 
a secondary consideration relative to their availability and the trustworthiness which seem to 
stem from the fact that it is an EU level body.   
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Figure 14: Reason for using ENISA’s products/services, (n=63), multiple choice question  
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Little visibility and lack of expertise impede ENISA becoming a centre of expertise and a 
reference point for stakeholders. Most importantly, compared to other EU agencies, ENISA has 
little visibility and most stakeholders doubted that ENISA had been able to develop its own brand 
as compared to Frontex or Europol (EC3). Without being sufficiently known across the EU, it will 
not be possible for ENISA to be considered as a central source of guidance, advice and assistance. 
The 2015 evaluation of ENISA’s activities found that the Agency could improve its effectiveness by 
ensuring better dissemination of events and publications in order to reach a larger audience and 
increase its visibility. Interviewees also criticised the Agency for its limited expertise, in particular 
in the technical fields. The findings also show that ENISA struggles to hire experts which can be 
explained by a combination of factors: there are general difficulties across the public sector to 
compete with the private cybersecurity sector when trying to hire experts; ENISA’s human 
resource policies over the period 2013-2016 did not function well (see section 3.2.2.8.) and, for 
some experts, Greece as a location seems to be less attractive, e.g. in terms of spouses being able 
to find work (see section 3.2.2.10).  
 
3.2.2.5 Effectiveness at setting its work priorities 
 
EQ6: How effectively has the Agency managed to set its work priorities? 
ENISA sets its annual work programme one year ahead – the work priorities are determined by the 
Management Board with input from ENISA’s management and to a limited extent the PSG. As a 
result, the work priorities primarily reflect the interests and needs of Member States (as ENISA’s 
main clients) over those of other stakeholders, e.g. industry, the Commission and the EU more 
widely. Due to divergences in priorities at national level, the work programme often reflects what 
is least controversial to Member States and risks representing the lowest common denominator. 
 
Changes in the work programmes from one year to the next, linked to ENISA’s broad mandate, 
mean that there is a lack of continuity in many of ENISA’s activities from one year to the next, 
namely due to the annual (rather than multi-annual) nature of its programming.  
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ENISA’s work priorities primarily reflect the interests of Member States and not 
necessarily the needs of all relevant stakeholders; they are set by the Management 
Board in an annual work programme with input from ENISA. ENISA’s work is based on 
annual planning. The work programmes are set up in consultation with the Management Board 
which is primarily made up of Member States, but also representatives of the Commission and 
observers; Member States provide comments on the programme that is initially set out in draft 
form by ENISA. PSG members have a lesser say than in the past – their views are expressed 
through the ad hoc group of certain Member State representatives and PSG members.41 The work 
programme’s structure underwent changes in 2015 – in 2013 and 2014 the work was divided 
across three work streams that changed on an annual basis with given activities being planned 
within these, while from 2015 onwards strategic objectives were set out that remain the same 
year-on-year. Additionally, Horizontal Operational Activities are conducted. KIIs are set by the 
Management Board for the work plan activities - they are followed up on through the annual 
activity reports. The process was judged by a few interviewees as being long, tedious, time 
consuming and burdensome, occupying much of ENISA managements’ time when it is being set.  
 
When commenting on the effectiveness of the process, ENISA staff and users and advisors, as well 
as some PSG members pointed to the fact that Member States were key in determining ENISA’s 
work priorities, sometimes at the expense of the needs and interests of other stakeholders, e.g. 
industry, the Commission and the EU more broadly. Moreover, it was felt that due to competing 
interests among larger, more experienced Member States and smaller, less resource-rich Member 
States, ENISA’s work programme risked representing the lowest common denominator and being 
diluted. Standardisation and certification were referred to as two areas where Member States had 
their own national plans and resist ENISA getting involved. Some areas that ENISA should be 
focussing on more as priority areas than is currently the case, according to industry stakeholders 
in particular, included the Internet of Things, the move to big data and machine intelligence, 
certification, becoming more active in the educational field, e.g. by supporting the creation of 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC) in the field of cybersecurity. 
 
It was suggested that more room could be integrated into ENISA’s work programme to allow for it 
to respond to the ad hoc needs of the Commission and to unforeseeable events/needs. A few 
interviewees from ENISA staff and ENISA’s users and advisors suggested that ENISA itself could be 
given the possibility to determine part of the work programme.  
 
 
ENISA’s work programme covers a wide range of activities and sectors, and there is a 
lack of continuity in many of its activities from one year to the next. The Cyber Europe 
Exercises and the threat landscape were cited as the two main activities that are repeated 
regularly; others change on an annual basis, leading to a lack of continuity and the inability for 
ENISA staff to develop in-depth expertise in given areas. This is also a reflection of the annual 
(rather than multi-annual) nature of the way ENISA sets its work priorities. The 2015 evaluation 
supported these findings with the broad mandate of the Agency and the variety of tasks it seeks to 
fulfil being perceived by stakeholders as a limiting factor to its effectiveness. In the open public 
consultation, stakeholders suggested that ENISA should keep a clearer focus on priorities and 
avoid taking on additional tasks that represent a burden for the staff members.  
 
3.2.2.6 Tackling upcoming, unplanned issues 
 
EQ7: How effectively does the Agency tackle important upcoming, unplanned issues 
derived from the demands of its constituencies and/or EU policy priorities? 
                                               
41 The PSG representatives are not formal members of the Management Board and primarily have an advisory role vis-à-vis the 
Executive Director. 
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ENISA is able to respond to upcoming, unplanned issues based on stakeholder demands or EU 
policy priorities through Article 14 requests and amendments to its work programme. These 
options are considered to be effective, though there is room for more flexibility in order to further 
consider the needs of stakeholders other than Member States, in particular those of the 
CERT/CSIRT community, and resource constraints mean it has to prioritise.  
 
Article 14 of ENISA’s Regulation allows it to respond to the upcoming needs of its key 
stakeholders to a degree Based on Article 14, the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Commission and a competent body appointed by a Member State can submit a request 
for advice or assistance falling within the Agency’s objectives and tasks. These requests have to be 
addressed to the Executive Director who then informs the Management Board and the Executive 
Board to take a decision whether the requested advice or assistance can be provided. Requests 
can be within the scope of what ENISA already does (e.g. the provision of a specific training 
course) or cover new areas as long as they are within the remit of the Agency’s mandate. The 
stakeholders concerned expressed satisfaction with the provision. However, ENISA staff and 
management noted that it was not possible to respond to all requests within the limits of the 
Agency’s budget and human resources. Therefore, requests had to be carefully considered and 
some requests were not responded to.  
 
Between 2013 and 2016, ENISA responded to a total of 63 requests submitted under Article 14. 
Over the years 2014 and 2015, requests were received from 17 different Member States, the 
Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European External Action Service, CEPOL and 
a third country. Member States’ requests primarily concerned training for CERTs/CSIRTs or other 
public bodies. Requests also concerned the implementation of topical workshops, support with 
developing a cybersecurity strategy for an entire Member State or on specific topics.42 Among the 
respondents to the open public consultation, “Article 14 requests” were one of the services that 
were less frequently mentioned as being used. Only five out of 15 responding national authorities 
reported that they had used Article 14 requests over the period 2013-2016. However, the actual 
number of different Member States having used the services shows that in fact, the requests are 
used more often. On average, the response to one request costs EUR 15,000. There is however no 
clear relation between the number of requests responded to per year and the total costs.  
Table 15: Overview of Article 14 requests 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of new Article 
14 requests 
13 12 23 15 
Total cost of Article 14 
requests  
€ 200,000 € 317,637 € 210,957 € 229,107 
 
The presented data shows that Article 14 requests are employed to receive support from ENISA 
and the Agency is able to use them as a means to respond to needs that were not foreseen at the 
moment the work programme was set up.  
 
ENISA’s work programme and activities can be amended to allow the Agency to react to 
upcoming, unplanned events. Although adopted well in advance, ENISA’s work programmes 
tend to evolve during their year of implementation. A structured process is in place allowing the 
Management Board to modify the work programme and reallocate financial and human resources 
when needed. This flexibility was positively viewed by a variety of stakeholders. However, there is 
room for more flexibility in order to further consider the needs of stakeholders other than Member 
States. The fact that the work programme needs to be drafted one year in advance, and does not 
allow for greater flexibility to respond to ad hoc requests, was perceived by a number of 
                                               
42 ENISA (2016) Activity Report 2015 and ENISA (2015): Activity Report 2014.  
   
 
 
 
47 
 
interviewees as a limiting factor to the Agency’s effectiveness and ability to respond in such a fast 
paced area as NIS with changing political priorities at EU level. A few survey respondents pointed 
to this rigidity in their comments on ENISA’s organisational set-up, stating that it blocked 
resources and did not allow the Agency to contribute to emerging issues. It was suggested that 
part of ENISA’s budget should be set aside to allow it to respond to emerging challenges.  
 
However, additional activities (which fall outside the work programme) undertaken by ENISA’s 
staff reflect its ability to tackle unplanned issues. This includes the preparation of Info Notes or 
ENISA internally deciding to produce papers in response to policy discussions as part of its role as 
an advisor to the EU institutions. As these activities are not foreseen in the Agency’s work 
programmes, they rely on the motivation of ENISA’s staff to take on additional tasks.  
 
Moreover, among the respondents to the open public consultation, 87% (54 respondents) 
agreed that ENISA’s products and services over 2013-2016 had to a large or to some extent 
responded to the emerging needs of the cybersecurity community in a timely manner. As Figure 
15 below shows, this was a consistent assessment across all respondent categories. 
Figure 15: Extent to which ENISA’s products/services over 2013-2016 responded to emerging needs of 
the cyber-security community in a timely manner, (n=62) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Limitations in ENISA’s flexibility to respond to unforeseen issues stem from the 
Agency’s limited resources. With generally scarce resources, ENISA’s management needs to 
carefully consider whether and to what extent Article 14 requests can be covered. According to 
interviewees, this can lead to situations where there is competition between the completion of the 
work programme as agreed with the Member States and any ad hoc request submitted by an EU 
institution. In fact, the CERT/CSIRT community expressed little satisfaction with ENISA’s ability to 
react to unplanned issues. Interviewees from the Member States and EU institutions and bodies 
suggested that they would seek support within their own community in case of unplanned, short-
term requests rather than address these to ENISA. Due to its limited resources, it was judged that 
the Agency would respond to ad hoc requests with significant delay or not at all. In particular, in 
the context of ENISA’s new responsibilities under the NIS Directive, an important amount of the 
Agency’s budget will be fixed and cannot be moved to respond to unplanned issues.  
 
3.2.2.7 Quality level of tasks over time 
 
EQ8: Does the Agency consistently perform the same tasks with the same quality level 
over time? 
Overall, the tasks performed by ENISA meet minimum quality expectations, though mixed 
feedback was provided on the quality and utility of its reports. Moreover, the evaluation identified 
a varying degree of utility of the Agency’s outputs depending on the needs of the different 
stakeholder groups. 
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ENISA’s performance generally meets quality standards but does not seem to exceed 
these. Interviewed stakeholders provided mixed feedback on the quality level of the Agency’s 
work, notably of its reports. A number of interviewees – across all stakeholder groups - suggested 
that the degree of usefulness and quality of ENISA’s reports/publications varied and that they did 
not necessarily “bring a unique selling point”. While a few Member State interviewees considered 
the reports which summarise information from several Member States and provide an independent 
EU perspective to be very useful, others suggested that the utility varied depending on what was 
available at national level. Among the open public consultation respondents, 62% (39 out of 63) 
indicated that they used ENISA’s products and services because they were of high quality. Among 
national authorities, 73% (11 out of 15) indicated to use products and services due to their high 
quality. This was not among the most selected reasons by respondents, but national authorities in 
particular selected this response. It was suggested by one interviewee that to improve the quality 
of reports, ENISA could draw more on the expertise of national cybersecurity experts from national 
authorities, academics and the private sector to assist them in developing reports/publications in-
house through a peer review process; such a practice would allow it to draw on a wider net of 
expertise to produce more tailored outputs. Another interviewee suggested that there could be a 
more structured approach to the selection of expert contributors to publications, thereby ensuring 
that this is a more European undertaking representing the cybersecurity point of view of Europe. 
Respondents to the open public consultation also suggested that ENISA could increase the quality 
of publications by covering less topics but more in-depth. In general, stakeholders showed to be 
very understanding when it came to smaller issues such as difficulties at the start of a cyber 
exercise.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 16 below, the quality control mechanisms in place were seen by 76% of 
respondents to the survey of ENISA’s staff and direct stakeholders (65 out of 86) as ensuring a 
high and consistent quality in ENISA’s work and publications “to some” or “to a high extent”. They 
were seen as doing so only “to a limited extent” or “not at all” by 9% of respondents (8 out of 86). 
ENISA staff were slightly more critical than the average in considering the quality control 
mechanisms as only ensuring such quality “to a limited extent” or “not at all” (14%).  
Figure 16: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement on quality control 
mechanisms 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Seven survey respondents provided additional comments, all of them referring to low or non-
existent quality control mechanisms.  
 
3.2.2.8 ENISA’s effectiveness considering its governance structure, organisational structure and HR 
policies 
 
EQ11: How do the current governance, the internal organisational structure and the 
human resources policies and practices of ENISA contribute to effectiveness in the work 
of the agency? 
 
ENISA’s governance structure, with a Management Board, an Executive Board and the PSG, is 
conducive to the effectiveness of its work, though there is room to increase its representativeness 
and effectiveness by, for example, giving the PSG a more formal role, delegating power within the 
Management Board to smaller groups, allowing the Executive Board to take on a more pro-active 
role, and formalising the role of the NLO network. 
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Its internal organisational structure contributes to the effectiveness of its work through its 
management practices, small size which leads to a lack of complexity, separation along thematic 
lines and relatively flat structure. That being said, reorganisations, while necessary to ensure 
renewal, risk posing a limit to its effectiveness when too frequent; here a balance is necessary. 
 
The human resource (HR) policies and practices of ENISA are a key limiter to effectiveness in 
that ENISA had weak HR policies and practices in place over the 2013-2016 period, with a formal 
HR department only being set up in late 2016. ENISA also suffers from difficulty recruiting and 
retaining staff due to both internal (i.e. slow recruitment procedures in a fast-paced, competitive 
environment; a lack of career progression prospects) and external factors (i.e. constraining staff 
management rules (e.g. number of contract agents (CAs) versus temporary agents (TAs)); an 
expertise shortfall in the sector; a lack of competitive salaries in an area that is dominated by 
demand from the private sector). 
 
ENISA’s governance structure is conducive to the effectiveness of its work. The current 
governance structure, with a Management Board, an Executive Board and the PSG Group (see 
section 1.2.2 for a description of the governance structure), was seen as conducive to the effective 
functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives) by the large majority of ENISA’s 
direct stakeholders (85% or 75 out of 88 survey respondents) (see Figure 17 below). The 
interviews with staff and direct stakeholders supported this finding, suggesting that the structure 
“worked well”, “was reasonable”, “was adequate”, and represented well the views of different 
stakeholders.  
Figure 17: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: To what extent do you 
agree/disagree with the following statement: The current governance structure, with a Management 
Board, an Executive Board and the PSG is conducive to the effective functioning of the Agency (i.e. in 
terms of meeting its objectives)? 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Key areas for improvement referred to by interviewed stakeholders concerned increasing the 
representativeness/effectiveness of the governance structure by:  
 Giving the PSG a more formal role: While it was acknowledged that Member States were 
ENISA’s main client and it therefore made sense for them to be the key players in the 
governance structure, it was also stated that “as [ENISA is] an internal market agency, the 
role of Member States versus the rest [e.g. industry] could be slightly more balanced”. To 
ensure this balance, a few interviewees from ENISA staff and among the direct stakeholders 
suggested giving the PSG (industry) a more formal role and having it feed more into the 
Management Board’s plenary meetings43.  
 Delegating power within the Management Board to smaller groups: The Management 
Board functions in a traditional manner, giving one place and one vote per Member State in 
plenary meetings. There are different levels of engagement and agendas among the Member 
States, and ENISA could consider doing like in other agencies and create sub-sets of the 
                                               
43 Until 2013 (i.e. ENISA’s mandate revision) there were three Management Board members representing consumers, industry and 
academia - they had no voting rights but had a voice; this was no longer the case at the time of writing. Through a non-formal 
approach, there is an attempt for three rapporteurs from the PSG to attend the Management Board meetings to have a voice. The PSG 
has an advisory role relative to the Executive Board and the Management Board listened to/exchanged views with them through an ad 
hoc group of Member States and PSG representatives.  
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Management Board to discuss given topics according to needs and the level of interest before 
discussing it in plenary form to make the process more streamlined and effective. This has 
been done with the Executive Board to a certain extent, but it can only prepare advice and 
assist the Management Board so it is confined to administrative, not policy matters. 
 Providing a more pro-active role to the Executive Board: The addition of an Executive 
Board was seen as a positive development, though one interviewee suggested that the 
structure could be streamlined so that the Executive Board could react to a certain need when 
it arose and be used in more areas to ensure further flexibility.  
 Formalising the role of the NLO network: The NLO network was also viewed as a positive 
element of the governance structure, but it was felt that its role needed to be more 
formalised44. The findings of the 2015 evaluation point to the fact that different NLOs view their 
role differently and are more or less active at, e.g. disseminating ENISA’s publications to 
national stakeholders. 
 
ENISA’s internal organisational structure was overall perceived as contributing to the 
effectiveness of its work, though frequent reorganisations limited its effectiveness. A 
high proportion of respondents to the survey (80% - 70 out of 88) saw ENISA’s organisational 
solutions and procedures as adequate to some or to a high extent (see Figure 18 below). However, 
ENISA staff (including management) was more critical of the organisational solutions and 
procedures relative to the direct stakeholders  - a quarter (25%) considered them to be only 
adequate to a limited extent or not adequate at all. Frequent internal reorganisations, limited 
professional development opportunities and an unclear evidence base being used for decisions 
related to the allocation of work to given individuals were cited as some of the problems faced.  
Figure 18: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s organisational 
solutions and procedures  
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
The interviews with staff and Executive and Management Board members supported these findings 
with the internal organisational structure being qualified as “adequate for a small organisation”, 
“rather flat and with an open atmosphere”, “not very hierarchical”, “not too complex because of 
the small size of the teams”, “the separation along thematic lines working well”, and the ability to 
avoid overlap by working together. Should the Agency grow in size, it was suggested that a further 
clustering of the operational department may be necessary along the lines of national agencies like 
ANSSI, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) etc. Moreover, reference was 
made to organisational reorganisations leading to a lack of continuity in activities and 
dissatisfaction among staff. However, views were also expressed as to the necessity of 
reorganisation for renewal, e.g. the end 2016 reorganisation involved bringing in a “stakeholder 
relations” aspect to ENISA’s architecture to support less technical aspect to their 
work/communications.  
 
Moreover, a majority of survey respondents (73% or 64 out of 88 respondents) saw ENISA’s 
management practices as conducive to creating an effective organisation (i.e. in terms of meeting 
its objectives) to some or to a high extent. Management Board members were generally more 
positive than the other stakeholders, with 63% indicating that ENISA’s management practices are 
conducive to creating an effective organisation “to a high extent”. Some concerns were expressed 
by respondents who rated these practices more negatively, citing unjustified decisions, the 
                                               
44 The NLO network is not defined in the ENISA Regulation. 
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expression of personal agendas and ENISA staff not being allowed to express themselves fully and 
freely as reasons for this assessment. 
Figure 19: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: ENISA’s management 
practices are conducive to creating an effective organisation (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives)?  
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
ENISA had limited formal HR policies and practices over the 2013-2016 period. While the 
recruitment and training procedures were seen as appropriate to some or to a high extent by 52% 
of respondents to the survey to ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (46 out of 88), they were seen 
by 33% of respondents (29 out of 88) as not being appropriate or only being appropriate to a 
limited extent for ENISA’s workload (see Figure 20 below). ENISA staff (including management) 
were more critical than the direct stakeholders vis-à-vis the recruitment and training procedures, 
with more than half of them (52%) regarding them as only adequate to a limited extent or not at 
all. Problems linked to the recruitment process were mentioned by 13 respondents. They criticized 
the process for being too slow and therefore not being adapted to the cybersecurity domain. It was 
stated that technical experts were being sought out heavily in this area and could not wait so long 
for a positive answer or a confirmation from ENISA. The lack of training that the staff experienced 
over the past five years due to the Agency not having an HR office was the second most 
mentioned issue, with 12 respondents providing comments on this topic. In the field of 
cybersecurity, which evolves fast, a lack of training was perceived as very detrimental as it did not 
allow ENISA staff to stay up to date with the most recent developments. In contrast to these 
findings, the 2013 and 2014 annual reports state that the Agency complies with the three 
assessment criteria for the internal control system, where the first criteria is “staff that have the 
requisite knowledge and skills”.45 
Figure 20: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s recruitment and 
training procedures 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
The interviews with ENISA staff and management revealed that ENISA has weak HR policies and 
practices in place, with a formal HR department only being set up in late 2016. The appointment of 
a formal HR manager was very positively viewed and hopes were expressed by many interviewees 
that HR practices and processes would be prioritised further in the future. 
 
ENISA has difficulty recruiting and retaining staff. The recruitment issues that ENISA faces 
are more significant than in most of the other EU agencies and bodies that ENISA was compared to 
as part of the benchmarking exercise. The data presented below, which compares the share of 
unfilled staff posts of 2014 and 2015 across a selection of EU agencies and bodies, points to the 
fact that ENISA has been unable to fill the same number of posts over the two year period and is 
the agency with the second highest number of unfilled positions.  
                                               
45 Annual activity report 2013, p.40; Annual activity report 2014, p.59 
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Figure 21 : Comparison of share of unfilled staff posts for a selection of EU agencies, 2014 and 2015 
 
Source: Source of data: Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2016 - Working Document Part III 
Bodies set up by the EU and having legal personality and Public-Private Partnership.  
 
The same development is also visible in Figure 22. ENISA’s share of filled staff positions has 
gradually decreased in comparison to FRA and EMCDDA who were able to maintain a fairly 
consistent percentage of filled positions across 2014-2016.  
Figure 22: Compared share of staff positions filled on an annual basis for ENISA, FRA, and EMCDDA,   
2014-2016 
 
Source: Data gathered through secondary sources and received by ENISA, FRA and EMCDDA. 
 
A number of factors have been identified that lead to ENISA’s issues in recruitment and 
retaining staff. The interviews with ENISA staff and management pointed to the fact that ENISA 
has difficulty recruiting and retaining staff due to a number of factors including:  
 constraining staff management rules (e.g. number of CAs versus TAs);  
 an expertise shortfall in the sector;  
 a lack of competitive salaries and attractive contract conditions in an area that is dominated by 
demand from the private sector; 
 slow recruitment procedures in a fast-paced, competitive environment;  
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 a lack of career progression prospects due to the size of the Agency and limited turnover at the 
Head of Unit level;  
 perceived barriers to integration for experts from outside Greece, including difficulties for 
spouses to find work (due to the language barrier, the economic crisis), and insufficient 
schooling options 
 
It was further mentioned that in other public sector organisations a more flexible structure has 
been created to keep people (e.g. legislation has been introduced to pay people more in a number 
of Member States, being more adaptable in the work arrangements offered like teleworking, 
offering a train package, or packages for the children of staff), but doing this within the confines of 
the EU institutions and legislation proves a challenge. This was also confirmed by ENISA’s annual 
activity reports, where the main reasons for difficulties in recruiting and retention are attributed to 
the types of post that are being offered (CA posts), the low coefficient factor which applies to 
salaries of ENISA employees in Greece (AAR:2015:50), and the absence of international schooling 
for the children of Agency staff (AAR:2014: 31, AAR:2015:50).46 The survey also supported this 
finding when respondents were asked about the size of the Agency, which was the element of 
ENISA’s organisational setup that was judged the most strongly by survey respondents (Figure 23 
below).  
Figure 23: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding ENISA? 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
ENISA staff (including management) was much more pessimistic about the size of the Agency 
being adequate than other respondent types, with 61% of them regarding it as adequate only to a 
limited extent or not at all. A large number of those respondents (35) that were more negative in 
their assessment referred to the need to have more staff (this was mentioned by a variety of 
respondent types, including six Management and Executive Board members, 21 ENISA staff 
members, two NLOs and five PSG members). They called for the need for “more operational 
experts” and expressed their concern related to hiring being frozen. They explained in detail the 
difficulties faced in recruiting staff willing to work in Greece and the negative impact on hiring of 
the lack of facilities for international families in Heraklion and Athens.  
 
The table below presents an overview of ENISA’s staff composition. A significant increase can be 
noted between 2014 and 2015 in the number of CA.  
Table 16: Staff by category end of year 
Staff category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Administrators 26 27 27 34 32 
Assistants 15 15 16 14 16 
Contract agents 13 12 13 15 24 
Seconded national experts 4 4 3 5 3 
Total 58 58 59 68 75 
 
                                               
46 These issues are not raised in the 2013 annual activity report, except for a reference to a shortage of staff in connection with the 
Internal Control Coordinator role. Furthermore, this report states that “adequate measures” are in place to ensure business continuity, 
also in relation to staff (sick-leave, holidays, etc.) (AAR:2013:38).  
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A comparison with other EU agencies and bodies also shows the increasing reliance 
within ENISA on CAs and a low number of seconded national experts (SNEs). As 
presented in Figure 24, ENISA has the highest share of CAs among the agencies and bodies 
considered as part of the benchmarking exercise conducted for this study. In addition, ENISA 
employs comparably few SNEs. In interviews, a need was expressed to ensure better exchange 
between ENISA and the Member States. An increase in the number of SNEs up to the level of other 
agencies could be a response to this request.  
Figure 24: Average distribution over staff categories, 2014-2016 
 
Source: presentation by Ramboll, data from European Commission: Draft General Budget of the European Union for the 
financial year 2017 - Working Document Part III  
 
Over the period 2014-2016, ENISA had the highest percentage increase of CAs compared to the 
other agencies, reflecting the efforts to reduce staff expenditure. The share increased by 120% for 
ENISA. As presented in Figure 25 below, BEREC and the EFCA went through a very similar 
development between 2014 and 2016 in which some of the SNE positions were replaced with CAs.   
Figure 25: Percentage change in budget allocations for different staff categories, 2014-2016 
 
Source: presentation by Ramboll, data from European Commission: Draft General Budget of the European Union for the 
financial year 2016 - Working Document Part III  
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Nevertheless, 65% of respondents to the survey to ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (57 out of 
88) saw staff composition as adequate for ENISA’s work to some or to a high extent and 30% of 
respondents (26 out of 88) saw it as only adequate to some extent or not at all (see Figure 26 
below). ENISA staff (including management) were more likely to express a more negative view 
than the direct stakeholders. A number of respondents felt that there was a need to develop 
internal expertise through the hiring of more senior staff. The balance between administrative staff 
and operational staff was also seen as an issue by seven respondents, who said that there was a 
clear need for more technical staff hires. Finally, one respondent expressed the importance for 
ENISA staff being more geographically representative of the EU; this view was also supported in 
the interviews.  
Figure 26: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s staff composition 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Vacancies are difficult to fill with the current salary level (basic level for the functional area 
concerned is 2,476.74 EUR according to vacancy announcements) and limited benefits or 
allowances. As a consequence, most applicants are either Greek nationals and/or from other parts 
of Southern Europe, with very few applicants from northern Europe. This is reflected in the staff 
composition of the Agency (presented in Figure 27 below), with approximately 32% of staff being 
Greek nationals in 2015. 
Figure 27: Nationality of staff members (2013-2015) 
 
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting based on data from ENISA annual reports 
 
As one interviewee put it: “To compete better, we need to put the HR department at a higher 
level; vacancy notices should be quicker; we could provide better topics (could be more interesting 
in our job offers); and in general we should provide a more competitive package in terms of 
medical scheme and other various things”. Another suggested that staff rotations between the EU 
agencies and with the Commission to make the work more attractive and to bring in new people 
qualified to work at a higher career level would be a plus. 
 
The findings of the evaluations of ENISA’s 2014 and 2015 core operational activities 
supported these findings. While stakeholders assessed that ENISA’s organisational set-up, 
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procedures and processes were conducive to the achievement of its objectives, a number of 
limiting factors to its effectiveness were identified, including: 
 The limited resources that ENISA disposes of (2014 and 2015 evaluation); 
 The broad mandate and the variety of tasks it seeks to fulfil; 
 Difficulties with recruiting staff/talent with the needed competence, due to the salaries ENISA 
can offer and its geographical location.  
 
3.2.2.9 Relationship with its stakeholders 
 
EQ12: How effective has ENISA been in building a strong and trustful relationship with 
its stakeholders when executing its mandate? 
The evidence shows that ENISA has created strong and trustful relationships with some of its 
stakeholders, most importantly with the Member States and in particular the CERT/CSIRT 
community. The evidence suggests that ENISA could further improve the exchange of information 
between CERTs/CSIRTs by providing an oversight of available knowledge and good practices and 
by enhancing the coordination of CERTs/CSIRTs at the policy level.   
The cooperation and coordination with the Commission’s DGs and some of the EU Agencies could 
be improved to reduce risks of overlap and create synergies. ENISA could also improve 
cooperation with the industry. 
 
ENISA’s direct stakeholders and ENISA staff agree that ENISA ensures successful 
cooperation with its stakeholders. As can be seen in Figure 28, almost all respondents to the 
survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (93%) thought that ENISA is open to cooperating 
with a variety of stakeholders to some or to a high extent, across different levels and sectors, to 
ensure better results. Two respondents from the Management and Executive Boards and one 
respondent from the PSG thought that the Agency was only open to such cooperation to a limited 
extent.  
Figure 28: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s cooperation with 
stakeholders 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
A majority of respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (81%) considered 
that to some or to a high extent, ENISA has good systems and procedures in place for stakeholder 
consultation and management, as shown in Figure 29 below. A minority (8%) thought that it only 
had such good systems in place to a limited extent or not at all. ENISA staff were slightly more 
critical of these systems than the average, with 12% of them considering that ENISA only had 
such good systems in place to a limited extent or not at all. The Management and Executive Board 
members as well as the PSG members were mostly positive (respectively 84% and 92%), saying 
that ENISA had good systems in place to some or to a high extent or did not know.  
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Figure 29: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s cooperation with 
stakeholders 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Almost all respondents (93%) to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders thought that 
ENISA had built strong and trustful relationships with its stakeholders when executing its mandate 
to some or to a high extent (see Figure 30 below). Responses across the different stakeholder 
groups were very similar.  
Figure 30: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s cooperation with 
stakeholders 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Open public consultation respondents from national authorities believed that one of the main 
achievements of ENISA was the support ENISA provided to Member States in particular by 
fostering cooperation via the share of expertise among Member States. However, it was also 
suggested that ENISA could do more to share information on which expertise and practices are 
available in the Member States and can be of benefit to others.  
 
General suggestions were made to improve ENISA’s cooperation with its stakeholders. 
These were found in the surveys, the open public consultation, as well as the interviews and 
provided by a variety of the different stakeholder groups: 
 ENISA should develop more internal expertise to provide better services to its stakeholders. 
Stakeholders did not refer to specific areas but rather indicated that in general ENISA should 
have more technical, in-depth expertise, ideally in all the thematic areas covered by the 
Agency.  
 ENISA tends to be very structured in their approach to stakeholders, following the work 
programme very closely. This limits the possibility for informal interaction or ad hoc 
cooperation.  
 It was recommended that ENISA ensures greater engagement with the PSG and generally 
ensures a better connection with the industry, for example through public private partnerships. 
 
Cooperation with the EU institutions is in place but there is a lot of room for 
improvement. In the interviews, stakeholders from the different Commission DGs and other EU 
institutions explained how they worked together with ENISA and highlighted some positive 
achievements of this cooperation. Nevertheless, the collected evidence also shows that ENISA’s 
relationships with EU institutions are not sufficiently strong. On the one hand, there is a perception 
that the Commission DGs do not systematically involve ENISA when they work on matters relating 
to cybersecurity or data protection. There seems to be some doubt about ENISA’s expertise in 
some areas and a lack of structural cooperation between ENISA and the DGs. On the other hand, 
ENISA seems to lack resources to take ownership on some of the tasks when sharing 
responsibilities with the Commission.  
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The interviews show that ENISA has positive relationships with most of the EU agencies. A topic of 
raised by many interviewees is the degree of cooperation between ENISA and CERT-EU, which is 
described in section 3.2.4.1. In general, there is a need for a clearer mandate and delimitation of 
the role of different EU agencies and bodies active in the area of cybersecurity, including ENISA, 
CERT-EU, Europol’s EC3, but also of the Commission’s DG JRC. There seems to be untapped 
potential for cooperation and exchange of information.  
 
ENISA has developed strong relationships with the Member States. Member States are 
present in ENISA’s Management Board allowing for the involvement in the development of the 
annual work programmes. ENISA cooperates with the Member States through the NLO network 
which is intended to serve ENISA as a point of reference into the Member States on specific issues. 
As shown in the survey results above, the participating members of ENISA’s Management Board 
and the NLOs show a high satisfaction with and trust in the cooperation with ENISA. There are 
various formats in which ENISA cooperates with the Member States, including exercises, trainings, 
meetings and the CERT/CSIRT community. A few of the interviewees of ENISA’s staff and direct 
stakeholders considered the complex structures of responsibility for cybersecurity issues in the 
Member States as a challenge for ENISA, in particular in the context of the upcoming 
implementation of the NIS Directive, under which ENISA will have to build up relationships with 
several new groups of authorities in the Member States.  
 
ENISA fosters the cooperation among CERTs/CSIRTs across the EU. ENISA is heavily 
involved in fostering cooperation between CERTs/CSIRTs, as well as capacity building for 
CERTs/CSIRTs. In the CERT/CSIRT survey, participants were asked to what extent they thought 
ENISA proactively supported cooperation among CERTs/CSIRTs during the 2013-2016 period. As 
can be seen in Figure 31 below, the answers were in large part positive, with 83% of respondents 
(28 out of 34) thinking it did so to a high or to some extent and 12% (4 out of 34) thinking that it 
did so to a limited extent or not at all.  
Figure 31: Extent to which ENISA proactively supported cooperation among CERTs/CSIRTs during the 
2013-2016 period 
 
Source: CERT/CSIRT survey 
 
In the survey but also during the interviews, CERTs/CSIRTs provided suggestions how cooperation 
could be even further improved. It was suggested that ENISA should work on improving how 
CERTs/CSIRTs exchange information. This could be done by providing an oversight of what 
expertise and knowledge exist in the CERT/CSIRT community and helping to share good practices 
and lessons learned from one country to another. Respondents also stressed the importance of 
“liaising with CERTs/CSIRTs members on the technical level” so as to make ENISA management 
better equipped to address the needs of the CERT/CSIRT community. At the same time, they 
suggested that there was a need to reach out to the decision making level of the CERTs/CSIRTs in 
the Member States and not only focus on the technical level.   
 
ENISA’s relationship with further stakeholders, including industry and academia is 
limited. Among industry and academia stakeholders ENISA is not widely known. Although ENISA 
publishes reports targeting the industry, for example SMEs, the Agency does not have sufficient 
outreach to these stakeholders. This was concluded in the evaluations of ENISA’s activities in 2014 
and 2015 and confirmed during the interviews for the present evaluation. With the PSG there is a 
formal approach to involving these stakeholders in the planning and decision making processes of 
the Agency. ENISA’s management as well as other stakeholders noted, however, that the role of 
   
 
 
 
59 
 
the PSG was not sufficiently formalised. Within the Management Board, Member States have the 
main voice and consequently most of ENISA’s activities are targeted towards them (see section 
3.2.2.8 for further findings relating to ENISA’s governance structure). Respondents from private 
enterprises and business associations to the open public consultation suggested that ENISA could 
foster private-public cooperation in the area of cybersecurity.  
 
3.2.2.10 ENISA’s effectiveness considering its location 
 
EQ13: What is the impact of the current arrangements related to the location of ENISA's 
offices on the overall capability of the Agency of meeting its objectives? 
ENISA’s effectiveness has overall been positively impacted by the move in 2013 of its operations 
teams to Athens from Heraklion, thereby facilitating access to the Agency from elsewhere and by 
Agency staff to Brussels. However, its location  limits its effectiveness in achieving its policy 
objectives to a degree as it is more difficult for ENISA’s management and staff to organise (ad hoc 
/ informal) exchanges with the EU institutions, thereby affecting the degree of influence it can 
have on cybersecurity policy at the EU level and its impact in this area. Moreover, the difficulties 
experienced in recruiting and retaining qualified/expert staff which are partially linked to the 
Agency’s location (see section 3.2.2.8 for further findings relating to ENISA’s human resources) 
limit its ability to recruit and maintain the necessary staff to meet its objective of providing 
expertise through collating, analysing and making available information and expertise on key NIS 
issues. 
 
The decision of the seat of EU agencies is a political one, determined by a common agreement 
between the representatives of the Member States meeting at Head of state or government level 
or by the Council. An attempt has been made to spread the agencies across all Member States. 
While in some cases the location decisions taken specify in which city a given agency will be 
located, in the case of ENISA, only Greece was defined as the location, leaving the decision on the 
city to the Greek government.47 ENISA was established in Heraklion. In March 2013, a decision was 
made to move the operations of the Agency to Athens.    
 
The move of operations to Athens in March 2013 has increased the Agency’s 
effectiveness, though the split between Athens and Heraklion was seen as a limiting 
factor to its effectiveness. ENISA staff generally saw ENISA’s location as less of a hindrance to 
its effectiveness than other stakeholder types; the move to Athens was overwhelmingly perceived 
as positive. The main benefit mentioned was that ENISA had become more easily accessible for 
those visiting the Agency and for staff it had become less time-consuming and expensive to travel 
across the EU. However, a few ENISA staff (including management) respondents were critical of 
the fact that the Agency is divided in two (between Heraklion and Athens), which it was perceived 
hampered internal communication and cohesion.  
 
ENISA’s location is limiting its effectiveness in achieving its policy48 related objectives. 
ENISA’s location was judged by 67% of respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct 
stakeholders (59 out of 88) as enabling ENISA to effectively conduct its work (i.e. in terms of 
meeting its objectives) to some or to a high extent. It was reviewed as not enabling such 
effectiveness or only doing so to a limited extent by 28% of respondents (25 out of 88). ENISA’s 
direct stakeholders were more critical than ENISA’s staff and management of its location, with the 
NLOs, the Management and Executive Boards and the PSG members seeing the location as 
enabling the effectiveness of the Agency to a limited extent or not at all (with 58%, 42% and 39% 
respectively being of this opinion). By contrast, the large majority of ENISA staff including 
                                               
47 European Commission (2012): Decentralised Agencies – Overhaul – Analytical Fiche No3 – Agencies’ seat and role of the host country. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/fiche_3_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf 
48 Policy objective: Promote network and information security as an EU policy priority, by assisting the European Union institutions and 
Member States in developing and implementing EU policies and law related to NIS. 
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management (84%) assessed the location as conducive to the effectiveness of ENISA’s work to 
some or to a high extent.  
Figure 32: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: ENISA’s location enables it 
to effectively conduct its work (i.e. in term of meetings its objectives) 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
It was primarily felt by the more critical stakeholders referred to above that ENISA was situated 
too far from Brussels, making (ad hoc / informal) exchanges between the Agency and the EU 
institutions more difficult and thereby affecting the degree of influence ENISA can have on 
cybersecurity policy at the EU level and its impact in this area. The location of ENISA was cited as 
one source for a lack of coordination with ENISA by several members of the Commission. A 
number of interviewees across all stakeholder groups were of the opinion that its location limited 
ENISA’s ability to keep its finger on the pulse. It was suggested that the location helped explain 
why CERT-EU, which is situated in Brussels and can be called upon more easily, is taking on tasks 
that are could arguably also fall within the mandate of ENISA. Some suggestions for improvement 
included having a more decentralized office structure though care would need to be taken not to 
create too much of a fragmented Agency, flexible arrangements with smaller offices where 
needed, for projects etc., or having a liaison office in Brussels.  
 
In the open public consultation, respondents were asked about the impact of ENISA’s split location 
on the Agency’s ability to conduct its work effectively and efficiently. As presented in Figure 33 
below, there were very mixed views on this question with 28% (18) judging that the split location 
affected ENISA’s ability to conduct its work effectively and efficiently to some or to a large extent, 
while 20%(13) felt it did not do so at all. The views were divided among all respondent 
stakeholder groups.   
Figure 33:  Extent to which ENISA’s split location arrangement affected ENISA's ability to conduct its work 
effectively and efficiently, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Respondents were invited to provide a further explanation of their assessment. Respondents who 
felt more positive about ENISA’s current arrangement said that being decentralised from Brussels 
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provided the Agency an advantage to be perceived as a neutral source of information. Considering 
that ENISA has still been successful in operating outside its offices and maintained presence and 
cooperation in relevant events, the location of its offices was not perceived to have affected 
ENISA’s ability to work effectively and efficiently. Respondents who felt less positive about ENISA’s 
current location arrangements said the split location was not optimal for efficiency. Reasons for 
this included the increase of travel costs as well as costs spent on maintaining both offices. The 
split location was thought to present a challenge to people management.  
 
ENISA’s location limits its effectiveness in terms of its objective to provide expertise49. 
There are several factors influencing ENISA’s ability to hire and retain staff but as described in 
section 3.2.2.8 difficulties for spouses to find work in Greece and the lack of a European school in 
Athens contribute to the Agency’s human resources issues and thus lead to difficulties to provide 
its stakeholders with the sought after expertise.   
 
3.2.2.11 ENISA’s internal mechanisms for programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluating 
 
EQ19: To what extent are the internal mechanisms for programming, monitoring, 
reporting and evaluating ENISA adequate for ensuring accountability and appropriate 
assessment of the overall performance of the Agency while minimising the 
administrative burden of the Agency and its stakeholders (established procedures, 
layers of hierarchy, division of work between teams or units, IT systems, etc.)? 
The programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluating mechanisms implemented by ENISA are 
adequate to ensure accountability and an appropriate assessment of performance. However, these 
mechanisms lead to a degree of administrative burden as they are not adapted to the size of the 
Agency and there is room for improvement in terms of the establishment of a monitoring system 
that enables the tracking of performance over time against pre-determined KIIs. 
 
ENISA has a series of internal mechanisms for ensuring accountability and the 
assessment of performance. ENISA’s work is based on annual planning and KIIs are set for all 
activities to evaluate performance. These KIIs are followed up on in ENISA’s annual activity reports 
(section 3.2.2.1 considers ENISA’s KIIs to assess effectiveness). The quality assurance of projects 
is done with a Quality Management System (QMS); the Agency reviewed the QMS in 2015 and 
2016. A range of instruments are available to ensure quality such as manuals and guidelines laying 
down standard operating procedures. Activities follow the Deming Cycle (plan, do, check, act). 
ENISA has been integrating tools such as electronic signatures, electronic workflows and enterprise 
resource management. Finally, ENISA has a number of activity-specific tools that it uses to 
monitor performance, including surveys of participants in the Cyber Europe Exercises and of 
participants in training sessions. The evaluation of ENISA’s 2015 core operational activities 
(undertaken in the first half of 2016) pointed to some areas for improvement in this regard and 
assisted ENISA by designing tools for the monitoring of publications via a brief pop up 
questionnaire, and of the initial and follow-up monitoring of training activities. 
 
ENISA’s internal mechanisms for programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluating 
ensure accountability and an appropriate assessment of the overall performance of the 
Agency. ENISA carefully follows requirements imposed by the Commission rules and according to 
reports from the Court of Auditors, the Agency has shown strong compliance and raised no 
concern with regard to its accountability.50 ENISA’s direct stakeholders, most importantly the 
Management Board, showed satisfaction with the developed procedures. Also internally (by ENISA 
                                               
49 Expertise objective: Anticipate and support Europe in facing emerging NIS challenges, by collating, analysing and making available 
information and expertise on key NIS issues (potentially impacting the EU taking into account the evolutions of the digital environment.) 
50 Court of Auditors (2015): Report on the annual accounts of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security for the 
financial year 2014 together with the Agency’s reply, and Court of Auditors (2016): Report on the annual accounts of the European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security for the financial year 2015 together with the Agency’s reply 
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staff and management), the effectiveness of project planning, project tracking and budget 
management was considered to be high.  
 
The survey results further confirmed this finding. As can be seen in Figure 34 below, the majority 
of respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (73%) thought that the 
internal management systems were conducive to effectiveness (i.e. in terms of meeting ENISA’s 
objectives) to some or to a high extent. This effectiveness was viewed as existing only to a limited 
extent or not at all by 16% of respondents (14 out of 86). Specifically, the members of the 
Agency’s Management and Executive Board were overall satisfied with the effectiveness of these 
systems, with 84% of them ranking them as leading to effectiveness to some or to a high extent.  
Figure 34: Extent of agreement or disagreement with statement regarding ENISA’s internal management 
systems 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
Requirements to ensure accountability and a review of performance are burdensome for 
ENISA, in particular considering the small size of the Agency. As an EU Agency, ENISA has 
to follow the rules and obligations imposed by the Commission. In particular, ENISA’s staff and 
management reported that these requirements represented an important burden as they were not 
adapted to the small size of the Agency. A quarter of ENSIA staff (25%) indicated in the survey 
question above that the internal management systems were only to a limited extent or not at all 
conducive to effectiveness. For example, the Agency works with a high number of rather small 
projects. Not each of these projects requires the same detailed planning and follow-up as some 
larger Commission projects would need. Interviewees noted that with limited administrative 
resources in the Agency it was burdensome to meet all the requirements.  
 
Specific suggestions were made to improve the mechanisms for programming, 
monitoring, reporting and evaluating: 
 Reporting tools should be better integrated with one another and automated to alleviate the 
burden of administrative tasks. This includes the planning and reporting tools for travel of staff 
 The follow up on the use of created reports could be improved. Currently, a focus is set on 
monitoring the number of downloads of reports. Interviewees suggested that it would be more 
informative to collect actual feedback from users of reports and to identify how information 
from reports is being used. Such follow up should take place over several years.  
 Members of the Management Board saw artificial constraints created by the requirement to 
provide an early draft of the work programme by January for the following year. It was 
reported to be difficult to make specific plans so early in advance and the Work Programme 
risks to be outdated quickly because the cybersecurity environment is changing rapidly.   
 
The 2015 evaluation also made some conclusions and recommendations in relation to the setting 
of KIIs which are worthy of note here: For ENISA, measuring impact is highly challenging 
and to a large extent dependent on contextual factors, so setting up a monitoring 
system that works over the long term is essential. This is true in particular for policy 
agencies like ENISA, since the impact can only take place in the larger community by stakeholders 
applying and/or using ENISA’s outputs. Moreover, impact can often only really be judged on the 
longer term through an annual monitoring process. In this respect, ENISA´s annual KIIs are an 
essential data source when it comes to monitoring the Agency´s impact over time. In comparison 
to 2014, some of the KIIs for 2015 were more ambitious and provided a better starting point to 
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measure ENISA´s contribution to reaching the impacts foreseen. However, it should be noted that 
the actual data needed to measure the KIIs was not available at the time of the evaluation. The 
reporting on some of the more ambitious KIIs which seek to ascertain “use” is more operational, 
focussing more on outputs (e.g. the organisation of and number of participants in a workshop) 
rather than on the actual contribution to an impact (e.g. using ENISA´s recommendations). This is 
likely to be in part the result of it being too early to judge the true impact of given activities, but 
also due to a lack of follow-up on a yearly basis in relation to the KIIs set in a given year. On this 
basis, it was recommended that ENISA set up a monitoring system which seeks to measure 
performance against pre-defined KIIs set in a given year, allowing for the measurement of impact 
over a more extended period of time than a year (as is currently the case). Monitoring and 
reporting in relation to such KIIs would therefore need to be ensured on an annual basis for, e.g. 
five years. It was further recommended that ENISA ensure that the KIIs capture impact rather 
than output, and that the collection of data in relation to these is improved.  
 
3.2.2.12 In-house capacity and use of external service providers 
 
EQ20: To what extent has ENISA succeeded in building up the in-house capacities for 
handling various tasks entrusted to it? Are the "make or buy" choices made according to 
efficiency criteria? 
The findings are contradictory on whether ENISA has succeeded in building up in-house capacity. 
Stakeholders strongly differ in their assessment. While the Agency has been able to hire some 
experts over the last years, ENISA highly depends on external expertise for the implementation of 
its activities. Decisions to outsource work are made on an individual basis and are only to some 
extent guided by efficiency criteria. 
 
ENISA strongly relies on external expertise for its activities. From 2014 to 2016, around 
80% of the Agency’s operational budget was used for procurement of studies. As indicated by 
ENISA in the benchmarking exercise, in 2016, procurement of study amounted to EUR 1.597.087 
of a total operational budget of EUR 2.000.000. Compared to other EU Agencies, ENISA relies a lot 
more on external expertise. For example, the ratio of operational budget used by the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) for procurement of study was reported 
by the EMCDDA to represent less than 5% in 2013 but has increased to reach slightly over 15% in 
2016.51 Table 17 below provides a detailed overview of ENISA’s procurement activities between 
2013 and 2016.  
Table 17: Overview of ENISA’s procurement (operations and non-operations) 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 
Contracts signed 
Service contracts 18 25 11 12 
Specific contracts awarded under re-opening 
of competition 
8 15 20 25 
Framework contracts 7 18 19 14 
Total number of procurement related contracts 33 58 50 51 
Purchase orders 
Issued under a framework contract 78 119 143 127 
Not issued under a framework contract 84 115 158 193 
Total number of purchase orders 162 234 301 320 
Procurement procedures 
                                               
51 Information provided by ENISA and EMCDDA for the benchmarking exercise. The agencies were asked to provide the ratio of budget 
used for procurement of study over the overall operational budget. It has not been possible to verify this information based on other 
sources. 
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Open procedures 15 10 9 8 
Other procedures 4 20 38 27 
Total number of tender procedures 19 30 47 35 
Source: Based on Annual Reports, completed and verified by ENISA 
 
From its outset, ENISA is an agency that uses procurement for a lot of its work. With limited 
human and financial resources, ENISA has to find external capacities to cover the very specific and 
complex topics of the cybersecurity field as needed by its stakeholders. Often research and data 
collection is done by external experts, while ENISA staff maintains the responsibility to analyse and 
report on the collected data. However, some specific tasks are being done internally, such as the 
cyber exercises, Article 14 requests and the preparation of the implementation of the NIS 
Directive. A few stakeholders suggested that these tasks would become even more important in 
the future. 
 
Stakeholders disagree on whether ENISA has successfully built up internal expertise to 
cover the various tasks assigned to the Agency. While some interviewees (direct stakeholders 
and representatives from the EU institutions) think that ENISA has managed to hire staff with 
specific expertise over the past years and see ENISA as being very capable to respond to their 
needs, other interviewees (of the same group) think that the Agency is significantly hindered to 
attract the needed expertise as explained in section 3.2.2.8 concerning the effectiveness of 
ENISA’s human resources policies.  
 
The disagreement also concerns the question whether the use of procurement is 
advisable at all. Some members of ENISA’s Management Board said they would like to see ENISA 
get more work done internally because procurement processes made the Agency slow and 
dependent on external stakeholders. Others said that ENISA should use its network of experts 
even more systematically and also involve them in project management roles. This way, staff 
resources could be freed up for other tasks.   
 
The findings suggest that the "make or buy" choices are made on a case by case basis 
with no institutionalised consideration of efficiency criteria. According to ENISA staff and 
management the decision whether an activity is carried out in-house or requires procurement of 
external services depends on the task and the topic covered. Reasons for outsourcing are to 
involve sector experts to provide a different perspective or for quality assurance, for specific data 
collection (e.g. through surveys) and to take over services developed by the Agency that have 
become too big to handle in-house. In this sense, it can be said that efficiency plays a role when 
outsourcing decisions are made: work that is faster or cheaper if implemented by an external 
service provider is considered for outsourcing. However, ENISA staff and management also noted 
that the Agency received a specific budget from the Commission for procurement and that 
decisions are made in a way to ensure full use of this budget.   
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3.2.2.13 Conclusion on effectiveness 
 
Conclusion – Effectiveness 
The baseline situation (established based on an evaluation of all EU agencies including ENISA in 
200952 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 201053) shows concerns about 
ENISA’s ability to achieve targeted impacts. The main reasons provided were ENISA’s limited 
financial resources and the small size of the Agency. These concerns continued to be relevant in 
the period 2013-2016, as presented below. 
 
The annual evaluations of ENISA show that the Agency implements its tasks and achieves its set 
targets. Through this work, ENISA has made a contribution to increased NIS in Europe. However, 
this contribution is limited by several factors:  
 the broad mandate under which a variety of tasks is to be covered, 
 the strong influence of Member States when it comes to setting the work programmes,  
 the Agency’s difficulties in attracting and retaining cybersecurity experts as staff members,  
 and the limited visibility of ENISA.  
 
ENISA’s activities have made an important contribution to enhanced cooperation between 
Member States and related NIS stakeholders. Community building has been enhanced across 
Member States and in particular the cooperation between CERTs/CSIRTs has increased. However, 
the cooperation and exchange between ENISA and the Commission and other EU agencies could 
still be improved. Furthermore, cooperation with industry stakeholders should be strengthened.  
 
ENISA has contributed to enhanced capacities in Member States, most notably in Member States 
with more limited capabilities and resources in the area of cybersecurity. Important activities have 
been developed and implemented, such as the Cyber Europe Exercises and trainings for 
CERTs/CSIRTs. Similarly to its contribution to enhance cooperation, ENISA is not reaching all 
stakeholders with its capacity building activities. Industry stakeholders could be better involved.  
 
ENISA is limited in the expertise it can provide. It makes an important contribution to the 
CERTs/CSIRTs. Other stakeholders from the Member States, but also the EU institutions and 
industry representatives, are less convinced by ENISA’s expertise. ENISA has not managed to 
become recognised as a centre of expertise or a reference point for stakeholders. The high reliance 
on the procurement of external expertise in the implementation of tasks is a consequence of the 
limited in-house expertise but also the limited resources available.   
 
ENISA has assisted the Member States and the Commission in developing and implementing the 
policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory requirements of NIS, though the Agency is 
not consistently being involved by the Commission in all NIS-related activities. 
 
Overall, ENISA has difficulties meeting its objectives. This is linked to the Agency’s broad mandate 
which is not matched by sufficient financial resources. A lot of efforts are being made but they are 
spread over a wide field of responsibility, therefore ENISA can only have a limited impact on 
cybersecurity.  
 
                                               
52 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
53 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
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3.2.3 Efficiency 
 
Efficiency considers the relationship between the resources consumed by an intervention and the 
changes generated by it (which may be positive or negative).54 The assessment of the efficiency of 
ENISA considers the relationship between the resources used by the Agency and the changes 
generated by its activities. The section also covers the efficiency of ENISA’s governance and 
internal organisational structure. The benchmarking of ENISA with other EU agencies and bodies 
has been integrated in this section.  
 
The following evaluation questions are covered in the present section: 
Table 18: Evaluation questions covered under the efficiency criterion 
Main evaluation question Other evaluation questions 
EQ14: To what extent has 
ENISA been efficient in 
implementing the tasks set 
out in its mandate as laid 
down in its Regulation? To 
assess this question, 
elements relating to internal 
structure, operation, 
programming of activities 
and resources, accountability 
and controls, etc. will be 
analysed. 
Retrospective 
 
EQ15: Were the annual budgets of the Agency implemented in an efficient way 
considering the results achieved? 
 
EQ16: Have the resources allocated to the Agency been sufficient for the pursuit 
of its tasks (input/output analysis)? 
 
EQ17: To what extent are the organisational solutions and procedures of ENISA 
adapted to the work entrusted to it and to the actual workload? Is the planning 
cycle of the agency (work programme and budget) in line with the objective of 
achieving efficient results? 
 
EQ18: To what extent have ENISA's governance, organisational structure, 
locations and operations as set in its Regulation and the arrangements related to 
the location of its offices been conducive to efficiency and to achieving economies 
of scale? 
 
EQ21: To what extent and how have external factors influenced the efficiency of 
ENISA? 
 
 
3.2.3.1 ENISA’s efficiency considering its governance, organisational structure, procedures, budget and 
location 
 
EQ14: To what extent has ENISA been efficient in implementing the tasks set out in its 
mandate as laid down in its Regulation? To assess this question, elements relating to 
internal structure, operation, programming of activities and resources, accountability 
and controls, etc. will be analysed. 
 
EQ17: To what extent are the organisational solutions and procedures of ENISA adapted 
to the work entrusted to it and to the actual workload? Is the planning cycle of the 
agency (work programme and budget) in line with the objective of achieving efficient 
results? 
 
EQ18: To what extent have ENISA's governance, organisational structure, locations and 
operations as set in its Regulation and the arrangements related to the location of its 
offices been conducive to efficiency and to achieving economies of scale? 
 
While ENISA’s governance structure (with an Executive Board, Management Board and the PSG), 
management practices and dedicated staff are conducive to the efficient functioning of the Agency, 
there are a number of areas where further efficiency gains could be made. These relate to the 
relatively rigid and inflexible planning cycle; the split location between Athens and Heraklion which 
incurs additional travel costs and costs in terms of ensuring cohesion; its working practices relating 
to its objective of delivering “expertise” through reports and publications which through a more 
                                               
54 Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 110 final 
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efficient process of, for example, peer review could be improved in terms of their quality; the need 
to further modernise and automate given administrative processes; and the need for HR processes 
to be further formalised to ensure a smoother, quicker process. 
 
ENISA’s governance structure is conducive to the efficient functioning of the Agency. The 
current governance structure was seen as conducive to the efficient functioning of the Agency (i.e. 
in terms of value for money) by most of the respondents to the survey on ENISA’s governance, 
organisational set-up and working practices (86% or 76 out of 88 respondents) and was judged 
conducive to this efficiency to a limited or to no extent by only 6% of respondents (5 out of 88). 
Members of the Management and Executive Boards provided more positive answers than the other 
groups of respondents: 63% considered the governance structure to be conducive to efficiency “to 
a high extent”. The interviews with staff and ENISA’s direct stakeholders also pointed to the fact 
that ENISA’s organisational set-up was adapted to the work it carries out and its workload, 
enabling it to achieve its objectives in an efficient manner. 
Figure 35: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: The current governance 
structure with a Management Board, an Executive Board and the PSG is conducive to the efficiency 
functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of value for money) 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
In particular, the establishment of an Executive Board was judged positively by more than half of 
respondents (56% or 49 out of 88 respondents) who saw this new board as bringing more 
efficiency to the functioning of the Management Board to some or to a high extent. A limited 
number of respondents (10% or 9 out of 88) saw this change as being conducive to more 
efficiency to a limited extent or not at all - a quarter of NLOs (25%) were of this opinion. In these 
cases, respondents questioned whether the Executive Board leads to a more efficient functioning 
of the Management Board, suggesting instead that it only increases the complexity and decreases 
the transparency of the structure. Interviewees from ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
suggested that the Management Board could gain in efficiency by working in smaller, targeted 
groups that focus on a given topic before feeding back to the plenary (see also section 3.2.2.8). 
The 2014 and 2015 evaluations supported these findings with reference being made to a clear 
delineation of responsibilities within the organisation, leading to a good execution of the work.  
 
The comparison with other EU agencies shows that ENISA had a comparatively high number of 
meetings with its governing bodies. The comparably higher number of Management Board and 
Executive Board meetings per year for strategic decision making supports the argument made by 
those respondents who judged that ENISA’s governance structure with two boards increased the 
complexity of the Agency. However, FRA also works with an Executive Board. At the same time, 
the high number of meetings shows the active engagement of the Management and the Executive 
Board in the running of the Agency.  
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Figure 36: Number of Management Board and Executive Board meetings per year for strategic decisions, 
2014-2016 
 
Source: Data gathered through secondary sources and received by ENISA, FRA and EMCDDA. 
 
ENISA’s management practices are conducive to creating an efficient organisation. The 
majority of respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (74% or 65 out of 
88) saw ENISA’s management practices as being conducive to creating an efficient organisation 
(i.e. in terms of value for money) “to some” or “to a high extent”. The interviews with ENISA staff 
suggested that the fact that many of ENISA’s management staff come from the private sector 
assists in ensuring that the Agency is managed in an efficient way. The number of meetings at 
management level was also referred to as a means to facilitate the dissemination of information 
and make management more transparent. However, a total of 18% of respondents (16 out of 88) 
saw ENISA’s management practices as only conducive to such efficiency to a limited or to no 
extent; it was felt that management and administration overall had too large a role.  
Figure 37: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: ENISA’s management 
practices are conductive to creating an efficient organisation (i.e. in terms of value for money)?   
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
The planning cycle of the Agency (work programme and budget) is lengthy. The planning 
process is lengthy and burdensome for management in particular, as detailed in section 3.2.2.5, 
but was overall deemed necessary and leads to a necessary result. The findings in this same 
section point to ENISA’s work programme being a relatively rigid means of determining work 
priorities in such a fast-paced area and a lack of continuity in many of its activities from one year 
to the next due to its aim to cover a wide range of activities and sectors. It can be assumed that 
increasing the flexibility and continuity of the work programme from one year to the next would 
therefore likely lead to efficiency gains. 
 
ENISA’s working practices are efficient, leading to timely but not necessarily 
consistently useful, high quality outputs. A large majority of respondents to the survey of 
ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (84% or 72 out of 86 respondents) saw ENISA’s working 
practices as efficient and making the best use of available resources to some or to a high extent. 
Some of the tools in place in the Agency are advanced compared to those used by other agencies 
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and favour efficiency, e.g. the Agency’s workflow paperless management system (use of e-
signatures). However, nine respondents (16%) saw ENISA’s working practices as being conducive 
to such efficiency only to a limited extent or not at all. ENISA staff members (including 
management) were slightly more critical of ENISA’s working practices than the direct stakeholders 
with 16% of them regarding them as conducive to efficiency to a limited extent. Reasons provided 
for such assessments included the level of bureaucracy being too important within ENISA and 
administrative tasks having to be conducted by operational staff.  
Figure 38: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement on ENISA’s working 
practices 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
While ENISA’s working practices enable it to produce services in a timely manner, the quality, 
usefulness and added value of some of its outputs was questioned (see section 3.2.2.7).  It was 
suggested by one interviewee that ENISA could gain in efficiency by procuring less work externally 
from contractors and drawing more on the expertise of national cybersecurity experts from 
national authorities, academics and the private sector to assist them in developing 
reports/publications in-house through a peer review process. 
 
With regards to the internal management systems for planning, follow-up and monitoring the 
majority of respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders (70%) saw them as 
creating value for money “to some” or “to a high extent”. This efficiency was viewed to be of “a 
limited extent” or to exist “not at all” by 10% of respondents. A large number of Management and 
Executive Board members saw the management systems to be bringing efficiency to some or to a 
high extent while ENISA staff was on average slightly more likely (16%) to consider the efficiency 
brought by management systems as being limited or non-existent.  
Figure 39: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement regarding ENISA’s internal 
management systems 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
ENISA’s administrative systems are adequate, but could be modernised to increase 
efficiency. The administrative systems in place to support ENISA’s operations were seen by 
survey respondents as adequate and appropriate to some or to a high extent by a majority of 
respondents (63% or 54 out of 86 respondents) and to a limited extent or not at all by 21% (18 
out of 86). ENISA staff (including management) was more critical than the average in this regard, 
with 35% of them stating that the administrative systems were adequate and appropriate only to a 
limited extent or not at all. Those who provided comments on their more negative assessment 
converged in saying that the administrative systems used were not modern enough and led to a 
duplication of work; required a lot of manual work to operate, not allowing for automation; and 
overall impeded the smooth functioning of the Agency.  
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Figure 40: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding ENISA? 
 
 
An example of a system referred to in the 2014 evaluation was the MATRIX project management 
system. Staff book their hours in the system and it provides an overview of resources for each 
project. MATRIX automatically generates reports for the management on a biweekly basis. 
However, the system was not considered relevant for generating management information at an 
operational level, and it was not used actively to steer projects. Instead, in addition to MATRIX, 
each Core Operations Department (COD) unit used spreadsheets to maintain an overview of 
projects on a daily basis. These sheets were individual to each unit and varied in content from one 
unit to another. During the interviews conducted in 2014, ENISA staff indicated that the MATRIX 
system did not provide for sufficient functions for project management at COD unit level, such as 
tracking risks and issues. For this reason the spreadsheets were set up, with plans to standardise 
them in the future. 
 
While the Agency’s staff was seen as a source of efficiency, human resource processes 
and issues are a source of inefficiency. A number of interviewees (ENISA management and 
Executive Board members) referred to ENISA’s motivated, hard-working staff as a key factor to its 
efficiency. However, ENISA’s difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff (see section 3.2.2.8) is a 
source of inefficiency with significant efforts needing to be put into recruitment by the 
administrative department. Moreover, inefficiencies in the recruitment process were cited by 
ENISA staff with references to the lengthy process, the need to ask the same questions of all 
interviewees making them “unnatural”, difficulties in organising interviews when all interview 
committee members are present, and a lack of follow-up with candidates. It was hoped that the 
arrival of a new human resources manager in late 2016 would enable the process to become more 
efficient. 
 
The difficulties in attracting staff are also reflected in the expenditure allocated to 
recruitment; ENISA dedicates more financial resources to staff recruitment than any of 
the other agencies and bodies considered under the benchmarking exercise. The figure 
below shows that 2.5% of ENISA’s total expenditure in 2015 was dedicated to staff recruitment; 
this figure is significantly higher than for agencies and bodies like BEREC, EFCA, CEPOL, EDA and 
EMCDDA. Despite these efforts, recruitment has not been successful. 
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Figure 41: Staff recruitment expenditure compared to overall expenditure, 2015  
 
Source: Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2016 - Working Document Part III Bodies set up by 
the EU and having legal personality and Public-Private Partnership. 
 
While the setting up of an office in Athens contributed to efficiency gains, the split 
location of the Agency is not conducive to its efficiency. Moving ENISA’s operational units to 
Athens in 2013 meant an important increase in efficiency. As stated in a Commission cross-cutting 
study on the decentralised agencies of 201255, the overall accessibility of EU agencies affects their 
efficiency. The study showed that agencies located in very remote places (including ENISA when 
located in Heraklion) faced difficulties in attracting and retaining staff from the rest of Europe, 
leading to difficulties in filling the establishment plans with appropriate staff and to geographical 
imbalances with a high representation of local staff. This issue has been alleviated to a great 
extent with the move of parts of ENISA to Athens but as shown below, inefficiencies linked to 
ENISA’s location persist.  
 
Among the respondents to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders, ENISA’s current 
location was judged by 59% (52 out of 88 respondents) as enabling ENISA to conduct its work 
efficiently (i.e. in terms of value for money) to some or to a high extent. A total of 35% of 
respondents (31 out of 88) saw it as being conducive to this efficiency to a limited extent or not at 
all. There was a difference in the opinions of ENISA staff relative to other types of respondents: 
PSG members, NLOs and Management and Executive Board members saw ENISA’s location as only 
being conducive to its efficiency to a limited extent or not at all (respectively 54%, 50% and 47%) 
whereas three quarters (75%) of ENISA staff (including management) saw ENISA’s location as 
being conducive to its efficiency to some or to a high extent.  
Figure 42: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: ENISA’s location enables it 
to conduct its work efficiently (i.e. in terms of value for money)  
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
                                               
55 European Commission (2012): Decentralised Agencies – Overhaul – Analytical Fiche No3 – Agencies’ seat and role of the host country. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/fiche_3_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf 
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The respondents who criticised the efficiency of ENISA’s location referred to the costs incurred by 
travel (direct costs and time commitment), and the duplications of costs related to ENISA’s 
facilities being divided over two locations (between Heraklion and Athens). A few ENISA staff 
(including management) respondents were critical of the fact that the Agency is divided in two, 
which it was judged decreased the Agency’s efficiency as its incurred additional travel costs, and 
led to duplications of work from an organisational set-up perspective, e.g. negotiations with 
landlords and other organisational questions. Inefficiencies in the split location were cited by 
interviewees as being primarily due to travel costs between Athens and Heraklion and to ensuring 
cohesion between the two offices, rather than the costs of maintaining an office in two locations. A 
variety of types of interviewee saw closing the office in Heraklion as a means to increase the 
Agency’s efficiency.  
 
In fact, the Agency itself sees efficiency losses stemming from duplication of services across the 
two offices. This includes duplication of costs for security and cleaning services as presented in 
Table 19. The costs listed below for the office in Heraklion represent 24% of ENISA’s 
administrative expenditure in 2016.  
Table 19: Annual costs for renting and maintaining two offices 
Costs Athens Heraklion 
Rent of premises €316,450 €316,444 
Security services €51,000 €47,400 
Cleaning services €24,000 €15,180 
Total €391,450 €379,024 
Source: Data provided by ENISA 
 
To this, the staff costs for employees in Heraklion have to be added. According to data provided by 
ENISA, there were 13 staff members working in Heraklion in 2016, representing a cost of more 
than 300,000 EUR per year (the number of staff in Heraklion has been reduced to eight in 2017). 
Similar costs would have to be paid if these staff members were based in Athens. Only the travel 
costs to Athens of EUR 751 per staff member could be saved.  
Table 20: Costs for staff based in Heraklion 
Costs Number of staff Total 
Daily subsistence allowances 13 €83,813 
Installation allowances 13 €89,422 
Removals 13 €139,000 
Travel expenses 13 €751 
Total 13 €312,986 
Source: Data provided by ENISA 
 
ENISA also assesses that the most important costs stemming from the two offices are related to a 
loss of productivity due to the separation of the teams and the needs to ensure coordination and 
across the offices.  
 
ENISA was not seen as achieving economies of scale to the extent that it could. Where 
ENISA can achieve economies of scale is through its cooperation with other bodies, which as 
presented in section 3.2.4 is not as effective as it could be. In fact, it was suggested that from a 
European perspective, ENISA's capabilities and skills could be used more efficiently and economies 
of scale could be achieved if ENISA is consulted/has a role in any European activity being linked to 
NIS/Cybersecurity in Europe such as the contractual public-private partnership (cPPP).  
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3.2.3.2 Implementation of annual budgets 
 
EQ15: Were the annual budgets of the Agency implemented in an efficient way 
considering the results achieved? 
Taking into account the results achieved by the Agency and the limited budget available it can be 
concluded that ENISA implements its budgets in an efficient way. ENISA makes important 
achievements in terms of created outputs, such as high numbers of publications and fully uses the 
allocated funds. The Agency has been able to contribute to its targeted impact (an increased level 
of NIS in Europe) though could achieve more if more resources were available.  
Improvements in budget implementation could be made by reducing the amount of carry-overs 
from one year to the next and ensuring that the budget is spent evenly within one year. Among 
the selected sample of EU Agencies, ENISA has the highest share of administrative expenditure. 
 
Over the period 2013 to 2016, ENISA’s budget has increased by 16%.  The budget of the 
ENISA comprises a subsidy from the EU budget which constitutes each year to 93% of the 
Agency’s revenue. In addition, revenue stems from rent subsidies from the Government of the 
Hellenic Republic (which constitutes between 6 and 7% each year), as well as contributions from 
third countries participating in the work of the Agency (around 1%).  
In 2016, the Agency had a budget of EUR 10.5 million. Figure 43 shows the annual increase in 
ENISA’s budget. The overall increase in four years is EUR 1.7m or an increase of 16% relative to 
the 2013 budget.  
Figure 43: ENISA’s budget 2013-2016 
 
Source: ENISA’s Annual Activity Reports (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) 
 
A comparison to other EU agencies shows that ENISA is among the decentralised agencies with the 
lowest budget. This is further discussed in section 3.2.3.3 below.  
 
ENISA ensures full budget execution but carry-overs are high; a problem that is 
encountered by many EU agencies. As shown in Table 21 below, ENISA reached a budget 
execution rate of its expenditure appropriations of 100% in 2014 and 2015, suggesting high 
efficiency in the use of its budget. The high payment rate also shows the capacity of the Agency to 
finalise its annual activities and execute payments as planned and on time. However, the Agency 
has made use of high carry-overs of committed appropriations from one year to the next. 
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Table 21: Budget execution of EU subsidy56 
 2013  2014 2015 
Budget execution rate 99.7% 100% 100% 
Payment rate on expenditure 
appropriations 
91.3% 85.6% 92.9% 
Carry-overs (share of committed 
appropriations) 
13.5% 49% 22% 
Source: Court of Auditors reports 
 
The European Court of Auditors commented in its reports on ENISA’s high carry-overs. The reports 
stated that the appropriations primarily concerned administrative expenditure. They were intended 
for IT equipment and furniture.57 However, in its 2015 “Summary of results from the Court’s 
annual audits of the European Agencies and other bodies” the Court noted that a high level of 
carry-overs was a frequent comment and concerned many agencies.58 In 2015, 32 out of 40 
assessed agencies were concerned. On average, 36% of committed appropriations for 
administrative expenditure were carried over. ENISA was thus in 2015 below the average. The 
execution rates reflect the detailed planning of the EU agencies’ budgets and the incentives to 
ensure full budget execution in order to avoid budget reductions in the following year. This shows 
that budget implementation could be further improved. ENISA staff and management noted during 
interviews that there were peaks in spending at the end of each year to ensure that a high budget 
execution is achieved.  
 
ENISA shows efficiency in the implementation of its different tasks. The annual evaluations 
of ENISA concluded that processes generally were efficient and a clear delineation of 
responsibilities within the organisation led to a good execution of the work. ENISA staff and 
Management Board noted in the interviews that regular follow ups on costs were taking place. 
Expenditure was assessed to be comparable across the projects. Planning and monitoring of 
implementation of tasks was reported to be working well. ENISA produces a high number of 
deliverables and generates good outreach in terms of downloads.  
 
Despite its budget restrictions, the Agency is able to meet its objectives and contributes 
to some extent to targeted impacts. As shown in sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 ENISA has been 
effective in implementing its tasks, though not to the extent of a full achievement of targeted 
objectives and impacts. ENISA is expected to contribute to a long list of tasks and it has proven 
difficult to contribute to all targeted objectives due to limited financial and human resources. The 
achievements that are being made show that considerations on the efficient implementation of 
resources are being made. Along the same lines, the 2015 evaluation indicated that the Agency 
risks dispersing already scarce resources across too many, too small activities, decreasing the 
chance of a real impact overall on NIS. 
 
Little potential to increase efficiency was identified. In the annual evaluations of ENISA only 
small adaptations were suggested to increase efficiency. A main issue raised was the split of 
ENISA’s location which to some extent explains the comparably high share of administrative 
expenditure of the Agency, as presented in the following section 3.2.3.3. As reported in section 
3.2.2.11, monitoring and reporting requirements are generally found to be effective but represent 
an important burden for staff members.  
 
                                               
56 Annual Activity Report 2014 
57 Court of Auditors (2014): Report on the annual accounts of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security for the 
financial year 2014 together with the Agency’s reply, and Court of Auditors (2016): Report on the annual accounts of the European 
Union Agency for Network and Information Security for the financial year 2015 together with the Agency’s reply 
58 Court of Auditor (2016): Summary of results from the Court’s annual audits of the European Agencies and other bodies for the 
financial year 2015 
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3.2.3.3 Adequacy of allocated resources 
 
EQ16: Have the resources allocated to the Agency been sufficient for the pursuit of its 
tasks (input/output analysis)?  
Compared to other EU agencies ENISA has a small budget and a low number of staff. The share of 
CAs among the staff is comparably high. There is concern among ENISA’s stakeholders that the 
Agency does not have sufficient resources to complete its tasks to its full potential; issues relating 
to the degree to which it is reaching its targeted objectives and impacts are presented in section 
3.2.2.1. In particular, more staff is needed. As a consequence of the limited resources, ENISA’s 
Management Board has to prioritise tasks for the Agency. ENISA relies on the dedication of staff 
members to ensure the implementation of tasks despite insufficient resources. 
 
ENISA works with a comparably low budget and a low number of staff. In 2016, ENISA 
had 69 staff members of which 24 were CAs. Staff increased by 14% between 2013 and 2016. At 
the same time, the share of CAs among staff increased from 22% to 35%. To some extent the 
increasing employment of CAs can be considered a cost-saving measure. The annual evaluations of 
ENISA’s activities noted that this would also represent a risk of increasing staff turnover and 
making positions less attractive, thus increasing the recruitment problem.  
 
In fact, ENISA has one of the lowest budgets and levels of human resources compared to all EU 
agencies. The figure below positions ENISA among 40 agencies covered by the European Court of 
Auditors report on agencies in 2016. The figure shows that ENISA is among the agencies with the 
lowest budget and lowest number of staff. However, the figure also shows that comparably small 
agencies tend to have low staff numbers in relation to their budget when compared with the trend 
line. 
Figure 44: Comparison of EU agencies based on staff and budget, 2017  
 
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, based on Draft General Budget of the EU for the financial year 2018 - Working 
Document Part III - Bodies set up by having legal personality and Public-Private Partnership (COM(2017) 400 - June 2017) 
 
The share of administrative expenditure of ENISA is higher than that of other EU 
agencies considered in the benchmarking exercise. For example, in 2015 CEPOL, with a total 
budget similar to ENISA’s but slightly lower staff numbers, used less than 6% of its budget as 
administrative expenditure. EFCA, even more similar in its total budget and staff numbers to 
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ENISA, used 12.42% of its budget for administrative expenditure in the same year, while ENISA’s 
administrative expenditure amounted to 14.8% of its total budget.  
Figure 45: Distribution of commitment appropriations between staff, administrative and operational 
expenditure, 2015  
 
Source: presentation by Ramboll, data from European Commission: Draft General Budget of the European Union for the 
financial year 2016 - Working Document Part III  
 
When comparing the distribution of staff between operational and administrative roles, as 
presented in Figure 46 below, it shows that ENISA has with 21% a very similar share of 
administrative staff as EMCDDA. However, FRA has a share of administrative staff of only 17%. 
Considering the much higher budget of FRA, this suggests that there are some economies of scale 
for larger agencies when it comes to the execution of administrative tasks. ENISA, as a small 
agency, cannot benefit from these.  
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Figure 46: Staff distribution between operational and administrative staff for ENISA, FRA and EMCDDA, 
2015  
 
Source: Data gathered through secondary sources and received by ENISA, FRA and EMCDDA. 
 
There is concern among ENISA’s stakeholders that the Agency does not have sufficient 
resources to meet the challenges in the cybersecurity area. Direct stakeholders, such as the 
Member States, see that ENISA is not able to respond to all their needs. This is reflected in the 
process of setting ENISA’s annual work programme where it is not possible to include requests 
from all members of the Management Board. More external stakeholders, such as other EU 
agencies, stressed that ENISA is also affected in its day-to-day work by its limited resources, for 
example in it being absent from key cybersecurity events. In the end, as shown in section 3.2.2, 
ENISA has difficulties to meet its objectives due to an important scope of its mandate which is 
matched with only a limited number of resources.  
 
Moreover, among the open public consultation respondents, 58% (38 out of 65) considered the 
size of the agency with 84 staff members to be partially or completely inadequate. There were no 
notable differences between the different respondent groups.  
Figure 47: Adequacy of the size of the Agency for the work entrusted to it (n=65)  
 
Source: Open public consultation 
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Please also refer to the findings on ENISA’s human resources in section 3.2.2.8. 
 
The insufficient human and financial resources require a lot of dedication from the staff 
to complete their work and a strict prioritisation of tasks in the work programme. ENISA 
is not able to respond to all needs of its stakeholders but has to focus on the most urgent ones. 
The Management Board has to set priorities within the tasks ENISA is supposed to fulfil based on 
its mandate.  
 
The limited resources represent a burden on staff who take on additional work. ENISA’s 
management and Management Board confirmed that ENISA was highly dependent on the 
dedication and willingness of staff to work overtime in order to implement the work programme 
and meet expected standards. The small budget also limits ENISA’s visibility. The main concern is 
to implement the Work Programme rather than build relationships with the stakeholders and, for 
example, visit all Member States at least once a year or follow up on the use of publications to 
gain insights on stakeholder requests for future work.  
 
3.2.3.4 Influence of external factors on efficiency 
 
EQ21: To what extent and how have external factors influenced the efficiency of ENISA? 
Evidence shows that ENISA’s efficiency is negatively influenced by limited exchanges with the 
Commission on its plans for the Agency, and limited exchange and cooperation with other EU 
bodies. 
 
Limited communication of the Commission when deciding on (new) tasks for ENISA has 
a negative impact on the Agency’s efficiency. The findings from interviews and the annual 
evaluations of ENISA suggest that there is some concern that the Commission does not sufficiently 
exchange with the Agency on the feasibility of implementing additional tasks when planning the 
allocation of new responsibilities. One example given was the role of ENISA under the NIS 
Directive. ENISA’s staff and management reported that they were not sufficiently able to comment 
on the feasibility of the tasks foreseen in the legislative text, as developed by the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council. Inefficiencies are created where the Agency then needs to 
adapt its Work Programme and drop tasks on which work was already planned or even started.  
 
The fragmentation of cybersecurity across different European Commission DGs, EU 
bodies and agencies creates inefficiencies where information is not shared or work is 
duplicated. Besides ENISA, a number of other EU agencies and bodies (including CERT-EU and 
Europol’s EC3) are active in different fields relating to cybersecurity. Also a number of European 
Commission DGs are touching in their work upon cybersecurity issues. These are for example 
beside DG Connect, DG Energy when covering security of energy grids or the DG for Economic and 
Financial Affairs when considering security of online banking. ENISA staff and management, as 
well as other interviewed stakeholders, expressed concern that inefficiencies were caused by two 
or more organisations working on the same topic and insufficiently sharing information about their 
work with one another. A further assessment of ENISA’s cooperation with EU bodies and potential 
duplication of efforts is presented in section 3.2.4. 
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3.2.3.5 Conclusion on efficiency 
 
Conclusion – Efficiency 
 
The baseline situation, (established based on an evaluation of all EU agencies including ENISA in 
200959 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 201060) points to ENISA being 
one of the smallest agencies in the EU. In 2009, ENISA had 57 staff members and a budget of EUR 
8 million. Together with its location in Heraklion, this factor was considered to impact on its 
efficiency. Since then, this evaluation shows that ENISA has slightly grown in size but the 
resources allocated to it are still not considered to be sufficient. The move of ENISA’s operational 
staff to Athens increased ENISA’s efficiency.  
 
ENISA demonstrates efficiency in the implementation of its tasks. ENISA has among the lowest 
budgets and levels of human resources compared to other EU agencies. In order to complete the 
various tasks set out in its mandate, ENISA has to be very efficient in the implementation of its 
budget and carefully consider where resources and working hours can be spent. The Agency 
develops a high number of publications every year and implements many other activities. Despite 
its small budget, the Agency has been able to contribute to targeted objectives and impacts, 
showing efficiency in the use of its budget.  
 
The assessment of the distribution of financial resources showed that while ENISA has a similar 
budget execution rate, relative to the other agencies reviewed as part of the benchmarking 
exercise. Its administrative expenditure was higher. The Agency has to fulfil a number of 
administrative requirements as set by the Commission. These requirements are the same for all 
EU agencies but weigh more heavily on smaller agencies.  
 
One of the main challenges to the Agency’s efficiency relates to ENISA’s difficulties in recruiting 
and retaining staff, also compared to other agencies and bodies considered as part of the 
benchmarking exercise. Despite allocating the highest level of expenditure to staff recruitment in 
comparative terms, posts are not being filled. The data showed that ENISA’s ability to maintain 
staff gradually decreased over the years, whereas other agencies such as FRA and ECMDDA 
maintained roughly the same number of staff. 
 
ENISA’s efficiency is further limited by its split location: having two offices means that the Agency 
has to implement additional efforts to ensure coordination between the offices and bear the extra 
travel costs.  
 
3.2.4 Coherence 
 
The evaluation criterion coherence assesses how well or not different actions work together.61 For 
this evaluation, the focus has been set on the external coherence of ENISA’s work with other EU 
Agencies and institutions, as well as with the Member States. This section also integrates the 
positioning exercise, under which the scope of services and products offered by ENISA has been 
compared to that of other EU agencies and bodies, as well as to Member States’ cybersecurity 
organisations. The complete data of the positioning exercise is presented in Appendix 4.  
                                               
59 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
60 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
61 Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 110 final 
   
 
 
 
80 
 
Table 22: Evaluation questions covered under the coherence criterion 
Main evaluation question Other evaluation questions 
EQ24: To what extent are 
ENISA activities coherent 
with the policies, strategy 
documents and activities of 
other stakeholders? 
Retrospective 
 
EQ9: How does ENISA compare to the other EU and national bodies offering 
similar services in relation to their capability to satisfy the cybersecurity and 
digital privacy needs of ENISA's constituency? 
 
EQ10: To what extent has ENISA been more effective in achieving its results 
compared to other past, existing or alternative national or EU level arrangements? 
 
EQ22: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation with the European 
Commission and other EU bodies, to ensure complementarity and avoid 
duplication of efforts? 
 
EQ23: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation with the Member States to 
ensure complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts? 
 
EQ25: Are the procedures put in place effective to ensure that ENISA's 
cooperation activities are coherent with the policies and activities of its 
stakeholders? 
 
EQ26: What are the risks/sources of overlaps/conflict of interests? 
 
 
3.2.4.1 ENISA’s cooperation with the European Commission and other EU bodies 
 
EQ22: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation with the European Commission and 
other EU bodies to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts? 
ENISA’s activities were found to be generally coherent with the activities of the European 
Commission and other EU bodies. Some cooperation is taking place and leads to complementarity. 
Nevertheless, the cooperation between ENISA and the different Commission DGs could be 
increased. It seems as if so far there is no reflex to involve ENISA in all Commission activities 
concerning cybersecurity. With some EU bodies, including the Commission’s DG Energy and EC3,  
ENISA is successfully cooperating by developing and implementing common activities.  
 
ENISA’s activities were identified as being coherent with the policies and activities of its 
stakeholders. Almost all respondents (94%) to the survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
regarded ENISA’s activities as being coherent with the policies and activities of its stakeholders to 
some or to a high extent. 
Figure 48: Extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statement on the coherence of ENISA’s 
activities 
 
Source: Survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders 
 
The coherence of ENISA’s activities with EU political priorities was also confirmed during interviews 
as outlined in 3.2.1.2. 
 
There were diverging assessments of cooperation between ENISA and the European 
Commission and other agencies but a desire for more cooperation was expressed. The 
annual evaluations of ENISA’s activities in 2014 and 2015 concluded that the Agency actively 
pursued cooperation with other relevant EU stakeholders. Many interviewees across all stakeholder 
groups noted that coordination efforts were high and systematic exchanges took place but were 
limited by constraints in resources on ENISA’s side. In contrast, even more interviewees, including 
several Commission representatives thought that cooperation between ENISA and the Commission 
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could be further improved. The location of ENISA was cited as one source for this lack of 
coordination by several members of the Commission. No overlaps or conflicts of interest were 
identified between ENISA and the Commission due to lacking cooperation but stakeholders saw 
room for improvement to allow for more coordinated planning of ENISA’s activities. From the 
perspective of ENISA’s staff and management, as well as the Management Board, a desire was 
expressed that the different Commission DGs should rely more on ENISA’s services and 
systematically involve the Agency when dealing with cybersecurity issues. Cooperation between 
the DG JRC and ENISA was generally assessed to be limited to specific projects. The DG JRC 
conducts research on request by DG CNECT, and where ENISA covers the same issue some degree 
of coordination is implemented to avoid duplication of work. However, there was no evidence of 
more systematic coordination to ensure synergies.    
 
The cooperation with other EU bodies and agencies could be further improved to 
enhance synergies. There are some efforts by ENISA to cooperate with other EU bodies like 
Europol’s EC3. EC3 is represented in ENISA’s PSG and the organisations have cooperated in the 
past on some activities, like the organisation of workshops aimed at defining a common taxonomy 
between CERTs/CSIRTs and law enforcement.62 However, the European landscape of cybersecurity 
remains fragmented with many actors covering specific fields and without an organisation acting 
as an umbrella for these different activities guiding the distribution of tasks. Duplications of efforts 
easily arise, as stakeholders are not fully aware of all activities of the different organisations active 
in the field of cybersecurity. A detailed assessment of overlaps and complementarities between 
ENISA, CERT-EU, the DG JRC and EC3 is presented in section 3.2.4.3. In particular, the positioning 
of ENISA relative to CERT-EU showed a risk for overlap in certain areas.  
 
3.2.4.2 ENISA’s cooperation with the Member States 
 
EQ23: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation with the Member States to ensure 
complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts? 
In general, ENISA’s activities are coherent with the activities of the Member States. There is a 
strong coherence and there are synergies between ENISA’s activities and those of the national 
CERTs/CSIRTs. ENISA is duplicating the efforts of some of the Member States’ national 
cybersecurity authorities. This applies mainly to Member States with a lot of experience and 
resources in cybersecurity, whereas Member States with fewer resources and capacities are more 
reliant on ENISA’s support.    
 
Overall, there is a good level of cooperation between Member States and ENISA which 
ensures complementarity and avoids a duplication of efforts. CERT/CSIRT stakeholders 
were asked in a survey to assess the extent to which the activities conducted by ENISA to support 
CERTs/CSIRTs over the 2013-2016 period were coherent with and complementary to (i.e. not 
overlapping or duplicating) what CERTs/CSIRTs were doing. For each of ENISA’s activities, a large 
majority of respondents saw a high or some coherence with CSIRT’s activities. The three most 
coherent activities cited were “organising and managing large-scale cybersecurity measures”, 
“supporting cooperation among CERTs/CSIRTs within the CERT/CSRIT network” and “organising 
workshops and conferences”. The activity that was seen as least complementary with 
CERTs/CSIRTs’ activities was “supporting the collaboration between CERTs/CSIRTs and law 
enforcement communities, in responding to recent policy and technical developments in this area”. 
Also “creating tools and best practices” and “developing training methodologies” were considered 
to be less complementary.  
                                               
62 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/events/5th-enisa-ec3-workshop 
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Figure 49: Extent to which ENISA’s activities towards CERTs/CSIRTs were coherent with and 
complementary to (i.e. not overlapping or duplicating) what CERTs/CSIRTs were doing 
 
Source: CERT/CSIRT survey 
 
To some extent duplication of efforts can be observed between Member States with 
strong expertise in cybersecurity and ENISA. The positioning exercise showed a duplication of 
efforts between ENISA and these Member States, as can be seen in the analysis of the services of 
ANSSI, NCSC and INCIBE (see section 3.2.4.3). The same activities are however benefiting 
Member States which do not have the same capacities and resources as their larger neighbours.  
 
3.2.4.3 Positioning of ENISA relative to other EU bodies and national organisations active in the NIS 
area 
 
EQ9: How does ENISA compare to the other EU and national bodies offering similar 
services in relation to their capability to satisfy the cybersecurity and digital privacy 
needs of ENISA's constituency?  
 
ENISA is able to some extent to respond to the cybersecurity needs of its constituency. There are 
however certain needs being covered by other EU bodies or within the Member States. Considering 
the growth in relevance of activities in promoting NIS in the past few years, there is room for a lot 
of different actors to cover the various thematic fields and the different needs of a growing group 
of stakeholders concerned by NIS. ENISA is not able to respond to all these needs but meets 
stakeholders’ expectations in specific areas, such as the implementation of exercises and fostering 
cooperation between the Member States.  
 
In comparison to CERT-EU, ENISA is perceived as being less flexible in responding to unforeseen 
needs but is valued for its independent point of view. In those Member States where resources and 
capacities in the area of cybersecurity are high, national sources of information are preferred over 
ENISA’s reports as they come in national language and are perceived to be more tailored to given 
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Member States’ circumstances. However, for stakeholders in Member States with fewer resources 
being invested in cybersecurity, ENISA represents a valued source of information and provider of 
services.  
 
As presented in section 3.2.1.3, most of ENISA’s stakeholders do not expect ENISA to cover digital 
privacy needs.  
 
EQ10: To what extent has ENISA been more effective in achieving its results compared 
to other past, existing or alternative national or EU level arrangements? 
 
ENISA was found to be only partially effective in the achievement of targeted results, primarily due 
to its limited resources and the broad mandate to be covered. Compared to other current EU 
bodies active in the area of NIS, ENISA seems to be more restricted in its capacity to effectively 
achieve results. For example, CERT-EU has for some stakeholders become the preferred source of 
expertise when setting up a CERT or when searching for information on threats even though its 
mandate points to it being a body at the service of EU institutions, agencies and bodies.  
 
Compared to Member States’ organisations, ENISA provides value in particular where it brings 
together stakeholders from across the EU and representing different sectors. However, the degree 
to which ENISA has been effective at achieving its intended results varies from one Member State 
to another. In general terms, the cybersecurity bodies of more experienced Member States are 
effective in policy development, capacity building and the provision of expertise, while in Member 
States with less capacity and expertise, ENISA’s activities lead to better results.  
 
EQ26: What are the risks/sources of overlap/conflict of interests? 
 
The evaluation identified risks of overlap between ENISA and CERT-EU, specifically in the area of 
fostering cooperation across the Member States and the advice provided to CERTs/CSIRTs. CERT-
EU is implementing activities that do not only target its constituents (i.e. the EU institutions, 
agencies and bodies) but also those of ENISA. In the provision of analysis of risks and threats and 
training activities, CERT-EU has become a relevant source for national public and private 
stakeholders. No overlaps were identified between ENISA and EC3. The DG JRC and ENISA cover 
similar topics and have published reports with comparable content, but the DG JRC implements 
research and testing in the field of cybersecurity which is something that does not fall within the 
mandate of ENISA. There is no direct coordination of the work between ENISA and the DG JRC 
which gives rise to a potential for a duplication of efforts. However, DG CNECT coordinates the 
distribution of work, thereby reducing this potential for a duplication of efforts.  
 
Member States with strong capacities in cybersecurity tend to implement similar activities as 
ENISA. While these are focussed on the national context and produced in the national language, 
there is some doubt whether ENISA actually needs to provide similar services. In some cases the 
EU level perspective can add another useful layer of information and exchange, but in other cases 
it is not clear whether ENISA adds any value. This however applies only to Member States with 
strong capacities and experience in cybersecurity. Member States with fewer resources rely on 
ENISA’s services.   
 
 
This section of the report is based on the positioning exercise which evaluated how ENISA is 
positioned vis-à-vis a sample of other EU and national bodies working on cybersecurity and digital 
privacy on the basis of the services offered and the needs expressed by the Agency's stakeholders. 
The organisations covered in the positioning exercise are CERT-EU, EC3, the DG JRC, the French 
ANSSI, the Spanish INCIBE and the Dutch NCSC. ENISA’s activities have been mapped across the 
Agency’s four tasks: enhancing cooperation, develop and maintain a high level of expertise, 
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enhancing capacity building and developing and implementing policies. Sub-categories of these 
have been developed to understand more specific tasks that have been implemented. The 
complete mapping of ENISA’s services and the detailed assessment of the services of the other 
organisations under review is attached in Appendix 4. The methodology applied for this exercise is 
described in section 2.3. 
 
ENISA responds to some extent to the needs of its constituency by providing expertise, 
enhancing capacity and cooperation, and supporting the development and 
implementation of policy. As outlined in section 3.2.1, ENISA’s focus is set on cybersecurity 
needs. There is less demand for support in the digital privacy area. The findings of the evaluation 
also show that ENISA is not able to meet all the needs of its stakeholders, primarily due to its 
limited resources.  
 
Respondents to the open public consultation were asked to assess whether the activities of ENISA 
were coherent with the policies and activities of their own organisation. 83% of respondents (54 
out of 65) considered ENISA’s activities to be to a large or to some extent coherent (e.g. take into 
account, do not overlap, do not conflict with) with the policies and activities of their organisation. 
This was the case for respondents across all categories.  
Figure 50: Extent to which ENISA’s activities are coherent e.g. take into account, do not overlap, do not 
conflict, with the policies and activities of respondent’s organisation, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Respondents were further asked whether they considered ENISA’s activities to be coherent with 
the policies and activities of its stakeholders, including other EU agencies and bodies. In total, 
68% of respondents (44) considered ENISA’s activities to be largely or to some extent coherent. 
This is comparably lower than for the coherence with respondents’ own organisation. Also the 
share of respondents considering ENISA’s activities to be coherent to a large extent was lower for 
this second question (46% against 23%).  
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Figure 51: Extent to which ENISA’s activities are coherent e.g. take into account, do not overlap, do not 
conflict, with the policies and activities of its stakeholders, (n=65) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Respondents who indicated in one or both of the questions that ENISA’s activities were coherent to 
only a small extent or not at all, were asked to provide further explanations. Those that considered 
ENISA’s activities not to be coherent with their own organisation’s activities mainly referred to 
issues with ENISA being up-to-date with the latest developments with regard to legislation or 
technical evolution. Respondents that saw ENISA’s activities to be coherent only to a small extent 
or not at all with policies and activities of other stakeholders mentioned a lack of clear distinction 
between the roles of ENISA and CERT-EU. Respondents also mentioned potential overlaps with 
other organisations (including the cybersecurity bodies of the Member States and the European 
Cyber Security Organisation).  
 
EU bodies 
 
ENISA and CERT-EU 
 
A comparison between the activities of ENISA and those of CERT-EU shows that there 
are some complementarities but also a risk of overlap.63 CERT-EU is the Computer 
Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, agencies and bodies, established in 2012. The 
team is made up of IT security experts from the main EU institutions (European Commission, 
General Secretariat of the Council, European Parliament, Committee of the Regions, and the 
Economic and Social Committee).64 Its Steering Board is composed of one member of senior 
management designated by each of the EU institutions or bodies, the Commission may designate 
up to two further members. EU agencies are represented by ENISA.65 CERT-EU’s mission is to 
support the EU institutions, agencies and bodies to protect themselves against cyber-attacks. This 
is done by providing information on threats, vulnerabilities and protection measures, by 
disseminating information to its constituents in case of an attack and to ensure coordination of 
response.66 The activities also include the delivery of extended security services, such as 
                                               
63 According to the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines, “complementarity” means that similar initiatives (of different 
organisations) contribute to the same overall objective and approach it from different perspectives. “Overlap” signifies that several 
interventions are delivering the same effects for the same people and at the same time. 
64 https://cert.europa.eu/cert/plainedition/en/cert_about.html 
65 Council of the European Union (2014): Information note - Recommendations by the inter-institutional Steering Board of the Computer 
Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU) on the future mandate, governance, organisational 
setup, staffing and funding of CERT-EU. Brussels, 9 September 2014 – document number 12992/14 
66 CERT-EU (2013): RFC 2350 
   
 
 
 
86 
 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment. The scope of CERT-EU’s activities thus covers 
prevention, detection, response and recovery.  
 
In general, the services provided by CERT-EU to the EU institutions, bodies and agencies are 
complementary to the work undertaken by ENISA to coordinate and promote cooperation at EU 
level among the Member States. The work of both bodies touches upon the field of prevention, for 
example, through the preparation of regular threat analysis reports and knowledge and 
methodology enhancement. In the field of threat analysis, the two bodies complement one another 
as CERT-EU provides daily, current information, while ENISA’s Threat Landscape reports are 
published on an annual basis, thus providing more in-depth assessments. In theory, the targeted 
audience of the two bodies differs. However, CERT-EU’s mandate includes a provision stating that 
the body may undertake any activities going beyond its mandate with the prior approval of the 
Steering Board.67 In practice, CERT-EU has become a reference point for technical advice for 
organisations interested in building up a CERT. CERT-EU also acts as a point of exchange between 
the Member States on cybersecurity issues. The body is aware of threats and issues in the 
different Member States and to some extent shares this information with the other Member States. 
Here CERT-EU enhances capacity and cooperation beyond its core stakeholders and implements 
activities that would also be within the scope of ENISA’s mandate. CERT-EU responds to a need 
that ENISA has not been able to fill due to limited financial and human resources (see section 
3.2.3.3).  
 
A high number of interviewees from different stakeholder groups expressed concern about this and 
saw a risk of overlap in the activities of the two bodies. For example, CERT-EU’s website provides 
a news monitor on vulnerabilities, threats and incidents, but also on the activities of different 
CERTs/CSIRTs. Another example of CERT-EU’s activities targeted at national CERTs/CSIRTs were 
workshops on Malware Information Sharing Platforms. The described activities do not represent an 
overlap with ENISA’s activities because the Agency does not provide the same services at the 
moment. However, they fall within the remit of ENISA’s mandate and there is a risk of duplication 
of work if both organisations were to provide similar services to national CERTs/CSIRTs.  
 
CERT-EU seems to be closing a gap in services that are needed by ENISA’s constituents, 
but that the Agency, as a decentralised, neutral source, cannot provide due to its limited 
resources. According to some of the interviewed stakeholders (direct stakeholders), CERT-EU is 
being contacted by stakeholders beyond its constituents for specific advice, for example on 
creating a CERT. CERT-EU is considered to be quicker in providing responses to such specific 
requests. CERT-EU also has the advantage of being located in Brussels which a few interviewees 
suggested was one of the reasons why CERT-EU was considered to be more accessible by 
CERTs/CSIRTs but also the broader stakeholder community. While this study showed that ENISA’s 
lack of visibility is not only due to the perceived distance of its location to Brussels, these 
stakeholder views show that there is some importance placed on the Agency’s location when 
comparing it to other bodies or agencies. As CERT-EU is an inter-institutional body and not a 
decentralised agency it can more easily ensure direct cooperation with the different DGs of the 
Commission. However, as a decentralised agency, ENISA is recognised by the Member States and 
the private sector as a neutral and independent source of information. This was reflected in the 
open public consultation, where national authorities very frequently and respondents from the 
private sector frequently indicated “the products and services provide information that is 
independent and neutral” as a reason for using ENISA’s products and services.  Interviewees from 
ENISA’s staff and Management Board reported that with additional resources some of the services 
provided by CERT-EU could also be implemented by ENISA. However, as presented in section 
3.2.3.3, with limited staff available ENISA needs to focus on given tasks in order to be able to 
implement its work programme.  
                                               
67 Council of the European Union (2015): Information note - CERT-EU mandate, service catalogue and information sharing and exchange 
framework. 3 March 2015 – document number 6738/15 
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ENISA and EC3 
 
Little to no overlap was identified between ENISA and Europol’s EC3; the two 
organisations seem to cooperate well. The European Cybercrime Centre was set up by Europol 
in 2013 to strengthen the law enforcement response to cybercrime in the EU and thus to help 
protect European citizens, businesses and governments from online crime.68 The organisation 
implements capacity building and policy development and implementation in the area of 
cybercrime. There are some topics in which the activities of ENISA can touch upon what EC3 does. 
For example, EC3 works on the development of a common taxonomy for CERTs/CSIRTs to 
facilitate cooperation and implements training to authorities in Member States. The evaluation 
findings show that in these cases ENISA and EC3 tend to work together rather than creating 
duplications.  
 
While there is some institutionalised coordination between ENISA and EC3, day-to-day 
cooperation could be further improved. ENISA sits on the Steering Board of EC3. In turn, EC3 
is represented in ENISA’s PSG. This allows for coordination of the organisations’ work. However, 
interviewees suggested that there could be even more coordination to avoid duplication of efforts 
on a daily level. While the reports of EC3 take a cybercrime perspective on topics that might be 
covered by ENISA, ENISA staff and management suggested that this does not fully avoid any 
overlaps.  
 
ENISA and the DG JRC 
 
Generally, there is complementarity between ENISA’s work and that undertaken by the 
DG JRC Science Hub as the organisations vary in the stakeholders they target and 
approach issues from different perspectives. The DG JRC is the Commission's science and 
knowledge service, carrying out research in order to provide independent advice and support to EU 
policy. The DG JRC conducts research in the NIS area on issues that are very similar to what 
ENISA covers. However, as a research centre, the DG JRC implements research and testing which 
in this form is not provided by ENISA. The DG JRC’s activities primarily come in the form of a 
contribution to the Commission’s work and are in this sense complementary to ENISA’s work which 
is more targeted at Member States and a broader stakeholder group. For example, the DG JRC 
published a risk assessment of cloud computing for citizens in 2012.69 ENISA published a study on 
the same topic in 2017, but provided an overview of different components to protect data in the 
cloud and discussed challenges to privacy as well as security.70 With an overview of different 
benefits and weaknesses, ENISA’s publication was more directly targeted to the Agency’s 
stakeholders.  
 
Where the DG JRC targets stakeholders beyond the Commission with its work, the organisation 
complements ENISA’s work by taking different angles. Through the ITIS project, the DG JRC 
provides news bulletins on vulnerabilities and threats for the energy sector in the EU and prepares 
reports on foresight for emerging threats. This complements ENISA’s annual threat landscape 
reports which cover a broader range of sectors. In the past, the two organisations have cooperated 
in the organisation of exercises such as the first Pan-European CIIP exercise in 2010.  
 
                                               
68 https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3 
69 JRC (2012): Will the cloud make the citizen more vulnerable? Risk and vulnerability assessment in times of cloud computing. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/contributions-conferences/will-cloud-make-citizen-more-vulnerable-risk-and-vulnerability-
assessment-times-cloud-computing 
70 ENISA (2017): Privacy and Security in Personal Data Clouds. Available at; https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/privacy-and-
security-in-personal-data-clouds 
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There is a risk of duplication of efforts between ENISA and the DG JRC as both 
organisations cover very similar issues and no systematic coordination is in place. There 
are a number of topics on which both bodies are conducting research and producing publications. 
This includes the threat analysis, as mentioned previously, but also the identification of good 
practices and recommendations as well as knowledge and methodology enhancement. For 
example, ENISA published a study on approaches to risk assessment for cybersecurity in the 
Member States in 2013.71 This study had a strong focus on the protection of critical infrastructures. 
In 2015, the DG JRC published a report entitled “Risk assessment methodologies for critical 
infrastructure protection”72 also assessing Member States’ practices. With such similar focus of 
their work, there is a clear need to ensure coordination or at least some awareness of what is 
being done in each organisation to avoid duplication of work. During the interviews ENISA 
management noted that there was no formal coordination process set up between ENISA and the 
DG JRC, but that it was rather DG CNECT that guided the scope of the work of DG JRC in the 
cybersecurity area and thus looking to identify any potential overlap with ENISA’s work. While 
there seems to be well functioning ad-hoc/informal coordination, whereby the DG JRC and ENISA 
are aware that they are working on similar issues, a risk of duplication of efforts remains if this 
awareness is not systematically ensured.  
 
National organisations 
 
ENISA’s activities have been further compared to those of national bodies. Organisations from 
Member States with rather developed experience and capacities in the field of NIS have been 
selected for this purpose.  
 
The Spanish INCIBE implements similar activities to ENISA in the area of expertise, 
policy development, capacity building and cooperation; in most fields they cooperate 
with and complement ENISA, there is however some potential overlap. The Spanish 
National Cybersecurity Institute is a subsidiary of the Secretary of State for the Information 
Society and Digital Agenda (SESIAD) and acts as a point of contact in Spain on cybersecurity. Its 
activities include research, service delivery and coordination.73 INCIBE organises workshops 
together with ENISA which are intended to develop and implement policies and to foster 
cooperation between the Member States. 
INCIBE’s expertise and capacity building is in Spanish and limited to stakeholders in Spain. It is 
however not clear to what extent ENISA can provide additional value to stakeholders in the 
Member State, specifically through its threat analysis reports, support in the field of critical 
infrastructures and incident analysis.   
 
The Dutch NCSC conducts very similar activities to ENISA by providing expertise, 
developing and implementing policies and enhancing capacity building. The National Cyber 
Security Centre, working under the Ministry of Security and Justice, is the national centre in 
charge of promoting cybersecurity and ensuring capacity for response in the Netherlands. The 
NCSC complements ENISA’s activities in the area of fostering cooperation between the Member 
States and other NIS related communities and by conducting cyber exercises with its neighbouring 
countries. Risks of overlap were identified in the threat analysis reports, provision of good 
practices, white papers for the Dutch government and trainings which CERTs/CSIRTs attend. 
Similar to the case of INCIBE, it is not clear whether ENISA’s activities in these specific areas are 
adding to what is done at national level. 
 
                                               
71 ENISA (2013): National-level Risk Assessments. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nlra-analysis-
report/at_download/fullReport. 
72 JRC (2015): Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure protection. Available at: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96623/lbna27332enn.pdf 
73 https://www.incibe.es/en 
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The French ANSSI collaborates with ENISA to enhance cooperation and develop policy 
but activities overlap in the area of providing expertise to stakeholders and some 
capacity building activities. The National Agency for the Security of Information Systems which 
works under the General Secretary of Defence and National Security is responsible for promoting 
cybersecurity and ensuring capacity for response in France. By organising events in collaboration 
and by supporting ANSSI to foster cybersecurity policy in France, ENISA and ANSSI complement 
each other. Although ANSSI provides its expertise in the form of reports and recommendations in 
French, there is a lot of overlap in terms of the topics covered and thus it can be questioned to 
what extent ENISA’s activities are needed in addition. 
 
There is strong coherence between the needs of Member States with fewer resources 
and capacities, and the services provided by ENISA. The national organisations selected for 
the positioning exercise are those of Member States with a comparably high budget and capacity 
in the area of cybersecurity. Many other Member States do not allocate the same resources to 
cybersecurity and thus rely more on the services provided by ENISA. This is in particular the case 
in the areas of capacity building, provision of expertise and support in the implementation of 
policies, as presented in section 3.2.1.4. The evaluation of ENISA’s activities in 2015 also found 
that there is a tendency that Member States with lower NIS capacity or maturity benefit in 
particular from the exchange of best practice (e.g. on national cybersecurity strategies), while 
Member States with higher NIS capacity tend to benefit from technical studies, and contribute with 
best practices. Hence, there is less of a risk of duplication of efforts between ENISA and such 
Member States where ENISA’s spectrum of services area relevant overall.  
 
Stakeholder interviews show that some of the activities are more effective when 
implemented by ENISA rather than at national level. For other activities the 
cybersecurity organisations of the Member States assessed in the positioning exercise 
are better equipped. In general, ENISA’s expertise is valued in all Member States as providing 
an additional, independent source of information. Often the comparison across the EU provides 
added value. However, some Member States (those with high resources for cybersecurity) were 
rather critical in the interviews, stating that ENISA’s reports did not match the quality and 
topicality of national-level reports. By contrast, ENISA has developed a strong capacity to bring 
different stakeholders to the table and ensure cooperation across the EU, adding to the 
stakeholders that Member States could reach individually when organising events or exercises. 
With regard to policy development and implementation, Member States’ cybersecurity 
organisations tend to have a more direct link to their government than what ENISA has been able 
to build. Here national organisations can provide legal and policy input more effectively. Finally, 
the quality of ENISA’s cyber exercises is considered high and allows ENISA to make an important 
contribution to capacity building, especially in Member States with fewer resources and capacities. 
However, some of the Member States have organisations which are also strong in providing 
training and organising smaller scale exercises.  
 
The complementarities and risks of overlap between ENISA and the assessed EU bodies and 
national organisations are summarised in further detail in Figure 52 below. The activities of ENISA 
have been structured across the four main tasks: enhancing cooperation, develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise, enhancing capacity building and developing and implementing policies. 
Sub-categories of these tasks present more specific activities. A potential overlap of an 
organisation’s activities with those of ENISA is indicated by a visual overlap of the symbol used for 
an organisation with the blue circle in middle, representing ENISA. The symbols of organisations 
that do not overlap with the blue circle representing ENISA represent organisations that implement 
the described activity or service, but where there are sufficient differences (e.g. in the approach, 
the scope, the target group) in the activities implemented that no potential overlap was identified.  
The complete assessment on which this figure is based can be found in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 52: Positioning map  
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3.2.4.4 Procedures to ensure coherence 
 
EQ25: Are the procedures put in place effective to ensure that ENISA's cooperation 
activities coherent with the policies and activities of its stakeholders? 
Only few coordination procedures are in place to ensure coherence. As potential overlaps have 
been identified there is a need to develop better procedures to avoid overlaps in the future. 
 
Besides the representation in the Management Board or the PSG, few coordination 
procedures are in place that aim at ensuring the coherence of ENISA’s activities with the 
policies and activities of its stakeholders. The 2014 and 2015 annual evaluations of ENISA’s 
activities did not identify many formal mechanisms in place to ensure coherence. It can be 
concluded that based on being represented in the Management Board or the PSG and the feedback 
process in connection to the work programmes, the Commission, other EU bodies and agencies, 
and the Member States are able to point to any potential overlaps.  
 
The identified risks of overlap suggest that there is a need to ensure further 
coordination between ENISA and some of its stakeholders. In particular with CERT-EU there 
is a need to clarify roles. The Commission foresees to present a cooperation blueprint to handle 
large-scale cyber incidents on the EU level in the first half of 2017.74 Based on this, the roles of 
CERT-EU and ENISA when handling mayor incidents could be clarified. As shown in section 3.2.4.1, 
there is a need for more trust and willingness to cooperate between the two organisations. In 
theory, one solution could be to merge ENISA and CERT-EU into one organisation. More generally, 
there is a need to consolidate the fragmented field of cybersecurity and ensure coordination across 
the different actors involved at EU level but potentially also beyond.  
 
3.2.4.5 Conclusion on coherence 
 
Conclusion – Coherence 
 
The baseline situation (established based on an evaluation of all EU agencies including ENISA in 
200975 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 201076) points to coherence 
between ENISA and the EU strategies and policies. Unlike over the period 2013-2016, there were 
no other EU agencies or bodies covering cybersecurity. Therefore no overlaps were identified in the 
2009 evaluation.  
 
ENISA’s activities are generally coherent with the policies and activities of its stakeholders but 
there is a need for a more coordinated approach to cybersecurity at EU level. The findings of the 
evaluation study suggest that the potential for cooperation between ENISA and the European 
Commission, as well as other EU bodies, is not fully utilised. There is room for more coordination 
to ensure better coherence and complementarity in order to attain increased NIS in Europe. For 
example, enhanced coordination between ENISA and the DG JRC would avoid the current 
(although low) risk of overlap. In addition, the division of responsibilities between ENISA and 
CERT-EU should be clarified.  
 
ENISA’s activities are largely coherent with the work done at national level in the area of 
cybersecurity. Coherence is particularly strong between the CERTs/CSIRTs and ENISA. Some 
                                               
74 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions: Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity 
Industry; COM (2016) 410 final 
75 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
76 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
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overlaps between ENISA’s activities and those of Member States with strong cybersecurity 
expertise were identified, but Member States with less capacity and resources in the area of 
cybersecurity still benefit from these activities. 
 
 
3.2.5 EU-added value 
 
EU-added value looks for changes which can be assigned to EU intervention, rather than any other 
factors.77 To some extent the questions presented below bring together the findings of the previous 
evaluation criteria. This section responds to prospective questions as listed in the roadmap for the 
evaluation of ENISA. In addition to the questions from the roadmap, a retrospective sub-section on 
the added value of ENISA over the years 2013-2016 has been added. 
 
The following questions are responded to in this section:  
Table 23: Evaluation questions covered under the EU added value criterion 
Main evaluation question Other evaluation questions 
EQ27: What would be the 
most likely consequences at 
the EU level of stopping 
ENISA? 
Retrospective 
 
EQ45: What has been the added value of having an EU cybersecurity agency such 
as ENISA over the period 2013-2016?78 
 
Prospective 
 
EQ28: How could ENISA increase its added value and its contribution towards the 
EU, the Member States and the private sector in the future, using the capabilities 
and competences already in place? 
 
EQ35: What would be the most likely consequences at the EU level of stopping 
ENISA's activities? 
 
3.2.5.1 EU-added value of ENISA 
 
EQ45: What has been the added value of having an EU cybersecurity agency such as 
ENISA over the period of 2013-2016? 
ENISA is providing significant added value to the cybersecurity activities implemented in the 
Member States. Most importantly, ENISA ensures cooperation in the prevention and mitigation of 
cybersecurity incidents. There is no other actor at EU level that supports the cooperation of the 
same variety of stakeholders on NIS. In addition, the Agency’s activities to provide expertise and 
capacity building represents important added value for Member States with little national resources 
for cybersecurity.  
 
ENISA fills a gap at EU level. Without ENISA there would be no EU-level mechanism seeking to 
bring together and bridge the diverse field of cybersecurity. Through its community-building 
objective in particular, ENISA brings together a variety of stakeholders representing different 
sectors. As mentioned in section 3.2.2.1, ENISA has made a clear contribution to the overall goal 
of increasing network and information security in Europe, including by sharing good practices in 
NIS (as shown in the stakeholder survey carried out by the 2015 evaluation) and through its work 
on developing networks, the Cyber Europe Exercises and training activities, awareness raising 
activities and the provision of the Agency’s expertise. Stakeholders appreciate ENISA’s publications 
for providing an EU wide overview and perspective on cybersecurity issues which is not available 
elsewhere.  
 
                                               
77 Commission Staff Working Document - Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 110 final 
78 This question has been added by the evaluator based on comments received from the Commission to the Interim Report. It was not 
presented in the Roadmap for the evaluation of ENISA.  
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ENISA adds value to the cybersecurity activities implemented by national authorities. 
Interviews with Member States but also with ENISA’s users and advisors show that some of the 
activities are more effective when implemented by ENISA rather than at national level. In general, 
ENISA’s expertise is valued in all Member States as providing an additional, independent source of 
information. Often the comparison of threats and chosen responses across the EU provides added 
value. As the positioning exercise has shown (section 3.2.4.3), ENISA’s added value is not the 
same in all Member States. In Member States with more cybersecurity capacity and resources, 
national expertise and capacity tends to be better adapted to the national context than what is 
provided by ENISA. This is also reflected in the responses to the open public consultation where 
the option “products and services provide unique information (not offered by other bodies or 
organisations)” was one of the least selected reasons for using ENISA’s products or services. 
However, for Member States with fewer resources, ENISA’s capacity building and expertise 
provides significant added value.  
 
3.2.5.2 Potential to increase added value 
 
EQ28: How could ENISA increase its added value and its contribution towards the EU, 
the Member States and the private sector in the future, using the capabilities and 
competences already in place?  
ENISA could increase its added value by ensuring better coordination with national cybersecurity 
authorities to ensure that there is no duplication of efforts. Under the current circumstances the 
Agency could also ensure increased exchange with other EU bodies such as CERT-EU to avoid any 
overlap. Beyond this, there is very limited scope for any increase in added value as the Agency is 
restricted by its financial and human resources. 
 
To some extent ENISA could increase its added value by ensuring better coordination 
with national cybersecurity authorities and other EU bodies. The annual evaluation of 
ENISA’s activities in 2015 suggested that ENISA could increase its added value by avoiding a 
duplication of efforts in its activities relative to those of Member States with strong cybersecurity 
capacities and with other EU institutions. This has also been confirmed by the present study (see 
section 3.2.4). Better coordination of activities with EU level actors in the field of cybersecurity 
such as CERT-EU and the DG JRC could create new synergies. Similarly, ENISA should continue to 
ensure that publications are not restating what is already known at national level but provide an 
added European perspective on a given topic.  
 
The potential to increase the added value of ENISA’s contribution to NIS in Europe is 
limited by the Agency’s restricted financial and human resources. Stakeholders’ 
suggestions from interviews across all consulted groups and in general the findings of this study 
point to a high potential for ENISA to expand and enhance its activities to create more value for its 
stakeholders. This includes an improved outreach to and cooperation with the private sector, 
developing and providing more technical expertise, and reaching out to third countries or even 
globally. However, under the current circumstances, ENISA will not be able to fulfil its potential. 
The findings of the evaluation show that in the next years ENISA will have to focus its resources on 
the implementation of the NIS Directive. There is limited capacity and budget available to take on 
any tasks in addition.  
 
3.2.5.3 Consequences of stopping ENISA’s activities 
 
EQ35: What would be the most likely consequences at the EU level of stopping ENISA's 
activities? 
A discontinuation of ENISA would most likely lead to other organisations taking up part of ENISA’s 
activities. Member States could bilaterally replace some of the coordination efforts and support to 
CERTs/CSIRTs. The Commission might take on the planned role for ENISA under the NIS Directive. 
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The consequences of stopping ENISA would be most felt by Member States with fewer resources 
being invested in the cybersecurity area that would risk falling further behind more advanced 
Member States. While there might be no immediate severe consequences in stopping ENISA for 
Member States with greater capacity, it can be considered a lost opportunity over the medium- to 
long-term. Most stakeholders expect a growing role for ENISA in the coming years to ensure NIS 
coordination and strengthen resilience in the EU. 
 
There is a need for coordination across the Member States to ensure NIS, therefore 
without ENISA another way of cooperation will have to be put in place. Most likely 
ENISA’s activities would be dispersed across several organisations. During the interviews 
ENISA’s direct stakeholders suggested that a discontinuation of ENISA would likely lead to more 
bilateral cooperation between the Member States, but not all the activities of the Agency could be 
replaced this way. As shown in section 3.2.5.1, ENISA’s added value lies in particular in the 
cooperation across all the Member States and in activities such as the Cyber Europe exercises and 
the support to the network of CERTs/CSIRTs. In particular for Member States able to invest 
comparably few resources in the cybersecurity area, ENISA represents significant added value. 
Interviewees from the EU institutions and bodies suggested an increased role for CERT-EU should 
ENISA be discontinued, but it was judged that none of the potential organisations that could take 
on the tasks of ENISA could be considered as a real alternative to having a decentralised agency 
covering NIS. These services would thus most likely cease to be provided.  
 
According to some of the users and advisors to ENISA, the division of ENISA’s activities across 
different organisations could lead to further fragmentation in the cybersecurity field in Europe as 
sector specific cybersecurity organisations could be created. Other EU agencies, such as the 
European Aviation Agency, already have built up some capacities in the area of cybersecurity. 
Member States investing fewer resources in the cybersecurity area would fall behind in their 
capacities, ultimately making the entire EU more vulnerable to threats.   
 
Another solution for the implementation of the NIS Directive would need to be identified. A few 
stakeholders from the EU institutions and bodies suggested that the Commission would have to 
take on this role, but Member States might be less willing to cooperate directly with the 
Commission relative to a decentralised agency with a Management Board in which they are 
represented (and can thus steer the activities to a large extent).  
 
Stopping ENISA would represent a lost opportunity. ENISA is needed over the medium- to 
long-term for its ability to ensure cooperation across the Member States and most stakeholders 
see a growing role for ENISA in the future. Many direct stakeholders and users and advisors 
envisage a role for ENISA in the future as a key player in European cybersecurity and there seems 
to be no immediate alternative option to ENISA, which is recognised by CERTs/CSIRTs as a trusted 
partner to ensure cooperation. Many of the interviewed direct stakeholders of ENISA concluded 
that the most likely consequence of stopping ENISA would be the creation of another agency down 
the line, potentially with more resources and a stronger mandate than ENISA has now, as an EU 
agency in the area of cybersecurity is needed. 
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3.2.5.4 Conclusion on EU added value 
 
Conclusion – EU-added value 
 
The baseline situation (established based on an evaluation of all EU agencies including ENISA in 
200979 and an impact assessment of changes to ENISA’s mandate in 201080) shows the added 
value of an EU agency covering NIS issues which were found to be more effectively addressed at 
EU level than by individual Member States. This added value was also identified in the present 
evaluation study focusing on the 2013-2016 period, as further described below. The evaluation of 
2009 found that ENISA was still building up a role which was expected to allow the Agency to 
delivery “true European value-added” in the future. This was also a conclusion reached as part of 
the present evaluation based on stakeholder feedback, suggesting that ENISA still has not been 
able to fully meet its potential.  
 
ENISA’s added value lies primarily in the Agency’s ability to enhance cooperation, mainly between 
Member States but also with related NIS communities. There is no other actor at EU level that 
supports the cooperation of the same variety of stakeholders on NIS. The added value of ENISA 
differs between Member States, depending on their cybersecurity capacities and resources. The 
Agency’s activities of providing expertise and capacity building represent important added value 
for Member States with few national resources dedicated to cybersecurity. This is less the case for 
Member States with more cybersecurity capacities. 
 
Consequently, a discontinuation of ENISA would impact Member States differently. While Member 
States with strong cybersecurity capacities will be able to replace the services provided by ENISA 
at least to some extent, this will not be the case for Member States with fewer resources. The 
latter Member States rely more on ENISA’s services in terms of capacity building, access to 
expertise and support in the implementation of policy and legislation. Cybersecurity crosses 
borders, so there is a need to build capacity to avoid weaker links that can impact on cybersecurity 
in the EU as a whole, as well as a need to provide a cross-EU response. It will not be possible to 
ensure the same degree of community building and cooperation across the Member States without 
a decentralised EU agency for cybersecurity; the picture would be more fragmented where 
bilateral or regional cooperation stepped in to fill a void left by ENISA. Therefore, coordination at 
EU level is needed. 
A potential discontinuation of ENISA would be a lost opportunity for all Member States. Most 
stakeholders were of the opinion that ENISA could take on a more important role in the EU 
cybersecurity landscape in the future, ensuring a common response capacity. This potential for the 
Agency to capitalise on future opportunities would be lost should it be discontinued.    
 
  
                                               
79 Ramboll, Euréval, Matrix insight (2009): Evaluation of the EU decentralized agencies in 2009, Final Report Volume III – Agency level 
findings 
80 European Commission (2010): Commission working document – Impact assessment accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
SEC(2010) 1126 
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3.3 Assessment of ENISA’s strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats  
 
Based on an analysis of the context – namely the evolution, since the last revision of ENISA's 
mandate in 2013, of the cybersecurity and digital privacy landscape - the evaluation study 
provides an assessment of the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA within its current 
mandate, organisational set-up and resources, in the new cybersecurity and digital privacy 
landscape. The evaluation study also examines whether a fixed-term mandate is coherent with the 
new challenges and tasks ENISA will have to take on. In the analysis of the context, the aim of the 
study is to assess if and how the increase in the frequency, sophistication and potential impact of 
cyber-threat trigger new needs of ENISA's constituency, and how the changed policy and 
regulatory landscape, having regard to the recently adopted NIS Directive and the priorities set by 
the Digital Single Market Strategy impact on ENISA's activities. This allows the identification of 
opportunities and threats emerging from such a landscape. 
 
This section relates primarily to the prospective aspects of the evaluation study. The table below 
presents the six evaluation questions which are covered in this section.  
Table 24: Evaluation questions covered under the assessment of ENISA’s SWOTs 
 
Prospective 
 
EQ36: Does the new scenario with increased frequency, sophistication and potential impact of cyber-threat trigger 
new needs from ENISA's constituency? To what extent is ENISA best placed to respond to these needs? To what 
extent could ENISA’s current mandate, tasks and/or capabilities address these needs?  
 
EQ37: How does the new policy and regulatory landscape, having regard for the recently adopted Network and 
Information Security Directive and COM(2016) 410, and the priorities set by the Digital Single Market Strategy, 
impact on ENISA's activities?  
 
EQ38: What are the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA in taking up new challenges, considering its current 
mandate and organisational set-up and capacity?  
 
EQ39: If ENISA should take on any new challenges and tasks, would a fixed-term mandate be suitable?   
 
EQ40: Which are the concrete needs and opportunities for further increased practical cooperation with Member States 
and EU bodies? 
 
EQ41: Which are the concrete needs and opportunities for cooperation and synergies with international bodies 
working in adjacent fields, like the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence? 
 
EQ42: Could ENISA’s mission, tasks, working practices or activities be further developed in order to better respond to 
the new cybersecurity landscape or would another EU initiative be more efficient?  
 
This section draws on the summative elements of the assessment of ENISA’s performance, 
governance and organisational structure and of the positioning exercise, as presented in section 
3.2 and a review of the evolution, since the last revision of ENISA's mandate in 2013, of the 
cybersecurity and digital privacy landscape. Based on this, the key strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats of ENISA in the current, changed policy and regulatory context are 
established. In so doing, the section contributes to the more formative, forward-looking dimension 
of this evaluation and will assist in ascertaining what type of mandate for ENISA would best fit the 
current, evolving context. A desk-based review of key documents was the main source of 
information for this part of the study, in addition to in-depth interviews to help identify key 
opportunities and threats. Moreover, three subcontracted policy, legal and technical cybersecurity 
experts provided their support on the subject and helped to assess how this has/will impact on 
ENISA as an organisation and the activities it carries out. Further input was obtained through the 
open public consultation and the validation workshop.  
 
Subsection 3.3.8 below summarise the preliminary findings and conclusions of this section in the 
form of an analysis of the different strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats faced by 
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ENISA. The following subsections responds to the prospective evaluation questions of the study. A 
more comprehensive table, summarising ENISA’s SWOTs can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
3.3.1 New needs for ENISA’s constituency 
 
EQ36: Does the new scenario with increased frequency, sophistication and potential 
impact of cyber-threats trigger new needs from ENISA's constituency? To what extent is 
ENISA best placed to respond to these needs? To what extent could ENISA’s current 
mandate, tasks and/or capabilities address these needs? 
Although there are differing opinions on which stakeholders make up ENISA’s constituency and 
there are strong divergences in the needs of different stakeholder groups, there is agreement that 
there are new needs as a result of increased cyber threats. The field most regularly mentioned 
concerns the rise of the IoT and new demands to increase the safety of connected devices. To 
respond to these, stakeholders see a need for increased cooperation between different authorities 
and communities (public and private), increased capacities at Member States level and further 
research into cybersecurity challenges. ENISA was considered to be able to provide activities that 
respond to such needs. Many stakeholders agree that a more operational role for ENISA with 
regard to collecting and sharing information on cyber incidents would be desirable. Although some 
of the stakeholders from all consulted groups see the NIS Directive as a step towards a more 
operational role, a majority of consulted stakeholders believe an extended mandate to be 
necessary to fully address the need for more effective information sharing. In addition, ENISA’s 
current financial and human resources are perceived to be insufficient to address these needs.   
 
ENISA has a constituency with diverse needs. Interviewees’ opinions differ on which 
stakeholder groups make up ENISA’s constituency. Some of ENISA’s stakeholders across all groups 
even criticise ENISA for the lack of a clearly defined constituency. According to certain 
interviewees (including Member States), this is sometimes reflected in ENISA’s deliverables in 
terms of inappropriate writing style and dissemination channels to reach the intended target 
audience. ENISA’s direct stakeholders noted that ENISA’s role concerning Member States’ needs 
requires clarification because of the strong differences between more experienced and resourced 
Member States and Member States which are more limited in their capacity and resources. Also 
the extent to which ENISA should prioritise the support to EU institutions requires clarification. 
Arguably, Member States are ENISA’s primary stakeholders. As shown in the section on relevance 
(3.2.1), the demands and priorities vary from one Member State to another. There is a tendency 
for Member States with more resources and capacity in cybersecurity to be less dependent on 
ENISA and to see the Agency’s role in responding to cybersecurity needs as more limited than 
other Member States. Meanwhile, a number of stakeholders from industry see a need for more 
action of direct benefit to industry. 
 
There is a wide spread perception that the increased frequency, sophistication and 
potential impact of cyber-threats triggers new, and reinforces current, needs from 
ENISA's constituency. The majority of the interviewed stakeholders from all groups view that 
there are increased risks, in particular in relation to the rise of the IoT and new demands to 
increase the safety of connected devices. In this regard, rapidly evolving cyber threats create a 
need for more rapid responses. In line with this, “cooperation across Member States in matters 
related to cybersecurity” and “the capacity to prevent, detect and resolve large scale cyber-
attacks” were identified by the largest number of respondents to the open public consultation as a 
main gap or need in the cybersecurity field in the EU over the next ten years. A majority of the 
respondents in each of the three categories of respondents (i.e. national authorities, private 
enterprise or business association, and other) were of the opinion that these were needs or gaps, 
as Figure 53 illustrates. Respondents that commented in their open responses on the need for 
increased cooperation across Member States suggested that cooperation was necessary not only to 
bridge the security gaps that arise from a lack of cross-country cooperation, but also to build trust 
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and confidence within the EU in matters of cybersecurity. Some respondents (including Member 
States) pointed to additional benefits of such cooperation, including increased market integration 
through the provision of internet services, support to the increase in cybersecurity capacity of less 
advanced Member States, and innovation for responses to current and future threats. Additionally, 
three respondents referred to an additional need, namely the need for “effective international 
cooperation” (i.e. EU and third countries such as the US, Japan, Korea and India). Comments on 
the need to increase capacity to prevent, detect and resolve attacks pointed to the fact that the EU 
should step up the detection and real-time response to cyberattacks in information, 
communication technology (ICT), critical infrastructures, SMEs, government and public agencies. 
Others felt that while detecting and responding to cyberattacks is important, the priority should be 
placed on developing a prevention-focused approach that allows protection from loss of intellectual 
property and personal data as well as loss of trust. The views of the different open public 
consultation respondent groups in relation to each of the options were relatively balanced, with the 
notable exception - among the most referred to gaps or needs - of “cooperation and information 
sharing between different stakeholders, including public-private cooperation” where only two 
national authority respondents (out of a total of 38 respondents) identified it as a need or gap.  
Figure 53: Most urgent needs or gaps in the cybersecurity field in the EU in the next ten years (multiple 
choice question) 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Instruments and mechanisms at EU level were not judged fully adequate to promote and 
ensure cybersecurity within such a context. Taking into consideration the above mentioned 
needs, only 6% of the open public consultation respondents judged the current instruments and 
mechanisms at European level (such as regulatory framework, cooperation mechanisms, funding 
programmes, EU agencies and bodies) to be fully adequate to promote and ensure cybersecurity. 
A great majority of the respondents (including Member States) regarded them as partially 
adequate or only marginally adequate (52% and 31% respectively) and 5% found them not at all 
adequate. As shown in Figure 54below, national authority respondents appear to be more positive 
about the adequacy of these instruments and mechanisms in comparison with representatives 
from private enterprises or business associations and other respondents.  
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Figure 54: Adequacy of current instruments & mechanisms at European level to promote and ensure 
cybersecurity 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
The open public consultation respondents were asked to elaborate on their answers and 51 
contributions were received, providing further assessments and recommendations for 
improvement. Some examples of the inputs from respondents who assessed the current 
instruments and mechanisms as “partially adequate” are summarised here. In their comments 
respondents positively assessed the progress the EU has made in the set-up of its regulatory and 
institutional framework for cybersecurity. However, respondents also felt that the majority of the 
instruments have yet to be implemented, enter into force or still need to be developed. Three 
respondents stated that the framework is too often open to interpretation, which “leaves the 
possibility of non-harmonised implementations” that are contrary to its aim. Considering the fast-
paced development of technology and cybersecurity needs today, respondents recommended that 
current policy instruments continue to evolve, change and adapt: “it is therefore important that 
the European agencies and bodies assess and evaluate the cybersecurity landscape to ensure the 
needs of the governments, industry and citizens are being met”. It was also suggested that 
cooperation mechanisms created by the NIS Directive should be evaluated after two years. Other 
respondents commented that the development of standardisation and certification regarding 
information security at EU level should be improved and accelerated. As a final example, on IT 
solutions respondents felt Internet-of-Things-risks ought to be addressed more strongly and EU-
made cybersecurity solutions developed by the private industry (SMEs) should be supported. 
 
Enhanced cooperation between Member States and with the private sector is considered 
to be the primary solution to the new and enhanced needs of ENISA’s stakeholders. 
Based on the identified needs or gaps, open public consultation respondents were asked to 
consider what the priorities for EU action should be from now on and select up to three responses 
out of a list of 15. As revealed in Figure 55 below “stronger EU cooperation mechanisms between 
Member States, including at operational level” was clearly considered to be the most important 
action, followed by “stronger public-private cooperation in cybersecurity” and “improving research 
to address cybersecurity challenges”. When analysing the number of responses from the three 
different groups of respondents, considering also the size of each group, it can be noted that the 
action “improving education and curricular development in cybersecurity” received relatively higher 
support from “other” respondents. In contrast, the action “improving capacity in Member States 
through training and capacity building” was comparatively more supported by national authorities. 
It should also be mentioned that three of the actions were not selected as a priority by any 
national authority representative, namely: “stronger cooperation between different authorities and 
communities (e.g. between CERTs/CSIRTs and law enforcement authorities; Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centres and CERTs/CSIRTs)”, “stronger cooperation between civil and military 
cybersecurity authorities and organisations”, and “improved monitoring of threats and incidents 
across Member States”.  
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Figure 55: Top priorities for EU action from now on in the area of cybersecurity 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Among the twelve open responses who selected the option “other” (see Figure 55 above), fourteen 
additional “top priorities for EU action” were identified. Among these, six of the priorities 
mentioned were also related to cooperation. Besides pushing for “stronger public-private 
cooperation” respondents pointed to “establishing stronger international / trans-Atlantic 
cooperation and collaboration” including regulatory convergence, as well as “developing policy and 
operational support for cooperation and information sharing between different stakeholders and 
Member States”. Five priorities mentioned concerned support and guidance, e.g. “Support uptake 
of new privacy techniques”, “Improved monitoring of threats”, “Provision of implementation, 
application and enforcement tools” and an “EU-reviewed open source, for public administration i.e. 
communes”. Finally, three matters related to cybersecurity regulation and the respondents asked 
for “more flexibility in regulation to allow adapting to nature of organisations, services and 
markets” and believed that ENISA’s role in relation to this should be that of “sign-posting relevant 
and robust standards that function at global level” given its “important role in harmonisation 
across the EU”.  
 
ENISA is expected and considered capable of taking on a role in responding to 
stakeholder needs in the future.  Following on from the assessment of needs, gaps and top 
priorities for action, the open public consultation respondents were asked about ENISA’s future 
role. As illustrated in Figure 56 below, 98% of respondents (82) thought that there is a role for an 
EU-level body in improving cybersecurity across the EU. 
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Figure 56: Is there a role for an EU-level body in improving cybersecurity across the EU? 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
Furthermore, almost all of the respondents (81 of 82) who saw a role for an EU-level body in 
improving cybersecurity considered that ENISA could fulfil a role in bridging the different gaps in 
the future. The Agency, if sufficiently mandated and resourced, was perceived as most able to 
contribute to the following five areas (percentages and numbers reflect respondents that 
considered ENISA to be able to a high extent or to some extent to fulfil a specific role; see Figure 
57 below for further details):  
 Stronger cooperation between different authorities and communities, 89% (71);  
 Stronger EU mechanisms between MS, including at operational level, 87% (69);  
 Improve capacity in Member States through training and capacity building, 82% (65);  
 Stronger public-private cooperation in cybersecurity, 82% (65); and  
 Improving research to address cybersecurity challenges, 82% (65). 
 
In summary, open public consultation respondents consider ENISA to be the right body to respond 
to the needs they identified as most pressing. In-depth analysis of the answers indicates clear 
differences in opinion per type of respondent group in some areas. In this sense “stronger 
cooperation between different authorities and communities” was less supported as a role for ENISA 
by national authorities (69% selected to a high extent or to some extent) compared to private 
enterprise & business association (92%) and other respondents (93%). In similar manner 
“stronger public-private cooperation in cybersecurity” received higher support from private 
enterprise & business association (96% selected to a high extent or to some extent) compared to 
national authorities (69%) and other respondents (76%). 
Figure 57: Gaps and needs for which ENISA is perceived to be most able to fulfil a role 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
The gaps and needs for which ENISA is perceived to be least able to fulfil a role correspond with 
the needs selected by fewer open public consultation respondents as being urgent, as presented in 
Figure 58.  
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Figure 58: Gaps and needs for which ENISA is perceived to be least able to fulfil a role 
 
Source: Open public consultation 
 
A variety of suggestions of tasks and activities that ENISA could add to its portfolio to 
further increase network and information security in the future were made by 
stakeholders. Interviewees and respondents to the open public consultation made the following 
suggestions for ENISA to expand its tasks and contribute even more to NIS in Europe: 
 Increase the Agency’s visibility and involve a broader group of stakeholders in the activities, 
including capacity building and awareness raising in the private sector and civil society 
 Develop more internal expertise rather than providing support based on data collected from 
other experts; taking on research on cybersecurity in cooperation with research centres 
 Cover the areas of standardisation and certification 
 Build more trust between the Member States to increase willingness to exchange information 
on threats and incidents. This could be based on further capacity building in less experienced 
Member States.  
 Work closer together (possibly even merge) with other EU institutions such as Europol’s EC3 
and CERT-EU 
 Enhanced cooperation with third countries, in particular with CERT-equivalents to obtain timely 
information on cybersecurity threats and incidents to diffuse across the Member States.  
 
Interviewed Member State authorities suggested that ENISA’s current tasks which will increase in 
relevance over the coming years include the Cyber Europe Exercises, training of Member States 
and fostering cooperation between the cybersecurity communities.  
 
Industry stakeholders would like ENISA to respond more to their needs in the future. 
The interviewed industry representatives saw an important role for ENISA in acting as a link 
between the public and private sector. This was confirmed in the open public consultation. The 
Agency could support industry in the future by ensuring harmonisation of baseline requirements 
for cybersecurity across the EU. Also a more operational role for ENISA to collect data on threats 
across the EU and make this data available to the industry would be welcomed by these 
stakeholders. Some areas that ENISA should be focussing on more as priority areas than is 
currently the case, according to industry stakeholders in particular, included the Internet of 
Things, certification and standardisation, the move to big data and machine intelligence, and 
becoming more active in the educational field, e.g. by supporting the creation of Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOC) in the field of cybersecurity. 
 
Many of ENISA’s stakeholders - beyond its group of direct stakeholders - see a need to 
extend ENISA’s mandate to embrace more operational roles. In particular, industry 
stakeholders regularly advocate ENISA taking on a more operational role to collect data on threats 
and cybersecurity incidents across the EU and share this information with industry. A few 
comments from the open public consultation respondents relating to this matter largely confirm 
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that the group of private enterprises & business associations is more positive about ENISA taking 
on a more operational role, while national authorities are less supportive of such a development. 
Findings from the workshop revealed equally that the majority of stakeholders see a need for a 
clearer definition of the term ”operational”, as it is currently used by many as a synonym for 
information sharing while others understand it to mean actual response to incidents. During the 
workshop some of ENISA’s direct stakeholders suggested that there could be some interest in 
enhanced cooperation on threat intelligence/situational awareness led by ENISA. While some 
interviewees indicate that the NIS Directive already goes in this direction, the majority thought 
that a review of the current mandate would be necessary for ENISA to be more actively involved in 
information sharing on cybersecurity incidents.     
 
A concern voiced among all consulted stakeholder groups was whether ENISA would be 
able to take on the new needs of its constituency given its currently limited resources. In 
light of the multiple obligations of ENISA today and the identified difficulties to fully respond to 
stakeholder needs over the period 2013-2016, there is a certain degree of doubt on the extent to 
which ENISA will be able to respond to the new needs of stakeholders with its current financial and 
human resources. This is in particular the case considering the additional tasks under the NIS 
Directive (presented in the following section) which will require an important share of ENISA’s staff 
in the coming years. A majority of the interviewees think that the scope of the Agency’s work will 
further grow in the future. 
 
3.3.2 The impact of new policy and regulatory landscape on ENISA’s activities 
 
EQ37: How does the new policy and regulatory landscape, having regard for the recently 
adopted Network and Information Security Directive and COM(2016) 410, and the 
priorities set by the Digital Single Market Strategy, impact on ENISA's activities? 
There is agreement among all of ENISA’s consulted stakeholders that ENISA as the main European 
entity mandated will be affected by the NIS Directive in multiple ways. While the NIS Directive is 
seen as an opportunity for ENISA to increase its influence in the current fragmented EU 
cybersecurity policy landscape, many of ENISA’s direct stakeholders, users and advisors see 
challenges for ENISA in terms of financial and human resource constraints and the risk of overlap 
with other agencies, above all CERT-EU.    
 
The NIS Directive will have a notable impact on ENISA’s activities. There is consensus 
among all stakeholder groups that the NIS Directive will have a significant impact on ENISA’s 
activities since ENISA is mandated to be the main European entity supporting the transposition of 
the Directive in the Member States. Several direct stakeholders refer to a large initial impact on 
ENISA’s organisation and activities, but interviewees’ opinions differ as to whether this is a 
temporary effect or whether it will be more long-lasting. A few experts even refer to the NIS 
Directive as being a “main disruption” and “game changer” in EU cybersecurity policy foreseeing 
long-lasting changes. 
 
The view of the majority of stakeholders is that the NIS Directive is an opportunity for 
ENISA to increase its influence. The general perception is that the NIS Directive strengthens 
ENISA’s influence within EU cybersecurity policy by giving the Agency a more operational role in 
supporting its implementation by the Member States. However, some observers voiced concern 
about whether the Agency is taking full advantage of the opportunity it is being provided with or 
whether it is acting too prudently. On the other hand, certain direct stakeholders of the Agency 
pointed out that ENISA is not equipped with a right to initiate action, but limited to proposing 
things to the Commission.  
 
The implementation of the NIS Directive currently takes up a large part of ENISA’s 
resources which poses a challenge for the Agency. As presented in section 3.2.1.5, the NIS 
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Directive is perceived as not only impacting on ENISA’s type of activities but also on increasing the 
overall volume of its responsibilities and work load. According to some of ENISA’s direct 
stakeholders, the Work Programme is currently dominated by the NIS Directive with around 20 
staff members having been designated to be work on the NIS Directive. Several interviewees 
(including Member States) think that without a corresponding increase in financial and human 
resources, or a reduction of ENISA’s activities in other topics, the additional tasks imposed by the 
NIS Directive are very challenging (by a few even considered impossible) for the Agency to 
perform. As a result, a number of direct stakeholders of ENISA point out that a potential threat for 
ENISA lies in capacity constraints to fulfil other tasks to the high standard. However, a few of 
those stakeholders (including Member States) are more optimistic seeing these challenges to be 
only temporary until the NIS Directive’s transposition in Member States. 
 
Despite the opportunities provided, there are risks of overlap with CERT-EU. The 
positioning exercise (section 3.2.4.3) detected a risk for overlap between ENISA and CERT-EU; this 
might increase in the future. Interviewed stakeholders described ENISA’s role in supporting the 
national CERTs/CSIRTs as foreseen under the NIS Directive as more operational and several 
stakeholders across all consulted groups perceived this new role to create (or increase the risk for) 
overlaps and conflicts of interest with CERT-EU. Examples referred to include the fact that CERT-
EU already implements activities that could fall within the scope of ENISA’s mandate by working 
with stakeholders that are among ENISA’s constituency (and go beyond CERT-EU’s main 
constituency of the EU institutions) or by getting in touch with commercial organisations through 
the use of CERTs/CSIRTs. One of ENISA’s direct stakeholders argues that the best option would 
have been to create CERT-EU as a part of ENISA from the start, but indicates that resistance from 
some of the Member States prevented this from occurring. 
      
ENISA’s new role as the main body mandated to assist national CERTs/CSIRTs puts 
higher requirements on ENISA to be better connected geographically. Some interviewed 
stakeholders (including Member States) stakeholders consider that the new obligations under the 
NIS Directive, e.g. working with the national CERTs/CSIRTs, require increased co-operation with 
other EU-bodies, in particular with CERT-EU. Following this argumentation, there is a need for 
ENISA to be more agile and connected to the cybersecurity policy environment.  
 
3.3.3 Main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA  
 
EQ38: What are the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA in taking up new 
challenges, considering its current mandate and organisational set-up and capacity? 
The assessment of the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA in taking up new challenges 
indicates that, in the current set-up, ENISA’s weaknesses outweigh its strengths. With regard to 
the Agency’s strengths, the perception of ENISA as a neutral facilitator, mediating the divergent 
policy priorities of Member States, has helped it gain trust at European level. Its role in fostering 
collaboration, community building, as well as supporting Member States in their cybersecurity 
capacities, also deserve a mention. However, ENISA is faced with many obstacles. Given its lack of 
expertise, weak communication and marketing, and limited self-assertion within the EU 
cybersecurity landscape, ENISA lacks overall visibility. ENISA also lacks a long-term vision, often 
being constrained by its fixed mandate and annual work programme. Finally, ENISA lacks 
resources, both financial and human, in terms of the Agency’s limited size and the staff’s 
composition which is being aggravated by the NIS Directive. In addition, ENISA’s split location in 
Athens and Heraklion causes difficulties for the Agency for attracting and retaining qualified staff 
members.  
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ENISA’s strengths in taking up new challenges  
 
ENISA is perceived as a “trusted” actor81 within the EU’s cybersecurity policy landscape, 
free from commercial interests or political bias. As presented in section 3.2.2.2, one of the 
main strengths of the Agency is its reputation as an independent and neutral facilitator82 that is 
capable of navigating a highly fragmented policy domain, while also being faced with the different 
priorities of Member States.83  
 
Furthermore, collaboration and community building belong to the Agency’s core 
strengths. As presented in section 3.2.1.4, ENISA has proven its capability to maintain a viable 
network with a range of different stakeholders including national governments, industry, the EU 
institutions and other EU and international bodies. ENISA acts as a node to gather and exchange 
information and best practices among Member State, EU and international players. ENISA is also 
involved in fostering cooperation with the private sector and encourages the setup of PPPs as a 
way to increase the operational capabilities in the sector.84 
 
ENISA maintains good and recognised working relationships with its direct 
stakeholders. The survey of ENISA staff and direct stakeholders further shows that the Agency’s 
relationship with its stakeholders and its efforts for cooperation were particularly well considered. 
A vast majority of 93% of respondents (including Member States)  thought that ENISA had built 
strong and trustful relationships with its stakeholders when executing its mandate. Furthermore, 
93% of the survey respondents agreed to some or to a high extent that ENISA was open to 
cooperating with a variety of stakeholders. Meanwhile ENISA’s systems and procedures in place for 
stakeholder consultation and management were considered to be well-working by 84% of 
respondents. 
 
ENISA is very active in capacity building assistance. This includes organising trainings, 
cybersecurity exercises, development of manuals, studies trying to reach a broad sector including 
Member States, private actors, EU institutions and agencies. The aim of this capacity building 
activity is to develop the capabilities of the agents, providing them with the necessary tools to 
prevent, detect and handle incidents.85  
 
The organisational solutions and procedures of ENISA were ranked positively by ENISA’s 
stakeholders. As presented in section 3.2.2.8, 80% of survey respondents86 regard the current 
solutions and procedures as adequate. Moreover, the current governance structure, with a 
Management Board, an Executive Board and the PSG, was assessed as conducive both to the 
effective functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives) and to the efficient 
functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of value for money), by 85% of the respondents in both 
cases. Finally, 73% and 74% of respondents respectively saw ENISA’s management practices as 
conducive to creating an effective organisation and an efficient organisation to some or to a high 
extent.87 
 
                                               
81 See section 3.2.2.8 for further information. 
82 Finding obtained from interviews with ENISA’s direct stakeholders.  
83 See section 3.2.1.5 for further information on diverging priorities of Member States.   
84 See, for example: Carrapico, H., Barrinha, A. (forthcoming). The EU as a coherent (cyber)security actor; Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European 
Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-
research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 February 2017; ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-
2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0; ENISA (2016) Evaluation Roadmap 25/07/2016. 
85 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0;  
ENISA (2016) Evaluation Roadmap 25/07/2016; ENISA (2015). Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Software Defines 
Networks/ 5G: ISBN: 978-92-9204-161-8, DOI: 10.2824/67261. 
86 Source: The survey on ENISA’s governance, organisational set-up and working practices 
87 See section 3.2.2.8 for further information.  
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As the European cybersecurity agency ENISA has significant horizontal expertise to 
assess how every EU Member State is performing in cybersecurity. ENISA is equipped with 
a broad mandate, allowing it to take on a wide variety of different tasks ranging from capacity 
support of Member States to the development of cybersecurity reports/expertise. Thanks to Article 
14, ENISA is able to react to ad-hoc requests from the EU institutions and Member States in the 
field of policy development and policy implementation. This mechanism is used by some of the 
Member States (see section 3.2.2.6).  
  
ENISA’s weaknesses in taking up new challenges  
 
A recurring finding from interviews with ENISA’s users and advisors is the Agency’s 
limited visibility. Several root causes are identified to play a part in this: ENISA is seen to lack, 
in particular technical, expertise and it has relatively weak communication and marketing, giving it 
marginal presence in the press and media. Indeed, other European agencies, e.g. Europol, FRA or 
the European Food Safety Authority, have managed to be more present in the media and the 
public. Potentially as a result of its limited visibility, ENISA has not managed to carve out its own 
space in the EU’s cybersecurity landscape. A few interviewed industry stakeholders expressed their 
support for the Agency more strongly engaging in commenting on headline events, such as major 
cyber-attacks on governments or companies in Europe, in order to increase the visibility of ENISA. 
It should be noted though, particularly in the case of governmental attacks, that ENISA would 
probably need the prior approval of the impacted Member State to be able to do so.   
ENISA lacks a more strategic, long-term vision. Unlike other EU agencies, ENISA has a fixed 
mandate which in the eyes of a few users and advisors is counterproductive to developing a more 
strategic, long-term vision. Furthermore, Member States’ dominance in the Management Board 
often leads to an annual work programme characterised by the individual priorities of Member 
States rather than a more strategic approach to cybersecurity. Finally, a few of ENISA’s users and 
advisors perceive ENISA as being too tied to fulfilling its work programme, contributing to the lack 
of a strategic approach.     
An important weakness concerning ENISA’s organisational set-up and capacity relates 
to its limited size and financial resources. The surveyed group of all stakeholders88 provided 
the least positive assessment of the size of the Agency among all elements in the Agency’s 
organisational set-up, with 51% of them perceiving it as being only appropriate to a limited extent 
or not at all appropriate to the work entrusted to ENISA and to its workload. ENISA’s surveyed 
direct stakeholders were by far the most pessimistic about its size. The open public consultation 
results overall confirmed this finding as 58% of respondents considered the size of the Agency to 
be partially or completely inadequate, with no major differences among different respondent 
groups having been identified. Negative assessments concerning the size of ENISA by interviewed 
experts – direct stakeholders as well as users and advisors – were often accompanied by 
comments on a need for more financial resources. The majority of interviewees (including Member 
States) saw a need to increase ENISA’s staff and resources with a few referring to a drastic 
increase, e.g. doubling the currently available resources. A number of interviewees also pointed 
out that the NIS Directive placed an additional burden on the Agency without reducing its other 
tasks or increasing its resources. 
 
Another tangible weakness with regard to ENISA’s organisational set-up relates to 
ENISA’s split office location in Heraklion and Athens. While the survey findings only point to 
ENISA’s location being a moderate weakness, the majority of interviewees (including Member 
States) regard the Agency’s location as a major weakness. Accordingly, ENISA’s location was 
reviewed by 67% of surveyed respondents89 as enabling, to some or to a high extent, ENISA to 
effectively conduct its work (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives) and by 59% to conduct its 
                                               
88 Source: The survey of ENISA  staff and direct stakeholders 
89 Source: The survey on ENISA’s governance, organisational set-up and working practices 
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work efficiently (i.e. in terms of value for money). The location was reviewed as not enabling such 
effectiveness and efficiency, or only to a limited extent, by 28% and 35% of surveyed respondents 
respectively. From the surveyed respondents, ENISA’s direct stakeholders were most critical of 
ENISA’s office location.90 Meanwhile, all groups of consulted stakeholders were very critical of the 
office location’s impact on the Agency.   
 
One of the arguments supported by a certain number of respondents is that ENISA’s effectiveness 
is impacted by being too far from Brussels, hence complicating ad hoc exchanges with the EU 
institutions. Various respondents were also critical of the fact that the Agency is divided in two, 
which decreases its efficiency by creating additional costs and requiring additional efforts to ensure 
internal communication. Meanwhile, all of ENISA’s consulted stakeholder groups admit that the 
establishment of an office in Athens improved the situation, in particular for the travel of ENISA’s 
stakeholders. Respondents also indicated that ENISA’s location is not fit for recruiting and retaining 
qualified staff due to the lack of facilities for international employees and their families, as well as 
the low pay and economic uncertainties faced by Greece.  
 
The staff composition of ENISA presents a more moderate weakness. Approximately 65% 
of surveyed respondents91 viewed the Agency’s staff composition as adequate for its work to some 
or to a high extent, while 30% viewed it as only adequate to a small extent or not at all. ENISA 
staff was particularly critical with more than one third of the respondents seeing the staff 
composition to be adequate only to a limited extent or not at all. Some recurring, highlighted 
weaknesses concern the need to develop more internal expertise by hiring more senior staff, and 
the need for more technical staff to improve the balance between administrative staff and 
operational staff. Some of ENISA’s direct stakeholders also reported that the Agency’s recruitment 
difficulties had led to an over-representation of Greek nationals in ENISA with often low incentives 
for job rotation. 
 
Along with the staff composition, the recruitment and training procedures can be 
considered a moderate weakness. Among the surveyed respondents, 33%92 found the 
recruitment and training procedures of ENISA not to be appropriate or to be only appropriate to a 
limited extent to manage ENISA’s workload. Additional comments revealed that the recruitment 
process is considered too slow and therefore not well adapted to the cybersecurity domain which is 
fast paced. The lack of training that the staff experienced over the five years prior to writing was 
linked to the absence of a dedicated HR department within the Agency.  
 
3.3.4 Format of ENISA’s mandate 
 
 EQ39: If ENISA should take on any new challenges and tasks, would a fixed-term 
mandate be suitable?   
Clear advantages for ENISA having a permanent mandate were identified. This would allow it to 
develop a more long-term strategy and increase its effectiveness. It could also alleviate current 
recruitment difficulties. A permanent mandate should not exclude the need for regular evaluations 
and revisions of ENISA’s mandate.   
 
The findings from the interviews show that views diverge on whether a fixed-term 
mandate would be suitable to help ENISA take on new challenges and tasks. ENISA’s 
Regulation foresees an end date by which the Agency’ mandate expires. Among the EU agencies, 
ENISA is the only one with such a mandate since the European Agency for Reconstruction was 
                                               
90 See section 3.2.3.1 for further information.  
91 Source: The survey on ENISA’s governance, organisational set-up and working practices 
92 Ibid. 
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disbanded in 2008.93 Many direct stakeholders see clear benefits in ENISA having a permanent 
mandate. The reasons for supporting a permanent mandate are linked to allowing ENISA to plan 
over the longer term and support the development of a greater vision. Aside from generating 
greater independence, these stakeholders also claimed that a permanent mandate would lead to 
more effectiveness. However, others were more in favour of a fixed-term mandate, thinking that 
this would provide for greater levels of flexibility to adapt the Agency’s mandate to the rapidly 
evolving cybersecurity landscape. Another recurring view in support of a fixed-term mandate was 
that ENISA’s performance could be more easily evaluated or re-evaluated in the case of changing 
needs. Yet, supporters of a fixed-term mandate also admitted that it can cause negative side 
effects, such as the Agency’s recruitment problems and political uncertainty. In the discussion at 
the workshop, a clear preference was shown for a permanent duration of the Agency with a 
mandate that is evaluated and reviewed every few years, as is the case for other EU agencies.  
 
3.3.5 Concrete needs and opportunities for practical cooperation with Member States and EU bodies 
 
EQ40: Which are the concrete needs and opportunities for further increased practical 
cooperation with Member States and EU bodies?  
With regard to practical cooperation with Member States, stakeholders agree that this needs to be 
further increased, in particular with the CERTs/CSIRTs. Aside from providing direct support and 
helping CERTs/CSIRTs to respond to the requirements under the NIS Directive and to further build 
their capacity, additional training and increased interaction between ENISA and the CERT/CSIRT 
community were found to be important.  
 
With regard to cooperation between ENISA and other EU bodies, only few consulted stakeholders 
suggested that there was a need to increase the interaction. However, the fragmentation of 
cybersecurity across different DGs of the European Commission and agencies, shows that there is 
in fact a need to enhance cooperation and coordination.  
 
Cooperation with Member States was seen as one of the top priorities to respond to 
stakeholder needs, while less emphasis was put on cooperation with EU bodies. The 
findings of the open public consultation showed that stakeholders expect ENISA to further foster 
increased Member State cooperation to respond to new and reinforced cybersecurity challenges, as 
presented in section 3.3.1. Fewer open public consultation respondents and interviewed direct 
stakeholders of ENISA considered cooperation between ENISA and EU bodies as a priority. 
Nevertheless, interviews with representatives from the Commission, other EU agencies and 
ENISA’s staff, as well as the assessment of ENISA’s coherence (see section 3.2.4), show that there 
is a need to enhance cooperation and coordination across EU bodies to create synergies and 
develop an EU approach to cybersecurity.  
 
ENISA’s new role under the NIS Directive will allow the Agency to better address the 
needs of CERTs/CSIRTs. An overwhelming majority (85%) of the respondents to the 
CERT/CSIRT survey were of the opinion that the new role foreseen for ENISA in relation to 
CERTs/CSIRTs as part of the NIS Directive will enable ENISA to better cover CERTs/CSIRTs’ needs. 
With respect to the activities to be carried out by ENISA, facilitating cooperation was seen as key 
by a large number of respondents. Fields where further assistance of ENISA would be useful 
included better understanding the needs of CERTs/CSIRTs and providing direct support and 
helping CERTs/CSIRTs implement the NIS Directive and build capacity. In terms of what ENISA 
could do to better cover CERTs/CSIRTs’ needs, more trainings and increased interaction of ENISA 
with CERTs/CSIRTs were seen as particularly important by respondents. The call for more training 
opportunities is largely confirmed by the different stakeholders. A few interviewed users and 
                                               
93 European Commission (2012): Decentralised Agencies – Overhaul – Analytical Fiche No4 – Ending of agencies. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/fiche_4_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf 
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advisors particularly point towards the opportunity for ENISA to train the trainers, i.e. to develop 
harmonised European training packages on different levels − from the citizens to the professionals 
and decision-makers − to be used by the Member States. 
 
3.3.6 Concrete needs and opportunities for practical cooperation with international bodies  
 
EQ41: Which are the concrete needs and opportunities for cooperation and synergies 
with international bodies working in adjacent fields, like the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence? 
All groups of consulted stakeholders were generally in favour of increased cooperation with 
international bodies and several examples of such bodies were presented as opportunities for 
future cooperation. These concern, for example, the United Nations’ International 
Telecommunication Unit (UN/ITU), the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), 
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and third country governments. 
However, with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), stakeholders’ views on 
the possibilities for efficient collaboration differed significantly. 
 
There is a strong consensus among ENISA’s direct stakeholders, advisors and users that 
increased international collaboration is important, however, opinions differ on whether 
NATO is the most appropriate partner. A majority of the interviewed stakeholders were 
supportive of increased cooperation with international bodies working in adjacent fields. The open 
public consultation confirmed this, showing that several respondents suggested that there is a 
need for more international cooperation but suggested approaches focussed on direct cooperation 
with third countries. Some direct stakeholders indicated in the interviews that there are both 
strong needs and good opportunities for collaboration with NATO and that there is a movement in 
the direction to combine civil and military aspects of cybersecurity. However, other direct 
stakeholders as well as advisors and users were either sceptical of the benefits of collaboration or 
indicated barriers to it, mainly in the form of reluctance and lack of trust from some Member 
States (e.g. not all Member States are NATO members), as well as uncertainty on whether this fell 
within ENISA’s mandate. In the open public consultation, civil-military cooperation was among the 
needs least frequently selected by respondents (see Figure 53).  
 
In terms of needs and opportunities, several other international bodies were mentioned 
as interesting for further collaboration in the future. Apart from the discussion above 
regarding NATO, the interviews with ENISA’s various stakeholders indicated good opportunities for 
increased collaboration with several international bodies, for example: UN / ITU (brings on-board 
the poorer countries lacking means to deal with cybersecurity problems), third country 
governments (exportation of European model legislation, as has been done already for Japan and 
Qatar), the FIRST community, standard developing organisations (e.g. NIST or similar bodies at 
international level, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the 
Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)), Europol and 
Interpol (as cybercrime and security threats are often closely related).  
 
ENISA needs to be more clearly positioned as the focal point of cybersecurity in Europe 
and a natural contact point for international collaboration. As presented in section3.2.2.4, 
ENISA is not widely described as a centre of expertise or as a reference point for stakeholders in 
the NIS area, mainly due to little visibility and lacking expertise in certain technical fields. 
Additionally, interviews with direct stakeholders indicated that a clarification with respect to 
international collaboration in ENISA’s future mandate would be useful. It is natural, given ENISA’s 
name, that international actors perceive ENISA as the Single Point of Contact of cybersecurity in 
Europe and contact the Agency to discuss cybersecurity matters and international cooperation. 
However, according to one of ENISA’s direct stakeholders, it is not clear whether this falls within 
their current mandate.  
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3.3.7 ENISA’s future mission, tasks, working practices or activities 
 
EQ42: Could ENISA’s mission, tasks, working practices or activities be further developed 
in order to better respond to the new cybersecurity landscape or would another EU 
initiative be more efficient? 
Although the broad scope of the current mandate was seen as adequate by given stakeholders, 
others saw a need for more clarity with respect to the activities to be performed. Many direct 
stakeholders, advisors and users linked the limited resources of the Agency to a need for a clearer 
mandate, with the work being more focused on key priorities. Furthermore, there was also broad 
consensus that ENISA needs to develop its in-house expertise in key areas. The difficulties faced 
by ENISA in recruiting competent staff were identified as a key barrier to its development in this 
regard. No other EU initiatives were identified as being more efficient or effective than ENISA in 
responding to the new cybersecurity landscape but open public consultation respondents pointed 
to other potential EU initiatives that could complement ENISA’s work in the field of cybersecurity.  
 
Many of ENISA’s stakeholders would like a revision of the mandate, with clarifications of 
the field of actions and key priorities. Stakeholders have different views on whether the 
mandate of ENISA needs to be changed or not to reflect new needs posed by the evolving 
cybersecurity landscape. Some of the interviewed direct stakeholders, as well as users and 
advisors of ENISA, think that the current mandate is wide enough (or flexible enough) to cover 
evolving needs, while other stakeholders think that there are some limitations to the current 
mandate, e.g. related to uncertainty of which actions ENISA can take to meet the needs from its 
users and regarding a change towards a more operational role of the Agency. As already pointed 
out (see e.g. section 3.2.2.8) the size of the Agency is assessed as a weakness by a close majority 
of surveyed stakeholders94. This point is confirmed by the interviews in terms of frequent requests 
for more resources, particularly from ENISA’s direct stakeholders. Linked to the comments on 
ENISA’s limited resources numerous interviewees (including Member States) also call for a clearer 
mandate and better definition of key priorities.95 A few interviewees also see a need for an 
improved description of ENISA’s role compared both to other EU agencies (particularly EC3 and 
CERT-EU) and national cybersecurity agencies. Examples of issues proposed to be clarified or to be 
specifically mentioned in the mandate are: the Agency’s role in cyber crisis collaboration and 
support activities for the private.  
 
There seems to be a general consensus among the stakeholders that ENISA needs to 
develop its in-house expertise in key areas. In relation to the need for more staff and greater 
focus on key priorities, the interviewed stakeholders (both direct stakeholder and users and 
advisors) see a need for ENISA to develop its expertise and concentrate its resources on fewer 
projects. The problems identified (see e.g. section 3.2.2.8) in attracting and retaining competent 
staff, particularly senior experts and technical experts, are reported as a barrier in this sense, 
together with the need for a revision of the current recruitment procedures. A few direct 
stakeholders propose increased interaction and knowledge sharing with Member States 
cybersecurity and NIS experts to increase the competencies of ENISA’s staff. This latter approach 
is in line with the results of the CSIRT survey, as increased interaction between ENISA and CSIRT, 
together with more training activities, were seen as particularly important by respondents. 
 
While respondents to the open public consultation pointed to other EU initiatives to help 
respond to current gaps and needs, these were not seen as alternatives to ENISA. Open 
public consultation respondents were asked to propose what other, if any, EU initiatives could be 
                                               
94 This refers to the “ENISA survey”. 
95 This is in line with previous evaluations key explanations to some of the shortcomings regarding effectiveness, namely 1) the broad 
mandate and the variety of tasks it seeks to fulfil, and 2) issues with staff recruitment and limited resources. 
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put in place to address the gaps and needs identified (see section 3.3.1). In total, 38 respondents 
commented on what these other EU initiatives could be:  
 National authority respondents felt that other EU initiatives could focus on “increased funding 
for capacity building and joint operational ventures, particularly for smaller Member States” 
and “further financial programmes to support CSIRTs capabilities and SMEs protection”. For 
this, ENISA should be allowed to participate in funding programmes to ensure more effective 
work with Member States and to extend the range of activities it offers.  
 Respondents from private enterprises and business associations commented on various topics: 
Specifically on the NIS Directive, a few respondents felt the current legislation was already 
outdated before the implementation process had been completed in Member States; therefore 
a revision of the Directive was considered necessary. One respondent proposed to adopt an 
EU-wide implementation of the US NIST framework which provides flexible and cost-effective 
risk based approaches and supply chain resilience, and suggested that its implementation 
would enable to streamline best practices across all sectors. Other contributions showed strong 
support for the EU to invest more in addressing the cyber skills gap ranging from basic 
education to professional qualification and advanced training of skilled and specialised cyber 
experts.  
 Respondents from the other stakeholder groups agreed that there must be an approach to 
legislation, particularly since the “slightly chaotic process surrounding the launch and 
subsequent debate on the NIS Directive”. Additional laws were not seen as necessary, but 
rather “effective continuous action” by focusing on education and information sharing at a fast 
pace. Other respondents also saw the need for the “establishment of a dedicated funding or 
financial programme for cybersecurity research”, suggesting it as a “powerful incentive for 
government, universities and the private sector to help archive security goals”.   
 
3.3.8 Conclusions on ENISA’s SWOTs 
 
In the context of the rapid evolution of the technological landscape and the related intensification 
of cybersecurity threats, increased cooperation between different authorities and communities 
(public and private), increased capacities at Member States level and further research into 
cybersecurity challenges, were identified as particularly important needs. Overall, if sufficiently 
mandated and resourced, ENISA was considered to be able to contribute to addressing the 
evolving needs of the NIS domain.  
 
On the strengths side, taking into account the borderless nature of cyber-attacks, as well as the 
concerns Member States have in disclosing sensitive information, ENISA is a neutral facilitator with 
policy expertise in the domain of cybersecurity.96 The Agency is well placed to help Member States 
and EU institutions find common ground for agreement in the face of divergent priorities, and 
strengthen the levels of cooperation and collaboration among them. As noted by s noted by all of 
the consulted stakeholder groups and in the reviewed documentation97, cyber resilience is a key 
element in the cybersecurity domain, and thus ENISA’s central role in strengthening cyber 
resilience, by helping Member States to foster their capability and capacity development, has been 
identified as one of the Agency’s strongest assets. The prompt eruption of new vulnerabilities and 
the difficulty to mitigate the attacks point to the need to involve different kinds of stakeholders in 
order to present a more comprehensive approach. ENISA has extensive experience engaging with 
different types of stakeholders which, combined with its expertise in collecting and sharing pan-
                                               
96 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0.; See ENISA 
(2015). CYBER 7: Seven messages to the edge of Cyber-Space; Catalogue Number: TP-04-15-745-EN-C; ISB: 978-92-9204-133-5. And 
Largely confirmed by ENISA stakeholder interviews. 
97 See, for example European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber 
Resilience System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry; Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper 
No13. Available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-
paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 February 2017. 
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European data, can facilitate the identification and dissemination of best practices to overcome 
diverse challenges.98 
 
ENISA is faced with several weaknesses that affect its role and effectiveness in the European 
cybersecurity landscape. ENISA has limited visibility in the press, media and among the general 
public due to weak communication and marketing, as well as limited self-assertion, meaning that 
its voice is only softly heard in the EU’s diverse, fragmented cybersecurity landscape. What is 
more, ENISA’s lacks a long-term vision as it is too constrained by its annual work programme. 
Aside from these substance-related challenges, there are more structural weaknesses that also 
have been identified in the evaluations of ENISA’s activities in 2014 and 2015. ENISA lacks 
sufficient human and financial resources to complete its various activities to a high standard. The 
size of the Agency was considered by several stakeholders99 to be insufficient to handle all the 
tasks entrusted to it, including the new tasks imposed by the NIS Directive. An additional burden 
concerns ENISA’s difficulties to attract and retain qualified human resources. 
  
The NIS Directive can be seen as an opportunity for ENISA to increase its role and importance in 
the cybersecurity landscape. In the light of increased levels of digitisation and rapidly evolving 
cyber-threats, ENISA could profit from growing demands for synergies between operators, e.g. 
digital service providers, encouraging collaboration across different sectors and stakeholders 
concerned or affected by cybersecurity policies. According to several industry representatives, one 
area of great potential for ENISA concerns the introduction of ICT standardisation and certification 
with a view to supporting further integration of the Single Market and consumer trust.100 In 
addition, ENISA’s users and advisors agree that there is an acknowledged need and demand for 
awareness raising in the field of cybersecurity and ENISA could have a strong role in coordinating 
future action in this regard.  
 
From a formative, future-oriented perspective, ENISA is faced with several threats that impact on 
the cybersecurity context in which the Agency is operating. Attacks are not only becoming more 
sophisticated, but are also more pervasive. The rapidly changing landscape, in addition to the 
growth in the interconnectivity of devices, have been recognised in several studies101 102 as 
contributors to the prompt eruption of new vulnerabilities and difficulties in mitigating attacks. A 
lack of capacity to meet such rapidly changing threats is considered an important threat faced by 
ENISA. Furthermore, ENISA is dominated by Member States’ divergent priorities and capabilities. 
Since Member States have difficulties agreeing on common action in ENISA, the outcome is often 
the least threatening action to all Member States. This in turn is limiting ENISA’s scope of action.101  
A further contextual threat concerns the general fragmentation of EU cybersecurity policy with 
several, at times competing, agencies active in the cyber-policy domain. Last but not least, there 
is a recognised lack of trained experts in cybersecurity in Europe which aggravates the Agency’s 
recruitment difficulties.103  
 
The table in Appendix 5 presents a more comprehensive compilation of ENISA’s SWOTs, while 
Figure 59 below summarizes the main SWOTs identified.  
                                               
98 European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace. 
99 Findings from the ENISA survey as well as from stakeholder interviews 
100 See interviews; the proposal for further action equally appears in: See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
101
 Accenture and HfS Research (2016). The State of Cybersecurity and Digital Trust 2016. 
102 
EY (2015). Cybersecurity and the Internet of Things. 
103 Finding from ENISA stakeholder interviews. 
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Figure 59: ENISA's main SWOTs 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
On the basis of the findings presented above, this section presents overall conclusions on the 
successes of ENISA and the most pressing issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure a 
coherent approach to NIS in Europe in the future. These issues are situated at the more strategic, 
policy level and at the level of ENISA as the subject of this study and one of the current players in 
this sphere. Following on from these, a series of possible options to review the current mandate of 
ENISA have been presented, including an assessment the costs of each of these options, their 
potential EU added value and their impact on ENISA’s coherence with national and EU 
cybersecurity bodies. 
 
4.1 Successes of ENISA 
 
Over the 13 years of its existence ENISA has made some important achievements towards 
increasing NIS in the EU. The main successes of ENISA, identified on the basis of the findings and 
conclusions of this evaluation study are presented below.  
 
ENISA implements activities and provides services in an area of rapidly increasing 
relevance. The increased frequency, sophistication and potential impact of cyber-threats shows 
the need for a coordinated approach across the EU. This is where ENISA’s objectives to contribute 
to securing NIS in Europe through the provision of expertise, increasing capacities, fostering 
cooperation and supporting the development and implementation of legislation and policies is of 
high relevance. Overall, if sufficiently mandated and resourced, ENISA was considered to be able 
to contribute to addressing the evolving needs of the NIS domain. 
 
ENISA has contributed to building a community of cybersecurity stakeholders across the 
EU. ENISA has proven capable of maintaining a viable network with a range of different 
stakeholders comprising national authorities, the EU institutions and bodies, academia, civil society 
organisations and to some extent also the private sector. ENISA is perceived as a trusted partner 
and acts as a node between the different organisations to gather and exchange information and 
best practices among Member States and beyond. A main success is the establishment of the a 
network of CERT/CSIRT which benefitted from training and workshops thereby fostering 
coordination and exchange.  
 
ENISA’s has increased capacity and coordination on cyber-attacks in the EU. In particular 
with the cyber exercises ENISA has brought together public and private stakeholders to increase 
their understanding of and capacities in NIS. As one of the Commission representatives pointed 
out in the context of the study, following the recent attack of multiple variants of a ransomware 
named WannaCry which affected many organisations in the European Union, ENISA successfully 
ensured cyber cooperation at EU level for the first time104. Other capacity building activities, such 
as trainings and the provision of manuals further contribute to better prevention, detection and 
response to incidents across the EU.  
 
ENISA makes NIS knowledge available and accessible. Some of ENISA’s publications have 
been highly appreciated and are considered to be very useful. ENISA’s publications provide 
relevant information on cybersecurity issues from an EU-wide perspective. The publications 
present technical expertise in a language that is accessible to policy makers and a broader public. 
Publications that were specifically highlighted by stakeholders as contributing to the study cover 
                                               
104 See also: ENISA’s press release on the issue. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/wannacry-ransomware-
first-ever-case-of-cyber-cooperation-at-eu-level 
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issues such as incident reporting, cloud computing and crisis management. ENISA’s neutrality as a 
decentralised EU agency is appreciated by the public and private sector.  
 
Finally, ENISA has contributed to increasing awareness about cybersecurity across the 
EU through the cybersecurity month. While the activities are increasingly organised by 
Member States with more independence from ENISA, the Agency has contributed to setting up this 
activity which reaches public and private stakeholders, as well as citizens across the EU with the 
aim of increasing their understanding of the risks posed to NIS.  
 
ENISA efficiently implements its assigned tasks. ENISA’s staff are highly dedicated to their 
work and ensure that despite tight resources, planned outputs are delivered. Within the Agency 
efficient work processes have been established with a clear delineation of responsibilities.  
 
4.2 Most pressing issues at the strategic / policy level 
 
The most pressing issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure a coherent approach to 
cybersecurity in Europe on the basis of the findings and conclusions of this study are presented 
below. 
 
Cybersecurity at the EU institutional level is fragmented: There are a number of EU-level 
actors that are active in the cybersecurity area including ENISA, CERT-EU and EC3 (Europol), 
leading to a fragmented approach towards cybersecurity among EU institutions. There is no one 
central point of reference for cybersecurity in Europe. While the mandates of these organisations 
are in theory different, their roles are not clearly defined in practice and there is a potential for 
overlap, as the positioning exercise presented in section 3.2.4.3 points to. Within this context, 
ENISA has had difficulty carving out a place for itself and has found other organisations such as 
CERT-EU in particular filling a gap by carrying out activities that would from a legal perspective fall 
within ENISA’s remit. 
 
The institutional and legal framework for cybersecurity in Europe is rather weak: 
Cybersecurity has not been seen as a legal priority at EU-level until more recently. The Single 
Market acquis105 do not apply to digital services to the same extent as to other areas. This has had 
an impact on the degree to which cross border cooperation in relation to NIS is working. 
Cybersecurity is primarily an area of national competence, while in reality it is an issue that 
transcends borders; an effective strategy for the prevention, mitigation and response to cyber 
threats/attacks requires cooperation across Member States. The advent of the NIS Directive, the 
Communication on Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive 
and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry (COM(2016) 410), and the priorities set by the Digital 
Single Market Strategy (COM(2015) 192) represent key new pillars to strengthening the 
institutional and legal framework for cybersecurity in Europe going forward.  
 
4.3 Most pressing issues at the ENISA level 
 
At the level of ENISA, the study’s findings point to a series of issues that would need to be 
addressed in order for the Agency to play a key role in cybersecurity in Europe going forward. 
 
ENISA lacks visibility: ENISA has not been able to carve out a strong, clear place for itself within 
the European cybersecurity landscape. While it is known and recognised within its circle of 
stakeholders, it has not managed to develop a strong brand name or be seen as the one point of 
reference at European level for cybersecurity. A number of factors help to explain this, including 
the fragmented nature of cybersecurity in Europe with multiple actors seeking to position 
                                               
105 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/acquis/index_en.htm  
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themselves within the areas of prevention, mitigation and response. Finally, the degree to which 
ENISA has been “allowed in” and consulted by the Commission and other players acting at EU level 
in this field has impacted on its visibility. While ENISA is more frequently consulted than in the 
past, it is not necessarily present in all relevant fora dealing with or funding programmes (e.g. 
CEF) related to cybersecurity at European level. 
 
ENISA does not have sufficient financial or human resources at its disposal to effectively 
respond to its broad mandate: Despite evolutions over the past few years in the degree of 
importance of cybersecurity and an according increase in the scope of ENISA’s mandate, ENISA’s 
budget has remained very limited. With the advent of the NIS Directive and the new tasks 
entrusted to it, e.g. taking part in the Cooperation Group and acting as the secretariat for the 
CSIRT Network, it has also had to prioritise and set aside some of the areas it has previously 
focussed on, thereby further depleting resources. While the evaluation suggests that there is 
potential for ENISA to increase its efficiency by introducing more flexibility in their programming 
cycle or automatization of some of the administrative processes, such improvements would not be 
sufficient in their scope to allow it to effectively respond to its broad mandate. An important area 
for improvement is recruitment. ENISA has difficulty recruiting and retaining the staff required for 
it to have the necessary expertise at its disposal to perform tasks in-house and in some cases to 
the quality standards expected (i.e. reference was made by stakeholders to the varying levels of 
quality of ENISA reports/publications in particular). This is due to both internal (i.e. slow 
recruitment procedures in a fast-paced, competitive environment; a lack of career progression 
prospects) and external factors (i.e. small budget; constraining staff management rules (e.g. 
number of CAs versus TAs); an expertise shortfall in the sector; and a lack of competitive salaries 
in an area that is dominated by demand from the private sector. 
 
ENISA is not perceived as a proactive, visionary Agency: ENISA’s mandate is broad enough 
to be all encompassing and allows for flexibility in the tasks it carries out. This leads to it being 
reactive by seeking to fulfil needs of as many stakeholders as possible and not being focussed, 
proactive and visionary. Stakeholders suggested that increased expertise within the Agency and a 
stronger focus on research could allow for ENISA to be more abreast of developments in 
cybersecurity. To make use of this knowledge, ENISA would need to be able to be more flexible in 
setting its own work priorities. One of the factors explaining this is the Member State dominance 
(via the Management Board) of the work programme. Given the differing needs and priorities of 
Member States, there is not a common line among Member States and the work programme tends 
to lead to ENISA having work priorities that represent the lowest common denominator among 
Member States and are not perceived as threatening to the national competence of given Member 
States. As such, ENISA has a tendency to spread itself too thin, as also concluded in the 2015 
evaluation. 
 
There is little consensus on what the future role of the Agency should be: The divergent 
needs of ENISA’s stakeholders lead to a lack of consensus on whether the Agency should take on a 
more operational role, or continue to be an Agency acting solely at the strategic level. In taking on 
a more operational role, it could gather data, monitor and share information on incidents occurring 
throughout the EU in order to ensure increased transparency and enable Member States to 
coordinate joint responses to incidents where this proves necessary. While Member States with 
fewer resources at their disposal and industry would perceive this as a positive development, 
Member States with strong cybersecurity capacity tend to see it as an encroachment on their area 
of national competence. 
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4.4 Options for the future 
 
Table 26 below sets out a set of possible options to review the current mandate of ENISA, including the issues that they would seek to address and 
expected results of the different factors for change that could be considered under each option. It also presents an assessment of the added value of 
each of the new changes foreseen and of the risk of overlap with the tasks and activities of other national, European or international bodies. The third 
table provides an estimation of the costs related to each of the factors for change derived from the results of the evaluation; these are based on a series 
of assumptions, as presented in the table.  
 
The section therefore serves to respond to the evaluation questions presented below. 
Table 25: Evaluation questions on the options for the future of ENISA 
 
Prospective 
EQ43: What would be the financial implications associated with each of the possible options for modifying ENISA’s mandate as they emerge from the 
evaluation? 
 
EQ44: If any new tasks for ENISA are identified (e.g. through EQ4 and EQ37), do these represent EU added value?   
 
EQ 45: Taking into account the new tasks (identified during the evaluation), will there be any risk of ENISA’s tasks and activities overlapping with those 
of other national, European or international bodies? 
 
Table 26: Options for the future – the key issues they will address and expected results 
Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
Option 0: Baseline, maintain the 
status quo 
 
This option concerns an extension 
of the current mandate in terms 
of scope and objectives, though 
the provisions from the NIS 
Directive, the eIDAS Regulation 
and Telecoms Framework 
Directive would need to be taken 
into account.  
N/A as status quo 
 
Revise ENISA’s mandate to 
make its new tasks as per 
recent/upcoming legislation 
more specific: 
 Involvement in 
Cooperation Group: Support 
MS cooperation on drafting 
and maintaining over time 
voluntary guidelines on 
security measures  
 CSIRT Network Secretariat: 
Provide technical support for 
back-end services that enable 
CSIRTs to exchange 
information on best practices 
Continuation of status quo 
 
If factor for change is 
implemented (review of 
mandate in light of new 
tasks) – Increased coherence 
of ENISA’s mandate and thus 
activities with EU 
cybersecurity policies 
 
N/A as status quo (see section 3.2.4.5 
and section 3.2.5.1) 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
and actual incidents and 
threats, as well as support 
voluntary cooperation in case 
of incidents 
 Electronic communications 
code, recital 92: Contribute 
to an enhanced level of 
security of electronic 
communications by, amongst 
other things, providing 
expertise and advice, and 
promoting the exchange of 
best practices 
 eIDAS: (1) Recital 39 - 
Enable the EC and MSs to 
assess the effectiveness of the 
breach notification mechanism 
introduced by this Regulation 
by, for example, aggregating 
the national reports provided 
by supervisory bodies into an 
annual Report on EU Breaches 
in Trust Service Providers. (2) 
Support supervisory 
authorities in the drafting and 
supervision of security 
measures of Trust Services 
through, for example, 
supporting national regulators 
in the drafting and 
maintenance of guidelines on 
security measures and 
incident notification formats 
and procedures on Trust 
Services 
Option 1: Expiry of ENISA 
mandate (terminating ENISA) 
 
This option would involve closing 
ENISA and not creating another 
EU-level institution, but relying 
on existing 
institutions/organisations to 
implement engagements under, 
 N/A See section 3.2.5.3 N/A 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
for example, the NIS Directive 
and bilateral or regional ties at 
Member State level. 
 
Option 2: Enhanced ENISA (Keep 
ENISA with changes to its 
mandate) 
 
This option concerns making 
significant revisions to ENISA’s 
mandate to address the key 
issues identified in the study, 
thereby building on its current 
role and ensuring that the new 
mandate is better adapted to the 
evolving cybersecurity landscape.  
The current level of 
cyber threats in the 
EU requires an 
enhanced, 
coordinated 
approach  
 
Member States with 
fewer cybersecurity 
capacities need 
support to prevent, 
mitigate and 
respond to 
cybersecurity 
threats 
 
ENISA is not 
perceived as a 
proactive, visionary 
agency 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
operational role:  
 Provide periodic threat 
intelligence and ad hoc 
alerts: ENISA would develop 
and maintain its own threat 
intelligence capacity in order 
to monitor the threat 
landscape and provide MSs 
fast alerts/warnings on 
emerging threats and risks 
and monitor security incidents, 
including those affecting 
specific MSs. This would 
involve: (1) producing regular 
threat intelligence reports 
including high-level strategic 
analyses on threats, incidents 
and trends (e.g. key 
technological developments) 
and (2) collecting and 
analysing public 
communications on an event 
and compiling EU-level flash 
reports and guidance to 
businesses and citizens. 
 Support the Blueprint for 
response to large scale 
cybersecurity incidents and 
crises at EU level: ENISA 
would: (1) organise 
cybersecurity exercises to test 
the Blueprint at all levels – 
operational, tactical and 
strategic) with all 
stakeholders; (2) collect and 
aggregate reports from 
national sources (CSIRTs) to 
establish a common situation 
awareness report for decision 
Based on information shared 
by the Member States, 
ENISA will be able to provide 
a common baseline and up-
to-date threat analysis 
 
The Agency will ensure 
cooperation and coordination 
across the Member States in 
case of an incident 
concerning several Member 
States 
 
ENISA would support 
capacity building in Member 
States through the provision 
of technical assistance on an 
on-demand basis 
 
ENISA will further assist the 
Union and the Member 
States in enhancing and 
strengthening their capability 
and preparedness to 
prevent, detect and respond 
to network and information 
security problems and 
incidents 
 
 
EU added value of new tasks:  
These tasks aimed at strengthening 
ENISA’s operational role represent EU 
added value as there is a need for 
data to be gathered at EU level to 
provide a common baseline and up-to-
date threat analysis in order to share 
knowledge, foment cooperation among 
Member States and help better 
respond to cyber security incidents 
that are cross-border in their nature 
 
There is also a need for capacity to be 
increased, in particular among smaller 
Member States that tend to invest 
fewer resources in cyber security, 
through the exchange of knowledge 
and expertise at EU level 
 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
With a strengthened operational role 
foreseen for ENISA there will be a 
need to clarify the respective roles of 
other EU bodies active in the area and 
which have been seeking to fill a 
vacuum in some of these areas (e.g. 
CERT-EU), as well as increase 
coordination between them 
   
 
 
 
120 
 
Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
makers in the event of an 
incident; (3) support technical 
handling of the incident, 
including facilitating sharing of 
technical solutions between 
MSs; (4) handle public 
communication around the 
incident; (5) in case of a 
major crisis, propose the 
activation of the political 
decision making (IPCR) by 
alerting all or one of the EU 
institutions; (6) publish flash 
report or alerts in the event of 
significant events or incidents 
based on publically available 
information OR information 
made available through the 
CSIRT Network  
 Provide emergency 
cybersecurity response: 
ENISA would provide on-
demand technical assistance 
to MS bodies and institutions 
by creating and maintaining a 
team of experienced senior 
cybersecurity incident advisors 
who may be sent to MSs upon 
their request to assist and 
contribute to cybersecurity 
incident response and 
recovery 
The institutional 
and legal 
framework for 
cyber security in 
Europe is rather 
weak 
 
The current level of 
cyber threats in the 
EU requires an 
enhanced, 
coordinated 
Strengthen ENISA’s role in 
policy development and 
implementation: 
 Establish ENISA as an agency 
that has to be involved by 
other EU bodies, including the 
Commission, when 
cybersecurity matters are 
being considered 
 Formally involve ENISA in the 
implementation of the 
Connecting Europe Facility on 
ENISA will play a stronger 
role in assisting the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies and Member 
States in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the legal 
and regulatory requirements 
of network and information 
security under existing and 
future legal acts of the 
Union, thus contributing to a 
EU added value of new tasks:  
These tasks aimed at strengthening 
ENISA’s role in policy development 
and implementation represent EU 
added value in that this policy 
development is happening at the EU 
level and ENISA has a cross-Member 
State perspective on cyber security on 
the basis of the multi-stakeholder 
network it has managed to establish 
and can draw on 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
approach 
 
ENISA lacks the 
visibility required to 
ensure it is seen as 
a key player and 
called upon to play 
an active role in EU 
policy making on 
cybersecurity 
Telecom as an advisory body 
 Establish semi-formal 
governance structures with 
regular meetings between 
ENISA and other 
agencies/international 
organisations (e.g. on given 
common themes such as 
training) to increase 
cooperation at EU institutional 
level 
 
Increase ENISA’s visibility: 
 Set-up a liaison office in 
Brussels with two to three 
permanent employees 
 Create a dedicated 
communications team within 
ENISA 
less fragmented, more 
coherent legal and 
institutional framework and 
ultimately the proper 
functioning of the internal 
market 
 
 
ENISA will be able to more 
easily and cost-effectively 
ensure a presence in 
Brussels and build 
awareness, notably when it 
comes to its strengthened 
role in policy development 
and implementation, but also 
in relation to research and 
innovation 
 
EU institutions and bodies 
will benefit from ENISA’s 
input on cybersecurity 
 
EU institutions and bodies, 
Member States and other 
stakeholders will be more 
aware of the expertise and 
support available through 
ENISA 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
Increasing ENISA’s involvement in 
policy development and 
implementation will imply the Agency 
increasing its ties and involvement 
with other bodies active in the area, 
thereby increasing the potential for 
synergies to be developed 
The institutional 
and legal 
framework for 
cyber security in 
Europe is rather 
weak 
 
There is limited 
long-term planning 
for ENISA’s  
activities 
Make ENISA’s mandate 
permanent: 
 This would involve ENISA 
having a permanent mandate, 
but still allow for the periodic 
evaluation of the performance 
of the Agency 
ENISA will be put on the 
map, ensuring a more 
permanent presence and 
longer-term, strategic 
outlook  
 
Will lead to an increase in 
staff retention, planning and 
competence development by 
providing a more long term 
perspective 
EU added value of new tasks:  
N/A 
 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
N/A 
ENISA’s work 
programme is 
dominated by the 
interests of Member 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
governance structure: 
 Formally involve other 
stakeholders in the 
ENISA will be less Member 
State dominated, thereby 
leading to a work 
programme that takes into 
EU added value of new tasks:  
N 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
States governance of ENISA by 
increasing the weight of the 
PSG in playing an advisory 
role on ENISA’s Work 
Programme   
 Allow more flexibility for 
ENISA to determine its own 
work priorities at Executive 
Board level  
account the needs of a 
variety of stakeholders 
including those of the EU 
institutions and the private 
sector 
 
The Agency will use its 
expertise to stimulate further 
cooperation between actors 
from the public and private 
sector 
 
The needs of the private 
sector will be better 
addressed 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
N/A 
 
There is a need for 
EU level 
coordination on 
standardisation and 
certification of ICT  
Include a role for ENISA in EU-
level standardisation and 
certification: 
 Support the EU ICT 
Security Certification 
Framework: Put in place an 
EU ICT security certification 
framework whereby ENISA 
would play a supporting role 
by (1) providing the 
secretariat and actively 
supporting the work 
undertaken (e.g. convene 
meetings of the framework’s 
governance structures and 
meetings and engagements 
with industry 
stakeholders);(2) providing 
technical expertise to Member 
States (e.g. MS taking part in 
the framework on issues 
related to security testing and 
vulnerabilities in ICT 
products); and (3) compiling 
and publishing guidelines 
concerning the security 
requirements of ICT products 
and services in cooperation 
with national authorities and 
Standardisation will be 
further supported 
 
ENISA would support 
capacity building in the 
Member States through the 
provision of technical 
expertise 
 
EU added value of new tasks:  
These tasks aimed at strengthening 
ENISA’s role in standardisation and 
certification represent EU added value 
in that action in this area needs to 
take place at a cross-European level 
and ENISA, with its wide network of 
EU-level stakeholders, demonstrated 
ability as a neutral player to support 
cooperation across Member States and 
stakeholders with differing views and 
its ability to compile and report on 
technical issues, will be key in 
ensuring this 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
In performing these tasks, ENISA will 
draw on existing sources to come up 
with assessments and guidelines and 
fill a void in this area at EU level. 
There is therefore limited risk of 
overlap of its activities in this area 
with other bodies at EU and 
international level. At national level, 
there is a risk of duplication of efforts 
where given Member States make 
their own recommendations/provide 
guidelines in this area. 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
industry, thereby 
communicating the work of 
the framework to industry, 
consumers at EU and 
international level  
 Support ICT security 
standardisation: ENISA 
would provide a supportive 
role in facilitating the 
establishment and take-up of 
European and international 
standards for risk 
management and for the 
security of electronic products, 
networks and services, 
including by cooperating with 
Member States on technical 
areas concerning the security 
requirements for operators of 
essential services and digital 
service providers. This could 
involve supporting the work of 
the EU ICT Security 
Certification Framework in EU 
and international standard 
organisations; taking part in 
and contributing to the work 
of cybersecurity working 
groups of the European 
Standardisation Organisations 
(ESCs); performing reviews 
and assessments of 
cybersecurity related 
standards when associated 
with regulatory and legal 
requirements (e.g. eIDAS) 
Cyber security at 
the EU institutional 
level is fragmented 
 
ENISA is not 
perceived as a 
proactive, visionary 
Agency 
Strengthen ENISA’s position 
relative to research and 
innovation:  
 Take part in programming 
implementation: ENISA 
would implement parts of the 
Framework Programme for 
R&I which relates to 
Research and development 
will be further supported 
 
ENISA’s presence in this area 
will be strengthened, thereby 
increasing its visibility and its 
access to information on 
latest technological 
EU added value:  
These tasks aimed at strengthening 
ENISA’s position relative to R&I 
represent EU added value in that 
ENISA has a cross-Member State 
perspective on what is going on in the 
cyber security field on the basis of the 
multi-stakeholder network it has 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
 
ENISA lacks the 
visibility required to 
ensure it is seen as 
a key player and 
called upon to play 
an active role in 
contributing to 
research and 
innovation 
 
cybersecurity whereby the EC 
delegates the relevant powers 
by performing the following 
tasks: (1) managing some 
stages of the programme 
implementation and some 
phases in the lifetime of 
specific projects on the basis 
of WPs adopted by the EC; (2) 
adopting the instruments of 
budget execution for revenue 
and expenditure and carrying 
out all the operations 
necessary for the 
management of the 
programme; and (3) providing 
support in programme 
implementation. Examples of 
the activities ENISA could 
perform include implementing 
calls on Public Procurement of 
Innovation (PPI) in close 
collaboration with MS 
authorities, and supporting MS 
public procurers in identifying 
common research and 
innovation requirements 
 Take part in programming 
through playing an 
advisory role: ENISA would 
play an expert advisory role in 
the cyber security-related 
elements of EU R&D funding 
programmes (H2020, CEF) by 
sitting on an advisory 
committee, providing 
independent advice and input 
and feeding into ideas for 
research. 
 Benefit from EU R&I 
funding: Open ENISA’s 
mandate to take part in EU 
R&D funding programmes 
(H2020, CEF) as a recipient of 
developments  managed to establish and can draw on 
 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
By taking part in programming 
implementation, ENISA would take on 
a series of tasks currently 
implemented by the European 
Commission, thereby ensuring a lack 
of overlap.  
Moreover, there is no other cyber 
security-focussed body at EU level 
involved in advising at programme 
level. 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
funding by changing the 
provisions on source of 
revenue but not adding it as a 
task. ENISA can provide added 
value to industry and 
academia in R&I by leveraging 
its practical expertise in areas 
such as cooperation, 
information sharing and 
regulatory requirements.  
 
Note: Either one or the other 
options set out above could be 
pursued due to issues of conflict of 
interest. 
Option 3: European Agency with 
full operational capabilities 
(Establish a European Centre of 
Cybersecurity) 
 
This option concerns developing 
ENISA into a new body at EU level 
that would cover the entire cycle 
cybersecurity lifecycle and deal 
with prevention, detection and 
response to cyber incidents. 
Cyber security at 
the EU institutional 
level is fragmented 
 
 
The current level of 
cyber threats in the 
EU requires an 
enhanced, 
coordinated 
approach 
Create an EU level cyber 
security umbrella:  
 Develop an umbrella 
organisation covering ENISA 
and CERT-EU, thereby 
bringing together three main 
functions, namely policy 
advice, centre for information 
and Computer Emergency 
Response Team. The 
operational role of CERT-EU in 
responding to cyber incidents 
in the EU institutions would 
therefore be combined with 
ENISA’s role of ensuring 
cooperation in the event of an 
incident. The new organisation 
would act as an EU contact 
point for cybersecurity related 
issues in close coordination 
with the EEAS. Options include 
merging ENISA and CERT-EU 
and having a governance 
structure that would allow 
different reporting lines and 
oversight for the team dealing 
with the EU institutions, or 
integrating (part of) CERT-EU 
within ENISA as one of the 
A more coordinated response 
to cyber incidents would be 
ensured across the EU and 
its various players 
 
Member States would receive 
direct support when 
responding to cyber incidents 
 
 
EU added value of new tasks:  
N/A 
 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
The potential for overlap between 
ENISA’s work and that of CERT-EU 
would be avoided 
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Options Key issues to 
address 
Factors of change Expected results Assessment of EU added value 
(EQ44) and coherence (EQ 45) 
Agency’s departments. 
 
Cyber security at 
the EU institutional 
level is fragmented 
 
The current level of 
cyber threats in the 
EU requires an 
enhanced, 
coordinated 
approach 
 
ENISA is not 
perceived as a 
proactive, visionary 
Agency 
 
Create a virtual European 
CSIRT: 
 Coordinate CSIRT Network 
operations: Enable the 
Agency to coordinate the 
operations of MS CSIRTs, 
collecting information and 
pooling national resources on 
analysing threats and 
responding to incidents 
 Produce real time 
situational awareness and 
dynamic (live) threat 
intelligence feeds: Enable 
ENISA to act as a broker, 
sharing information on 
incidents between Member 
States in the form of real-time 
situational awareness and 
dynamic (live) threat 
intelligence feeds on the basis 
of information exchanged on 
the CSIRT Network 
 Maintain and provide own 
cybersecurity incident 
response capacity to public 
and private sector: ENISA 
would create and maintain the 
capacity to provide on-
demand technical operational 
assistance to MS CSIRTs, 
operators of essential services, 
EU bodies and institutions for 
the prevention, detection and 
response to incidents 
 
Creation of a more coherent, 
stronger CS presence in 
Europe 
 
Based on information shared 
by the Member States, 
ENISA will be able to provide 
a real time threat analysis 
 
The European CSIRT will 
ensure cooperation and 
coordination across the 
Member States in case of an 
incident concerning several 
Member States 
 
The European CSIRT would 
support capacity building on 
an on-demand basis in the 
public and private sector 
 
The European CSIRT  would 
further assist the Union and 
the Member States in 
enhancing and strengthening 
their capability and 
preparedness to prevent, 
detect and respond to 
network and information 
security problems and 
incidents 
 
EU added value:  
These tasks aimed at creating a virtual 
European CSIRT represent EU added 
value as there is a need for real-time 
data to be gathered, assessed and 
shared at EU level to provide common, 
real-time situational awareness and 
dynamic (live) threat intelligence, 
foment cooperation among Member 
States and help better respond to 
cyber security incidents that are cross-
border in their nature 
 
There is also a need for capacity to be 
increased, in particular among smaller 
Member States that tend to invest 
fewer resources in cyber security, 
through the exchange of knowledge 
and expertise at EU level 
 
 
Coherence with tasks of other bodies: 
Such a body aimed at providing 
response services to stakeholders 
other than EU institutions, agencies 
and bodies does not currently exist at 
EU level. 
 
However, if such a body were created 
independently of CERT-EU, there 
would be a need to clarify the 
respective roles of other EU bodies 
active in the area and which have 
been seeking to fill a vacuum in some 
of these areas (e.g. CERT-EU), as well 
as increase coordination between 
them 
As above 
 
All factors related to Option 2 
would/could be fulfilled under 
Option 3 as well 
As above As above 
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4.5 Costs of the options 
 
This section provides an estimation of the costs related to each of the factors for change derived from the results of the evaluation of ENISA. The 
estimations are presented in two tables: The first table (Table 27) provides an overview of the estimated costs per option and per grouped 
factors of change. It should be read in combination with the second table (Table 28) which provides more detail on the costs per factor of change 
and the specific assumptions applicable to the estimations of each of the individual cost factors.  
 
The costs are based on a series of general assumptions: 
 It has been assumed that the Greek government will continue to provide its current financial contribution (of EUR 640,000 per year) for the offices in 
Heraklion and Athens. 
 It has been assumed that Temporary Agents (TAs) would implement the new tasks foreseen and averages of the salaries (as per Article 66 of the 
Staff Regulations, applicable from 1 July 2016) of categories of TAs minus the 79.3% corrective coefficient for Greece have been applied as follows: 
Junior experts/analysts (grades AD5 to 6 – EUR 4,214/month, equivalent to EUR 50,568/year), Senior experts/analysts (grades AD7 to 12 – EUR 
7,046/month, equivalent to EUR 84,552/year) and Heads of Unit (grades AD9 to 14 – EUR 9,020/month, equivalent to EUR 108,240/year). For staff 
based in Brussels, no coefficient applies.  
 For the calculation of overall costs per option, efforts have been made to take potential synergies between the different factors for change listed 
under each option into account. However, it can be expected that there are further synergies to be gained should ENISA be changed to take into 
account all the factors for change listed under Options 2 and 3 in the evaluation study report.  
 Additional set-up costs could apply, for example, for staff recruitment; these have not been taken into account here.  
 
The cost estimations are based on several sources:  
 A variety of stakeholders were consulted in order to further operationalise the factors for change and establish the assumptions presented below. 
They included representatives of DG CONNECT, ENISA, industry and Member States. 
 A number of reports and documents have been consulted, as listed in the table below. 
 
Secondary sources 
ENISA Annual Activity Report 2015.  
Europaid (2017): Current per diem rates. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/perdiems-2017-03-17_en.pdf. Accessed 16.06.2017. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation 
(EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final. 
Statista – The Statistics Portal (2016): Rental prices of prime office properties in selected European cities as of 4th quarter 2016 (in euros per square meter per year). 
Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/431672/commercial-property-prime-rents-europe/. Accessed 16.07.2017 
ENISA (2017): Statement of estimates (budget 2017). Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/accounting-finance/files/annual-budgets/enisa-
2017-annual-budget. Accessed 16.07.2017 
ENISA (2017): Programming document 2017-2019. Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/corporate/enisa-programming-document-2017-
2019. Accessed 19.06.2017 
 
   
 
 
 
128 
 
The cost estimations for each of the four options are presented below. The table presents the costs for year 1 of the introduction of the options, including 
specific set-up costs where relevant (notably in Option 3). The costs of each option in the following four years are also presented, considering the costs 
arising once an option is fully implemented. Please note that no standard inflation rate has been applied.  
 
Two scenarios are presented. The first one considers the minimum changes that need to be implemented under each option. Costs thus represent the 
minimum number of staff and additional meetings that will be needed. The second scenario presents a more ideal situation, where costs represent the 
staff that need to be hired and meetings to be held for a smoother implementation of the options. Under Option 1 the minimum scenario assumes that 
ENISA will be able to take on all new tasks assigned to it as per recent legislative changes by reallocating responsibilities and tasks, as it has been done 
in the 2016 and 2017 Work Programme. The second scenario assumes that ENISA will get another eight staff members (two for each of the key sectors 
finance, health, transport and energy) to respond to its new responsibilities.  
 
The costs are presented differentiating between staff costs (costs due to additional human resources) and “other” costs for additional office space, 
meetings or operational activities. These are further explained and specified in Table 28. 
 
Under Option 2 and 3, three sub-options are presented (a, b and c) because there are three different factors of change to strengthen ENISA’s position 
relative to research and innovation which exclude one another due to issues of conflict of interest. Sub-option a) represents the costs for the factor of 
change under which ENISA will take part in programme implementation of the Framework Programme for R&I; a lump sum of EUR 3.5 m has been 
estimated for this factor of change based on a similar function foreseen for Frontex106 (including additional staff) which is added under “other” costs. Sub-
option b) includes the costs of ENISA taking part in programming through playing an advisory role in EU R&D funding. Sub-option c) includes the costs of 
ENISA befitting from EU R&I funding (which are nil).  
Table 27: Cost estimations for the options –overview 
 Year 1 Year 2 to 5 
 Scenario 1 – Minimum changes Scenario 2 - Ideal changes Scenario 1 – Minimum changes Scenario 2 - Ideal changes 
 Costs in EUR per 
year 
Number of 
staff/ 
specification of 
other costs 
Costs in EUR per 
year 
Number of 
staff/ 
specification of 
other costs 
Costs in EUR per 
year 
Number of 
staff/ 
specification of 
other costs 
Costs in EUR per 
year 
Number of 
staff/ 
specification of 
other costs 
Option 0: Baseline, maintain the status quo: This option concerns an extension of the current mandate in terms of scope and objectives, though the provisions from 
the NIS Directive, the eIDAS Regulation and Telecoms Framework Directive would need to be taken into account. 
Current budget 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84    11,244,679.00  84 
Revise ENISA’s 
mandate to make 
its new tasks per 
0 0 676,416 8 
(8 senior 
experts) 
0 0 676,416 8 
(8 senior 
experts) 
                                               
106 Based on: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final. See SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE NO 6 "Management of Pooled resources and R&D. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-
we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/regulation_on_the_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf 
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 Year 1 Year 2 to 5 
recent/upcoming 
legislation more 
specific 
Total budget 
under the option 
11,244,679.00 84 
(48 TAs, 31 
CAs, 5 SNEs)107 
11,921,095.00  92 
(56 TAs, 31 
CAs, 5 SNEs) 
11,244,679.00 84 
(48 TAs, 31 
CAs, 5 SNEs) 
11,921,095.00 92 
(56 TAs, 31 
CAs, 5 SNEs) 
Option 1: Expiry of ENISA’s mandate (terminating ENISA): This option would involve closing ENISA and not creating another EU-level institution, 
but relying on existing institutions/organisations to implement engagements under, for example, the NIS Directive and bilateral or regional ties at Member 
State level. 
 
Current budget  11,244,679.00  84  11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 
Costs savings for 
the EU budget108 
 10,322,000.00  84  10,322,000.00  84 10,322,000 
plus standard 
2% increase 
per year 
84 10,322,000 
plus standard 
2% increase 
per year 
84 
Option 2: Enhanced ENISA (Keep ENISA with changes to its mandate): This option concerns making significant revisions to ENISA’s mandate to address the key 
issues identified in the study, thereby building on its current role and ensuring that the new mandate is better adapted to the evolving cybersecurity landscape. 
Current budget 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84    11,244,679.00  84 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
operational role 
531,000.00 6 (1 HoU, 5 
senior experts) 
700,104.00 8 (1 HoU, 7 
senior experts) 
531,000.00 6 (1 HoU, 5 
senior experts) 
700,104.00 8 (1 HoU, 7 
senior experts) 
 926,142.00  Exercises  926,142.00  Exercises  926,142.00  Exercises  926,142.00 Exercises 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
role in policy 
development and 
implementation 
 1,140,235.75  13 (3 HoU, 10 
senior experts) 
 1,251,077.00  15 (3 HoU, 12 
senior experts) 
 1,140,235.75  13 (3 HoU, 10 
senior experts)  
1,251,077.00 15 (3 HoU, 12 
senior experts) 
 175,320.00  Meetings  175,320.00  Meetings  175,320.00  Meetings  175,320.00  Meetings 
 7,500.00  Office space  7,500.00  Office space  7,500.00  Office space  7,500.00  Office space 
Make ENISA’s 
mandate 
permanent 
n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
Strengthen ENISA’s 
governance 
structure 
n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
Include a role for 
ENISA in EU-level 
standardisation 
and certification 
361,896.00  4 (1 HoU, 3 
senior experts) 
531,000.00 6 (1 HoU, 5 
senior experts) 
361,896.00  4 (1 HoU, 3 
senior experts) 
531,000.00 6 (1 HoU, 5 
senior experts) 
 28,002.00  Events/ 
meetings 
58,440.00 Events/ 
meetings 
 28,002.00  Events/ 
meetings 
58,440.00 Events/ 
meetings 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
position relative to 
research and 
innovation sub-
option a) 
3,500,000 Total costs 
based on 
similar function 
in Frontex 
3,500,000 Total costs 
based on 
similar function 
in Frontex 
3,500,000 Total costs 
based on 
similar function 
in Frontex 
3,500,000 Total costs 
based on 
similar 
function in 
Frontex 
Strengthen ENISA’s 192,792.00 2 (1 HoU, 1 277,344.00 3 (1 HoU, 2 192,792.00 2 (1 HoU, 1 277,344.00 3 (1 HoU, 2 
                                               
107 Based on: Multi-annual staff policy plan year 2017-2019, Establishment plan in Draft EU budget 2017, in ENISA Programming document 2017-2019; Annex III 
108 Excluding the budget contribution by Greece and other income of the Agency 
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 Year 1 Year 2 to 5 
position relative to 
research and 
innovation sub-
option b) 
senior expert)  senior expert) senior expert) senior expert) 
23,373.00 Meetings 35,064.00 Meetings 23,373.00 Meetings 35,064.00 Meetings 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
position relative to 
research and 
innovation sub-
option c) 
n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
Additional staff 
costs sub-option a) 
    2,033,131.75  23 (5 HoU, 17 
senior, 1 junior 
experts) 
     
2,482,181.00  
29 (5HoU, 22 
senior, 2 junior 
experts) 
     2,033,131.75  23 (5 HoU, 17 
senior, 1 junior 
experts) 
     2,482,181.00  29 (5HoU, 22 
senior, 2 junior 
experts) 
Additional staff 
costs sub-option b) 
   2,225,923.75  25 (6 HoU, 18 
senior, 1 junior 
expert) 
    2,759,525.00  32 (6 HoU, 24 
senior, 2 junior 
experts)  
     2,225,923.75  25 (6 HoU, 18 
senior, 1 junior 
expert) 
     2,759,525.00  32 (6 HoU, 24 
senior, 2 junior 
experts) 
Additional staff 
costs sub-option c) 
    2,033,131.75  23 (5 HoU, 17 
senior, 1 junior 
experts) 
     
2,482,181.00  
29 (5HoU, 22 
senior, 2 junior 
experts) 
     2,033,131.75  23 (5 HoU, 17 
senior, 1 junior 
experts) 
     2,482,181.00  29 (5HoU, 22 
senior, 2 junior 
experts) 
Additional other 
costs sub-option a) 
4,636,964.00   4,667,402.00    4,636,964.00    4,667,402.00   
Additional other 
costs sub-option b) 
1,160,337.00   1,202,466.00    1,160,337.00    1,202,466.00   
Additional other 
costs sub-option c) 
    1,136,964.00   1,167,402.00    1,136,964.00    1,167,402.00   
Total budget 
under the sub-
option a) 
 17,914,774.75  107  18,394,262.00  113  17,914,774.75  107  18,394,262.00  113 
Total budget 
under the sub-
option b) 
 14,630,939.75  109  15,206,670.00  116  14,630,939.75  109  15,206,670.00  116 
Total budget 
under the sub-
option c) 
 14,414,774.75  107  14,894,262.00  113  14,414,774.75  107  14,894,262.00  113 
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 Year 1 Year 2 to 5 
Option 3: European Agency with full operational capabilities (Establish a European Centre of Cybersecurity):  This option concerns developing ENISA into a new 
body at EU level that would cover the entire cycle cybersecurity lifecycle and deal with prevention, detection and response to cyber incidents. 
Current budget 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 11,244,679.00  84 
Create an EU level 
cybersecurity 
umbrella 
243,125.75 2 (1 HoU, 1 
senior expert) 
349,753.00 3 (1 HoU, 2 
senior experts) 
243,125.75 2 (1 HoU, 1 
senior expert) 
349,753.00 3 (1 HoU, 2 
senior experst) 
7,500.00 Office space 7,500.00 Office space 7,500.00 Office space 7,500.00 Office space 
Create a virtual 
European CSIRT 
 2,531,104.00  29 (3 HoU, 26 
senior experts) 
 3,446,448.00  40 (3 HoU, 37 
senior experts) 
 361,896.00  39 (3 HoU, 36 
senior experts)  
446,448.00 91 (3 HoU, 88 
senior experts) 
Additional staff 
costs 
2,774,229.75  31 (4 HoU, 27 
senior experts) 
3,796,201.00  43 (4 HoU, 39 
senior experts) 
3,651,469.75 41 (4 HoU, 37 
senior experts) 
8,127,201.00 94 (4 HoU, 90 
senior experts) 
Additional other 
costs 
 7,500.00   7,500.00   7,500.00   7,500.00   
Total budget 
under the option 
14,026,408.75  115  15,048,380.00   127  14,903,648.75 125  19,379,380.00 178 
Combined costs 
of Option 2 a) 
and 3109 
 31,690,557.75   136   33,085,389.00   153   32,567,797.75   146   37,416,389.00   204  
Combined costs 
of Option 2 b) 
and 3110 
 28,406,722.75   138   29,897,797.00   156   29,283,962.75   148   34,228,797.00   207  
Combined costs 
of Option 2 c) 
and 3111 
 28,190,557.75   136   29,585,389.00   153   29,067,797.75   146   33,916,389.00   204  
 
This second table provides more detailed information on the costs of the options. It presents the specific assumptions taken into account to calculate the 
costs of the factors for change. Please note that where synergies are expected (as detailed in the assumption column) the estimated costs are only taken 
into account once. Therefore, the costs indicated in the last column of this table cannot be added up to reach the total costs.  
Table 28: Cost estimations for the options – detailed including assumptions 
Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
Option 0: Baseline, maintain the status quo: This option concerns an extension of the current mandate in terms of scope and objectives, though the provisions from 
the NIS Directive, the eIDAS Regulation and Telecoms Framework Directive would need to be taken into account. 
Revise ENISA’s 
mandate to make its 
new tasks as per 
recent/upcoming 
 Involvement in Cooperation Group: 
Support MS cooperation on drafting and 
maintaining over time voluntary guidelines on 
security measures for Operators of Essential 
 It is assumed that ENISA will be able to take on all 
new tasks assigned to it as per recent legislative 
changes by reallocating responsibilities and tasks, 
as it has been done in the 2016 and 2017 Work 
Human resource costs: 
Status quo to EUR 676,416 
 
                                               
109 Taking into account that the costs for a liaison office in Brussels would only have to be added once.  
110 Taking into account that the costs for a liaison office in Brussels would only have to be added once.  
111 Taking into account that the costs for a liaison office in Brussels would only have to be added once.  
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
legislation more 
specific 
 
Services, Incident Reporting, Identification of 
Essential Operators and Essential Service   
Programme. 
 Should this not be possible, ENISA could get 
another eight staff members (two for each of the 
key sectors finance, health, transport and energy) 
to respond to its new responsibilities. This 
represents eight FTEs at senior expert/analyst 
level (AD 7 to 12 grade). 
 
  
 CSIRT Network Secretariat: Provide 
technical support for back-end services that 
enable CSIRTs to exchange information on 
best practices and actual incidents and 
threats, as well as support voluntary 
cooperation in case of incidents 
 Electronic communications code, recital 
92: Contribute to an enhanced level of 
security of electronic communications by, 
amongst other things, providing expertise 
and advice, and promoting the exchange of 
best practices 
 eIDAS: (1) Recital 39 - Enable the EC and 
MSs to assess the effectiveness of the breach 
notification mechanism introduced by this 
Regulation by, for example, aggregating the 
national reports provided by supervisory 
bodies into an annual Report on EU Breaches 
in Trust Service Providers. (2) Support 
supervisory authorities in the drafting and 
supervision of security measures of Trust 
Services through, for example, supporting 
national regulators in the drafting and 
maintenance of guidelines on security 
measures and incident notification formats 
and procedures on Trust Services 
TOTAL COST OF OPTION 0 
 
Assuming that all factors of change are being 
implemented 
Current budget: EUR 11,244,679 
Additional human resources 
costs: EUR 0 to EUR 676,416 
Other additional costs: EUR 0 
TOTAL: EUR 11,244,679 to 
11,921,095 
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
Option 1: Expiry of ENISA’s mandate (terminating ENISA): This option would involve closing ENISA and not creating another EU-level institution, but 
relying on existing institutions/organisations to implement engagements under, for example, the NIS Directive and bilateral or regional ties at Member 
State level. 
N/A N/A N/A Cost savings: 
The direct costs for the EU 
budget of not extending the 
mandate of ENISA in 2020 
would be EUR 0, which implies 
thus a cost saving for the 
European institutions112 of 
approximately EUR 
10,332,000113 yearly, plus a 2% 
standard increase per year.   
 
Note that abstraction is made of 
any possible cost of e.g. re-
allocating staff and the removal 
of infrastructure and all 
miscellaneous administrative 
requirements for ending ENISA’s 
activities. 
Option 2: Enhanced ENISA (Keep ENISA with changes to its mandate): This option concerns making significant revisions to ENISA’s mandate to address the key 
issues identified in the study, thereby building on its current role and ensuring that the new mandate is better adapted to the evolving cybersecurity landscape. 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
operational role 
 Provide periodic threat intelligence and 
ad hoc alerts: ENISA would develop and 
maintain its own threat intelligence capacity 
in order to monitor the threat landscape and 
provide MSs fast alerts/warnings on 
emerging threats and risks and monitor 
security incidents, including those affecting 
specific MSs. This would involve: (1) 
producing regular threat intelligence reports 
including high-level strategic analyses on 
threats, incidents and trends (e.g. key 
technological developments) and (2) 
collecting and analysing public 
communications on an event and compiling 
EU-level flash reports and guidance to 
 Would need analysis capability and need to source 
the information which would require a kind of 
security operation centre (SOC) receiving feed or 
threat data which could come through individual 
CSIRTs. Would have automated tools to interpret 
what that data is saying and then a team of 
analysts to transpose what the tools are saying 
into something that makes sense.  
 ENISA have the staff necessary to conduct the 
preparatory analysis, but do not have anyone to 
conduct the technical, short-term, quick analysis 
 For the periodic threat intelligence: 6 to 8 FTEs 
(TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 to AD14 
grade) to engage and interpret the data and 
provide high level situational reports and a mix of 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 531,000 to EUR 700,104 / 
year 
 
                                               
112 The financing provided by the Government of the Hellenic Republic (which constitutes between 6 and 7% each year), as well as contributions from third countries participating in the work of the Agency 
(around 1%) has been deducted from this estimate. 
113 Share of ENISA’s budget in 2017 representing a subsidy from the EU budget. 
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
businesses and citizens. IT players that understand the tools, senior 
subject experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to 
interpret the data and with a multi-stakeholder 
experience (i.e. relations and links to industry, 
CSIRTs, EC3 etc.) 
 For the ad hoc alerts: 0.5 FTEs among the 6 to 8 
FTEs (TAs) senior subject experts/analysts (AD 7 
to 12 grade) above to focus on this and be able to 
scale when an incident takes place as will be on 
demand  
 Note: An additional cost that could be incurred is 
derived from ENISA acquiring feed or threat data 
for a fee, but here it has been assumed that data 
would be channelled to it by CSIRTs 
 Support the Blueprint for response to 
large scale cybersecurity incidents and 
crises at EU level: ENISA would: (1) 
organise cybersecurity exercises to test the 
Blueprint at all levels – operational, tactical 
and strategic) with all stakeholders; (2) 
collect and aggregate reports from national 
sources (CSIRTs) to establish a common 
situation awareness report for decision 
makers in the event of an incident; (3) 
support technical handling of the incident, 
including facilitating sharing of technical 
solutions between MSs; (4) handle public 
communication around the incident; (5) in 
case of a major crisis, propose the activation 
of the political decision making (IPCR) by 
alerting all or one of the EU institutions; (6) 
publish flash report or alerts in the event of 
significant events or incidents based on 
publically available information OR 
information made available through the 
CSIRT Network  
 Would go hand in hand with the “Provide periodic 
threat intelligence and ad hoc alerts” change 
above for points 2 and 6 in particular, so synergies 
in the team could be exploited if both changes are 
implemented 
 Synergies could be exploited here with the 
communications team should this change be 
implemented 
 The organisation of cyber exercises would be 
scaled up by 50%: Would look at incident from 
beginning to end, involve a variety of stakeholders 
and would be carried out yearly (rather than every 
2 years) 
 6 to 8 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) to engage and interpret the data 
and provide high level situational reports, as well 
as bridging the operational and strategic levels, 
being responsible for escalation and facilitation in 
a crisis situation; a communications professional 
with an understanding of cybersecurity to manage 
the press and support the Head of Unit; and a mix 
of IT players that understand the tools, senior 
subject experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to 
interpret the data and with a multi-stakeholder 
experience (i.e. relations and links to industry, 
CSIRTs, EC3 etc.) 
 0.5 FTEs among the 6 to 8 FTEs (TAs) senior 
subject experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) above 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 531,000 to EUR 700,104 / 
year 
 
Organisation of exercise costs114: 
EUR 926,142 / year 
 
 
                                               
114 Based on the cost of the 2016 exercise which amounted to EUR 617,428.See ENISA Annual Activity Report 2015. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/corporate/enisa-annual-activity-report-2015   
   
 
 
 
135 
 
Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
to be able to scale up and support the technical 
handling of an incident when an incident takes 
place as will be on demand 
 Note: An additional cost that could be considered 
and for which external funding could be sought is 
the updating of the platform used for these 
exercises – here it has been assumed that the 
existing platform will be employed 
 Provide emergency cybersecurity 
response: ENISA would provide on-demand 
technical assistance to MS bodies and 
institutions by creating and maintaining a 
team of experienced senior cybersecurity 
incident advisors who may be sent to MSs 
upon their request to assist and contribute to 
cybersecurity incident response and recovery 
 Would be on-demand, so difficult to estimate the 
exact need, but synergies in the team “supporting 
the Blueprint for response to large scale 
cybersecurity incidents and crises at EU level” and 
the before and after incident response capability to 
be developed as part of this could be exploited 
 15% of 4 FTEs (TAs) among the 6 to 8 FTEs (TAs) 
senior subject experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) 
above working on “Providing periodic threat 
intelligence and ad hoc alerts” and “Supporting the 
Blueprint for response to large scale cybersecurity 
incidents and crises at EU level” with experience in 
dealing with events in real time and advising, as 
well as contacts in the CERTs who could be called 
upon in the event of an incident 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 50,731 / year 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
role in policy 
development and 
implementation 
 Establish ENISA as an agency that has to be 
involved by other EU bodies, including the 
Commission, when cybersecurity matters are 
being considered 
 Would involve ENISA taking a more proactive 
approach where it would actively follow policy and 
play the role of a strong coordination body in this 
respect 
 Ideally, would need to have 2 FTEs per sector (i.e. 
energy, transport (aviation/vehicles), health, 
finance) to avoid a single point of failure 
 9 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 to 
AD14 grade) and senior sector-specific 
experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade)  
 Estimated 15 meetings per month with travel and 
per diems for 1.5 staff/meeting on average – 
(where other than Brussels-based staff) 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 784,656 / year 
 
Meeting costs115: 
EUR 175, 320 / year  Formally involve ENISA in the implementation 
of the Connecting Europe Facility on 
Telecoms as an advisory body 
 Establish semi-formal governance structures 
with regular meetings between ENISA and 
other agencies/international organisations 
(e.g. on given common themes such as 
training) to increase cooperation at EU 
institutional level 
 Set-up a liaison office in Brussels with two to 
three permanent employees 
 2 to 3 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) to talk to MEPs, senior officials and 
go to meetings at short notice and senior 
experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to follow 
through and execute what has been decided 
 Office space rental in Brussels at a cost of EUR 300 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 243,125.75 to 349,753 EUR 
/ year 
 
Office space rental: 
EUR 7,500 / year 
                                               
115 Return trip estimated at EUR 500 and per diems at EUR 224 on the basis of an average of EuropeAid per diem rates for Europe – see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/perdiems-2017-03-17_en.pdf  
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
/square meter116 and a need for an estimated office 
space of 25 square meters for 2 to 3 people 
 
 
 Create a dedicated communications team 
within ENISA  
 2 to 3 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) with experience in communications 
at different levels and understanding of cyber 
security and junior communications 
experts/analysts (AD 5 to 6 grade) to assist the 
Head of Unit 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 112,454 to 116,668 / year 
Make ENISA’s mandate 
permanent 
 This would involve ENISA having a 
permanent mandate, but still allow for the 
periodic evaluation of the performance of the 
Agency 
 Would simply involve a revision of the mandate N/A 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
governance structure 
 Formally involve other stakeholders in the 
governance of ENISA by increasing the 
weight of the PSG in playing an advisory role 
on ENISA’s Work Programme   
 Would simply involve a revision of the mandate N/A 
 Allow more flexibility for ENISA to determine 
its own work priorities at Executive Board 
level  
 Would simply involve a revision of the mandate N/A 
Include a role for 
ENISA in EU-level 
standardisation and 
certification 
 
 Support the EU ICT Security Certification 
Framework: Put in place an EU ICT security 
certification framework whereby ENISA would 
play a supporting role by (1) providing the 
secretariat and actively supporting the work 
undertaken (e.g. convene meetings of the 
framework’s governance structures and 
meetings and engagements with industry 
stakeholders);(2) providing technical 
expertise to Member States (e.g. MS taking 
part in the framework on issues related to 
security testing and vulnerabilities in ICT 
products); and (3) compiling and publishing 
guidelines concerning the security 
requirements of ICT products and services in 
cooperation with national authorities and 
industry, thereby communicating the work of 
the framework to industry, consumers at Eu 
and international level 
 Synergies could be exploited here with the team 
set-up to strengthen ENISA’s role in policy 
development and implementation should this 
change be implemented 
 4 to 6 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) and senior experts/analysts (AD 7 
to 12 grade) including a mix of sector-specific 
experts and experts in certification (preferably 
with experience of industry or a good 
understanding of it), as well as multi-stakeholder 
expertise and an understanding of policy 
 Estimated 3 to 5 meetings/events per month with 
travel and per diems for 1.5 staff/meeting on 
average – (where other than Brussels-based staff) 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 361,896 to 531,000 EUR / 
year 
 
Attendance at event/ meeting 
costs117: 
EUR 28,002 to 58,440 / year 
 Support ICT security standardisation: 
ENISA would provide a supportive role in 
 Would go hand in hand with the “Support the EU 
ICT Security Certification Framework” change 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 361,896 to 531,000 EUR / 
                                               
116 Source: Rental prices of prime office properties in selected European cities as of 4th quarter 2016 (in euros per square meter per year). The Statistics Portal. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/431672/commercial-property-prime-rents-europe/ 
117 Return trip estimated at EUR 500 and per diems at EUR 224 on the basis of an average of EuropeAid per diem rates for Europe – see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/perdiems-2017-03-17_en.pdf  
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
facilitating the establishment and take-up of 
European and international standards for risk 
management and for the security of 
electronic products, networks and services, 
including by cooperating with Member States 
on technical areas concerning the security 
requirements for operators of essential 
services and digital service providers. This 
could involve supporting the work of the EU 
ICT Security Certification Framework in EU 
and international standard organisations; 
taking part in and contributing to the work of 
cybersecurity working groups of the 
European Standardisation Organisations 
(ESCs); performing reviews and assessments 
of cybersecurity related standards when 
associated with regulatory and legal 
requirements (e.g. eIDAS) 
above as the issues are related and there would be 
a need to avoid silos, so synergies in the team 
could be exploited if both changes are 
implemented in order to avoid single points of 
failure 
 4 to 6 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) and senior experts/analysts (AD 7 
to 12 grade) including a mix of sector-specific 
experts and experts in standardisation/certification 
(preferably with experience of industry or a good 
understanding of it), as well as multi-stakeholder 
expertise and an understanding of policy 
 0.5 FTEs among the 4 to 6 FTEs (TAs) above to be 
used for the stock taking, compiling and reviewing 
of standards 
year 
 
Strengthen ENISA’s 
position relative to 
research and 
innovation 
 
 Take part in programming 
implementation: ENISA would implement 
parts of the Framework Programme for R&I 
which relates to cybersecurity whereby the 
EC delegates the relevant powers by 
performing the following tasks: (1) managing 
some stages of then programme 
implementation and some phases in the 
lifetime of specific projects on the basis of 
WPs adopted by the EC; (2) adopting the 
instruments of budget execution for revenue 
and expenditure and carrying out all the 
operations necessary for the management of 
the programme; and (3) providing support in 
programme implementation. Examples of the 
activities ENISA could perform include 
implementing calls on Public Procurement of 
Innovation (PPI) in close collaboration with 
MS authorities, and support MS public 
procurers in identifying common research 
and innovation requirements. 
 ENISA would perform a similar function with 
respect to R&I to that foreseen as part of the new 
Frontex Regulation118  
Estimated costs based on similar 
function foreseen for Frontex: 
EUR 3.5m / year 
 Take part in programming through  Synergies could be exploited here with the team Human resource costs: 
                                               
118 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final. See SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE NO 6 "Management of Pooled resources and R&D. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/regulation_on_the_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf  
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playing an advisory role: ENISA would play 
an expert advisory role in the cyber security-
related elements of EU R&D funding 
programmes (H2020, CEF) by sitting on an 
advisory committee, providing independent 
advice and input and feeding into ideas for 
research. 
set-up to strengthen ENISA’s role in policy 
development and implementation should this 
change be implemented 
 Advisors would need to draw on the knowledge of 
sector experts/analysts for input  
 2 to 3 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) and senior experts/analysts (AD 7 
to 12 grade) 
 Estimated 2 to 3 meetings per month with travel 
and per diems for 1.5 staff/meeting on average – 
(where other than Brussels-based staff) 
 
EUR 192,792 to 277,344 EUR / 
year 
 
Meeting costs: 
EUR 23,373 to 35,064 /year 
 Benefit from EU R&I funding: Open 
ENISA’s mandate to take part in EU R&D 
funding programmes (H2020, CEF) as a 
recipient of funding by changing the 
provisions on source of revenue but not 
adding it as a task. ENISA can provide added 
value to industry and academia in R&I by 
leveraging its practical expertise in areas 
such as cooperation, information sharing and 
regulatory requirements.  
 Would simply involve a revision of the mandate N/A 
TOTAL COST OF OPTION 2  
 
Assuming that all factors of change are being 
implemented 
 
There are different factors of change to strengthen 
ENISA’s position relative to research and innovation 
which exclude one another due to issues of conflict of 
interest. Sub-option a) represents the costs for the 
factor of change under which ENISA will take part in 
programme implementation of the Framework 
Programme for R&I. Sub-option b) includes the costs 
of ENISA taking part in programming through playing 
an advisory role in EU R&D funding. Sub-option c) 
includes the costs of ENISA befitting from EU R&I 
funding (which are nil). 
Current budget: EUR 11,244,679 
 
Additional human resources 
costs:  
a) EUR 2,033,131.75 to EUR 
2,482,181  
b) EUR 2,225,923.75 to EUR 
2,759,525 
c) EUR 2,033,131.75 to EUR 
2,482,181 
 
Other additional costs: 
a) EUR 4,636,964 to EUR 
4,667,402 
b) EUR 1,160,337 to EUR 
1,202,466 
c) EUR 1,136,964 to EUR 
1,167,402 
 
TOTAL: 
a) EUR 17,914,774.75 to EUR 
18,394,262 
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Options Factors of change Assumptions Estimated costs/year 
b) EUR 14,630,939.75 to EUR 
15,206,670 
c) EUR 14,414,774.75 to EUR 
14,894,262 
Option 3: European Agency with full operational capabilities (establish a European Centre of Cybersecurity ): This option concerns developing ENISA into a new 
body at EU level that would cover the entire cycle cybersecurity lifecycle and deal with prevention, detection and response to cyber incidents. 
Create an EU level 
cyber security 
umbrella 
 Develop an umbrella organisation covering 
ENISA and CERT-EU, thereby bringing 
together three main functions, namely policy 
advice, centre for information and Computer 
Emergency Response Team. The operational 
role of CERT-EU in responding to cyber 
incidents in the EU institutions would 
therefore be combined with ENISA’s role of 
ensuring cooperation in the event of an 
incident. The new organisation would act as 
an EU contact point for cybersecurity related 
issues in close coordination with the EEAS.  
 Options include merging ENISA and CERT-EU 
and having a governance structure that 
would allow different reporting lines and 
oversight for the team dealing with the EU 
institutions, or integrating CERT-EU within 
ENISA as one of the Agency’s departments. 
 If this option is adopted, ENISA would be in the 
position to “Provide periodic threat intelligence and 
ad hoc alerts” and “Support the Blueprint for 
response to large scale cybersecurity incidents and 
crises at EU level” (see above – Option 2) by using 
a combination of ENISA and CERT EU staff. 
 Most of the changes referred to above in relation 
to “Providing periodic threat intelligence and ad 
hoc alerts” and “Supporting the Blueprint for 
response to large scale cybersecurity incidents and 
crises at EU level” (see above – Option 2) would 
come for free (i.e. anything related to response 
side, e.g. flash notes, following up on incidents 
etc.) as CERT-EU have the capacity internally to 
deal with this 
 Relocation of ENISA to Brussels would not be 
necessary, but the establishment of a liaison office 
would 
 
Costs linked to the establishment of a liaison office (as 
above): 
 Synergies could be exploited here with the team 
set-up to strengthen ENISA’s role in policy 
development and implementation should this 
change be implemented 
 2 to 3 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) to talk to MEPs, senior officials and 
go to meetings at short notice and senior 
experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to follow 
through and execute what has been decided 
 Office space rental in Brussels at a cost of EUR 300 
/square meter119 and a need for an estimated office 
space of 25 square meters for 2 to 3 people 
 Note: Change management costs would be 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 243,125.75 to 349.753 EUR 
/ year 
 
Office space rental: 
EUR 7,500 / year 
 
Efficiency gains: 
This option would involve 
combining or ENISA absorbing 
the current staff of CERT EU. 
There is the potential to create 
synergies and decrease costs 
through the ability to spread 
tasks over 2 teams with 
complementary skill-sets. 
                                               
119 Source: Rental prices of prime office properties in selected European cities as of 4th quarter 2016 (in euros per square meter per year). The Statistics Portal. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/431672/commercial-property-prime-rents-europe/ 
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incurred but it is outside of the scope of this study 
to assess these 
Create a virtual 
European CSIRT 
 
 Coordinate CSIRT Network operations: 
Enable the Agency to coordinate the 
operations of MS CSIRTs, collecting 
information and pooling national resources on 
analysing threats and responding to incidents 
 ENISA would act as a facilitator as the expertise 
would come from the Member States themselves 
 Could second people to/draft people in from 
Member State CSIRTs to build a virtual European 
CSIRT and then have an aggregation of 
information so what is sensitive to Member States 
is taken out without losing the contextual picture 
 4 to 5 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 
to AD14 grade) and senior experts/analysts (AD 7 
to 12 grade) to put the infrastructure in place, and 
carry out the outreach with industry in Member 
States, through the ISACs at sectoral, with CSIRTs 
etc. 
 
Human resource costs: 
EUR 361,896 to EUR 446,448 
EUR / year 
 
 Produce real time situational awareness 
and dynamic (live) threat intelligence 
feeds: Enable ENISA to act as a broker, 
sharing information on incidents between 
Member States in the form of real-time 
situational awareness and dynamic (live) 
threat intelligence feeds on the basis of 
information exchanged on the CSIRT Network 
 Would be an observatory in real time 
 First there will be a need to set-up the necessary 
infrastructure, including the communication links 
across Europe with a variety of players (industry, 
ISACs). This would result in the establishment of a 
security operation centre (SOC) that would 
process and share the data, report to the press 
and conduct briefings at political level.  
 Initial set-up: 10 to 15 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 
Head of Unit (AD9 to AD14 grade) and senior 
experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to put the 
infrastructure in place.  
 Once up and running: 5 to 6 FTEs (TAs) - including 
1 Head of Unit (AD9 to AD14 grade) to engage at 
the right levels and across sectors, and senior 
(ICT) experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to 
process and analyse the data real time through a 
roster (24/7) and in order to avoid single points of 
failure 
Human resource costs: 
 
(1) Initial set-up: 
EUR 869,208 to 1.3m / year 
 
(2) Once up and running: 
EUR 446,448 to 531,000 EUR / 
year 
 Maintain and provide own cybersecurity 
incident response capacity to public and 
private sector: ENISA would create and 
maintain the capacity to provide on-demand 
technical operational assistance to MS 
CSIRTs, operators of essential services, EU 
 The scope and scale of this task could vary 
extensively depending on the breadth of “clients” 
of the service, e.g. whether SMEs or not etc. 
 Initial set-up: 15 to 20 FTEs (TAs) – including 1 
Head of Unit (AD9 to AD14 grade) and senior 
experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) to put the 
Human resource costs: 
 
(1) Initial set-up: 
EUR 1.3m to 1.7m / year 
 
(2) Once up and running: 
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bodies and institutions for the prevention, 
detection and response to incidents 
infrastructure in place.  
 Once up and running: 30 to 80 FTEs120 (TAs) - 
including 1 Head of Unit (AD9 to AD14 grade) and 
senior experts/analysts (AD 7 to 12 grade) 
EUR 2.6m to 6.8m / year 
 
 
Note as a means of comparison 
(and while keeping in mind the 
differing aims of these centres) 
that Frontex runs a 24/7 
situation centre at an average 
cost of EUR 3.0m / year, as per 
the new Frontex Regulation121 
 
TOTAL COST OF OPTION  3 Assuming that all factors of change are being 
implemented 
Current budget: EUR 11,244,679 
 
YEAR 1 
Additional human resources 
costs: EUR 2,774,229,75 to EUR 
3,796,201 
Other additional costs: EUR 
7,500 
TOTAL: EUR 14,026,408.75 to 
EUR 15,048,380 
 
YEAR 2-5 
Additional human resources 
costs: EUR 3,651,469.75 to EUR 
8,127,201 
Other additional costs: EUR 
7,500 
TOTAL: EUR 14,903,648.75 to 
EUR 19,379,380 
TOTAL COST OF OPTION 2 AND OPTION 3 COMBINED Assuming that all factors of change are being 
implemented 
 
Taking into account that the costs for a liaison office in 
Brussels would only have to be added once 
YEAR 1  
Option 2a and 3: EUR 
31,690,557.75 to EUR 
33,085,389 
Option 2b and 3: EUR 
28,406,722.75 to EUR 
29,897,797 
Option 2c and 3: EUR 
28,190,557.75 to EUR 
                                               
120 Based on an average of the number of FTEs employed in CERT-EU (30 FTEs) and in the larger Member State CERTs  
121 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final. See SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE NO 7 "EUROSUR and situational picture" https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-
eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/regulation_on_the_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf  
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29,585,389 
 
YEAR 2-5 
Option 2a and 3: EUR 
32,567,797.75 to EUR 
37,416,389 
Option 2b and 3: EUR 
29,283,962.75 to EUR 
34,228,797 
Option 2c and 3: EUR 
29,067,797.75 to EUR 
33,916,389 
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Table 29: Evaluation questions matrix 
Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
EQ1 To what 
extent has the 
Agency achieved 
its objectives and 
implemented the 
tasks set out in its 
mandate?  
Retrospective 
 
EQ2: What have been the benefits of acting at 
Agency level both from the operational and strategic 
perspective? 
 
EQ3: To what extent has ENISA contributed to the 
overall EU goal of increasing network and information 
security in Europe? What more could be done? 
 
EQ4: How appropriate is the balance of activities in 
relation to different cybersecurity and digital privacy 
topics considering the evolving needs of the main 
stakeholders? 
 
*EQ5: To what extent has ENISA become an EU-wide 
centre of expertise and a reference point for 
stakeholders122 in providing guidance, advice and 
assistance on issues related to network and 
information security?123 
 
EQ6: How effectively has the Agency managed to set 
its work priorities? 
 
EQ7: How effectively does the Agency tackle 
important upcoming, unplanned issues deriving by 
demands of its constituencies and/or EU policy 
priorities? 
 Activity level indicators: Number of training courses, 
exercises, publications (e.g. training material, toolkits, 
BP guides, reports, roadmaps), methodologies, 
workshops, conferences. 
 
Output level indicators:  
- Number of responses to Article 14 requests 2013-
2016 
- Number of guidelines issued and disseminated 2013-
2016 
- Number of recommendations issued and 
disseminated 2013-2016 
- Number and type of participants in trainings, 
workshops, exercises 2013-2016 
- Number of downloads of different types of 
publications (e.g. training material, BP guides etc.) 
- Number and type of standards established 
 
Result level indicators: 
- Stakeholders’ views on the extent to which ENISA has 
achieved its objectives as per its mandate. 
- Degree to which stakeholders’ have made use of 
material, followed recommendations and guidelines, 
copied BPs 
- Degree to which stakeholders have disseminated 
material, guidelines, BPs more widely 
-Overall degree of achievements of objectives – as per 
specific M&E framework (yearly adapted to core 
Products (e.g. 
publications/papers) and 
services are delivered as 
planned. 
 
The activities carried out 
by the Agencies are 
shown to support the 
achievement of the 
objectives.  
 
70% of objectives and 
intended results were 
reached and where 
objectives or results 
were not reached this is 
accounted for (cross-
checking KPIs and 
stakeholder´s 
assessments). 
 
Users are satisfied with 
the products and 
services (no issue is 
mentioned)127 
 
Mechanisms are in place 
to ensure that the 
Data sources:  
Desk research – 
annual reports, in 
particular 
reporting on the 
KIIs128 
 
Results of 
ENISA’s follow-up 
activities relating 
to exercises, 
trainings, 
workshops, 
events  
 
Results of the 
evaluations of 
ENISA’s activities 
of 2014 and 
2015 
 
In-depth 
interviews 
 
Public 
consultation 
(excluding EQ11) 
 
                                               
122 The stakeholders include EU institutions, Members States and the wider stakeholders community 
123 This question has been reformulated to ensure that it is open. The original question was: “To what extent ENISA became an EU-wide centre of expertise and a reference point for EU institutions, Members 
States and the wider stakeholders community, in providing guidance, advice and assistance on issues related to network and information security?” 
127 This judgement criterion is also expected to rely on the assessments made in relation to evaluation question related to the evaluation criterion relevance.  
128 Please note that, as concluded in the evaluation of ENISA’s 2015 core operational activities, while some KIIs are situated at the impact level and data has been collected in relation to them, it was found that it 
was too early to report on many of the indicators. An additional challenge is that the KIIs change on an annual basis, making it difficult to monitor results on a year-on-year basis as there is no requirement to do 
so. Some of the indicators are situated at the output/result levels and will be used to report in relation to the indicators set out in this matrix. 
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
 
EQ8: Does the Agency consistently perform the same 
tasks with the same quality level over time? 
 
EQ9: How does ENISA compare to the other EU and 
national bodies offering similar services in relation to 
their capability to satisfy the cybersecurity and digital 
privacy needs of ENISA's constituency? 
 
*EQ11: How do the current governance, the internal 
organisational structure and the human resources 
policies and practices of ENISA contribute to 
effectiveness in the work of the agency?124 
 
EQ12: How effective has ENISA been in building a 
strong and trustful relationship with its stakeholders 
when executing its mandate? 
 
EQ13: What is the impact of the current 
arrangements related to the location of ENISA's 
offices on the overall capability of the Agency of 
meeting its objectives? 
 
*EQ19: To what extent are the internal mechanisms 
for programming, monitoring, reporting and 
evaluating ENISA adequate for ensuring 
accountability and appropriate assessment of the 
overall performance of the Agency while minimising 
the administrative burden of the Agency and its 
stakeholders (established procedures, layers of 
hierarchy, division of work between teams or units, 
IT systems, etc.)?125 
 
*EQ20: To what extent has ENISA succeeded in 
building up the in-house capacities for handling 
various tasks entrusted to it? Are the "make or buy" 
choices made according to efficiency criteria?126 
 
 
operational activities) 
 
Impact level indicators:  
- Stakeholders’ perceptions on the extent to which 
ENISA contributed to the overall EU goal of increasing 
network and information security in Europe, and what 
more could be done. 
 
Degree to which there are internal/external factors to 
ENISA which influence / restrict progress 
 
Other indicators: 
Mapping of the Agencies' structured quality 
management processes (gathering and analysing 
feedback from users). 
 
Mapping the process of developing multi-annual work 
programmes. 
 
Evidence of adjustments to annual work programmes, 
justified by policy, political or economic changes.  
 
Stakeholders' assessment of the Agencies' ability to 
adapt to policy, political or economic changes. 
 
Expert assessment of whether evaluation/monitoring 
requirements and practices are adequate compared to 
the Better Regulation Guidelines.  
 
A comparison of make or buy between similar 
agencies, e.g. procurement/operational budget. 
 
Mapping of how make or buy (or a hybrid form) 
decisions have been made. 
 
 
products (e.g. 
publications/papers) and 
services developed 
continuously meet the 
needs of the users. 
 
It can be documented 
that ENISA’s products 
and services are used by 
a wide range of national 
and European 
stakeholders.  
 
Survey of ENISA 
staff (only for 
EQ11) 
 
 
Prospective Findings from the research done for EQ1-9, EQ11-13, Since the prospective Data sources: 
                                               
124 This question has been reformulated by removing a reference to “efficiency”, which will be covered by EQ14 and its sub-questions. The original question was: “How do the current governance, the internal 
organisational structure and the human resources policies and practices of ENISA contribute to efficiencies and  effectiveness in the work of the agency?”. 
125 This question was originally (in the Roadmap) included under efficiency, but is better suited under effectiveness. 
126 This question was originally (in the Roadmap) included under efficiency, but is better suited under effectiveness. 
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
 
*EQ37: How does the new policy and regulatory 
landscape, having regard for the recently adopted 
Network and Information Security Directive and 
COM(2016) 410, and the priorities set by the Digital 
Single Market Strategy, impact on ENISA's 
activities?129 
 
*EQ38: What are the main strengths and 
weaknesses of ENISA in taking up new challenges, 
considering its current mandate and organisational 
set-up and capacity?130 
 
*EQ39: If ENISA should take on any new challenges 
and tasks, would a fixed-term mandate be 
suitable?131  
 
EQ41: Which are the concrete needs and 
opportunities for cooperation and synergies with 
international bodies working in adjacent fields, like 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence? 
 
EQ19 and EQ20.  
 
Stakeholders’ assessment of the Agency’s mandate 
main strength(s) and weakness(es) in view of taking 
up new challenges. 
 
Stakeholders’ assessment of the Agency’s 
organisational set-up and capacity main strength(s) 
and weakness(es) in view of taking up new challenges. 
 
Stakeholders’ assessment of the optimal type of 
mandate. 
 
Expert assessment of the optimal type of mandate. 
EQs are explorative it is 
not recommendable to 
define judgement criteria 
(as there is no justified 
basis).  
Public 
consultation and 
in-depth 
interviews 
 
EFFECIENCY 
 
EQ14: To what 
extent has ENISA 
been efficient in 
implementing the 
tasks set out in its 
mandate as laid 
down in its 
Regulation? To 
assess this 
question, 
elements relating 
Retrospective 
 
*EQ15: Were the annual budgets of the Agency 
implemented in an efficient way considering the 
results achieved?132 
 
EQ16: Have the resources allocated to the Agency 
been sufficient for the pursuit of its tasks 
(input/output analysis)? 
 
*EQ17: To what extent are the organisational 
Tracking of cost/resources used per deliverable 
Cost per download for reports  
 
Cost saving measures are in place 
 
% of staff positions filled (on an annual basis) 
 
% of staff members working on core operations.  
 
Agencies'  managerial staff assessment of flexibility in 
adjusting staff composition 
Stable costs, and 
decreases/increases can 
be justified 
 
Continuous 
work/processes in place 
to save costs in the 
operations 
 
Follow-up measures in 
place  
Data sources: 
AARs, Governing 
Boards analysis 
and assessment 
of the AARs, in-
depth interviews 
 
  
                                               
129 This question has been revised based on comments from the Commission. It was originally (in the Roadmap) “How does the new policy and regulatory landscape, having regard to the recently adopted Network 
and Information Security Directive, in COM(2016) 410 , and the priorities set by the Digital Single Market Strategy, impact on ENISA's activities?” 
130 This question has been re-worded to improve clarity. The original question was: “What are the main strengths and weaknesses of ENISA, within its current mandate and organisational set-up and capacity, in 
taking up new challenges?” 
131 This question has been re-worded to improve clarity. The original question was: “Is a fixed-term mandate coherent with the new challenges and tasks ENISA will have to take on?” 
132 This question has been re-worded to improve clarity. The original question was “Were the annual budgets of the Agency implemented in an efficient way with a view on achieved results?” 
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
to internal 
structure, 
operation, 
programming of 
activities and 
resources, 
accountability and 
controls, etc. will 
be analysed. 
solutions and procedures of ENISA adapted to the 
work entrusted to it and to the actual workload?133 
 
Is the planning cycle of the agency (work programme 
and budget) in line with the objective of achieving 
efficient results? 
 
EQ18: To what extent have ENISA's governance, 
organisational structure, locations and operations as 
set in its Regulation and the arrangements related to 
the location of its offices been conducive to efficiency 
and to achieving economies of scale? 
 
EQ21: To what extent and how have external factors 
influenced the efficiency of ENISA? 
 
*Please note that EQ19 and EQ20 were originally (in 
the Roadmap) included under efficiency, but have 
here been organised under effectiveness as this is 
more appropriate.  
 
 
Share of budget allocated to administrative tasks 
 
Existence of own implementation rules (approved by 
the Commission) 
 
Prevalence of use of external expertise 
 
% of publications and similar deliverables where 
dissemination/ communication was successful 
 
Number of studies procured vs. number of studies 
produced in-house”, including relative to other 
comparable organisations 
 
Typologies of what triggers procurement decisions 
(need for expertise, resource constrains or other) , 
including relative to other comparable organisations 
 
 
Drivers and inhibitors in the budgeting process.  
 
Usage of permanent stakeholder groups/bureaus or 
similar134 and use of advisory committees/working 
groups or similar. 
 
Development in location costs during the period 
(compared to a 2009 baseline).  
 
% of agency staff and management which assess that 
the Headquarters Agreement is fulfilled. 
 
Host member states assessment of the extent to which 
the Headquarters Agreement is fulfilled 
 
Positive/negative assessments from the respective 
Governing Boards of the AARs.  
 
 
Evidence of efficient 
management of the 
resources available with 
improvements in the 
balance between 
operational budgets and 
administrative budgets 
achieved where 
necessary (based on 
previous evaluations, 
audits or similar).  
 
Evidence can be 
provided on how current 
organisation allows for 
optimal use of 
capabilities and 
resources: 
•Division of work and 
resources are 
appropriate 
•Shared resources are 
available 
•Cooperation is 
encouraged  facilitated 
 
No organisational 
obstacles are 
encountered in the 
delivery of products and 
services 
 
The internal 
organisational structure 
for the delivery of 
products and services 
allow for the most 
optimal use of 
capabilities and 
resources: 
                                               
133 This question has been re-worded to improve clarity. The original question was “To what extent are the organisational solutions and procedures of ENISA adequate to the work entrusted to it and to the actual 
workload?” 
134 Several EU decentralised Agencies have established such groups in order to consult/engage/involve stakeholders in the Agencies work, for example annual work programme’s priorities.  
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
•no gap is identified 
•no redundancy is found 
Prospective 
 
*EQ42: Could ENISA’s mission, tasks, working 
practices or activities be further developed in order 
to better respond to the new cybersecurity landscape 
or would another EU initiative be more efficient?135 
 
EQ43: What would be the financial implications 
associated with each of the possible options for 
modifying ENISA’s mandate as they emerge from the 
evaluation? 
Findings from EQ14-18, and EQ21 as well as EQ 36.  
 
 
 
 
Since the prospective 
EQs are explorative it is 
not recommendable to 
define judgement criteria 
(as there is no justified 
basis). 
Data sources: 
Public 
consultation 
(only for EQ42) 
 
RELEVANCE 
 
EQ33: Are the 
objectives set out 
in the mandate of 
ENISA still 
appropriate given 
the current 
cybersecurity and 
digital privacy 
needs, regulatory 
and policy 
framework and 
needs? 
Retrospective 
 
EQ29: How far are the Agency's tasks and resources 
aligned with key EU political priorities? 
 
EQ30: Which Agency tasks are absolutely essential to 
deliver on these priorities? 
 
EQ31: Which Agency tasks are necessary to continue 
implementing existing and evolving obligations under 
the Treaties and EU legislative framework? 
 
EQ32: Are there some Agency tasks that have 
become redundant / negative priorities? If so, which 
are they?  
 
EQ34: Have some of the initially non-core activities 
of the Agency become part of its core-business? 
What was the rationale in such cases? 
Mapping of structured quality management processes 
(gathering and analysing feedback from users). 
 
% of KPIs related to uptake of the Agencies expertise 
in policy documents or by industry. 
 
% of KPIs related to the Agencies contribution to policy 
development through events. 
  
Users' assessment of the extent to which the agency 
fulfils current needs. 
 
Estimate of media-coverage of the Agency (which 
reaches a broader audience) 
  
New stakeholders are engaged when appropriate (e.g. 
new sign-ups for newsletters, new consultations or 
similar). 
 
 
Mechanisms are in place 
to ensure that the 
products and services 
developed continuously 
meet the needs of the 
users. 
 
All existing products and 
services provided by the 
Agencies' correspond to 
current needs (no issues 
are mentioned) 
 
All current needs are 
fulfilled (no gaps are 
identified) 
Data sources: 
Public 
Consultation, in-
depth interviews, 
staff survey (only 
for EQ34) 
 
 
 
Prospective 
 
*EQ36: Does the new scenario with increased 
frequency, sophistication and potential impact of 
cyber-threat trigger new needs from ENISA's 
Findings from EQ29-EQ34.  
 
Stakeholders assessment of needs which are not 
addressed, weighed against the relevance of ENISA 
providing them.  
Since the prospective 
EQs are explorative it is 
not recommendable to 
define judgement criteria 
(as there is no justified 
basis). 
Data sources: 
Public 
consultation 
                                               
135 This question has been revised based on comments from the Commission to the inception report. The origanl question (from the Roadmap) was: “How could ENISA’s mission, tasks, working practices or 
activities be further developed in order to better respond to the new cybersecurity landscape?” 
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
constituency? To what extent is ENISA best placed to 
respond to these needs? To what extent could 
ENISA’s current mandate, tasks and/or capabilities 
address these needs?136 
 
EQ40: Which are the concrete needs and 
opportunities for further increased practical 
cooperation with Member States and EU bodies? 
COHERENCE 
 
*EQ24: To what 
extent are ENISA 
activities coherent 
with the policies, 
strategy 
documents and 
activities of other 
stakeholders?137 
Retrospective 
 
EQ22: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation 
with the European Commission and other EU bodies, 
to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication of 
efforts? 
 
EQ23: To what extent is ENISA acting in cooperation 
with the Member States to ensure complementarity 
and avoid duplication of efforts? 
 
EQ25: Are the procedures put in place effective to 
ensure that ENISA's cooperation activities are 
coherent with the policies and activities of its 
stakeholders? 
 
EQ26: What are the risks/sources of overlaps/conflict 
of interests? 
Comparison of the ENISA’s mandate, objectives and 
activities to comparable organisations/bodies, including 
potential overlap between stakeholders/users 
 
 
Number of joint workshops and deliverables between 
ENISA and cooperation partners. 
 
Identification of areas in which ENISA cooperates 
closely with other EU, national or international bodies. 
 
Mapping of coordination mechanisms in place between 
the Agencies.  
 
Stakeholders’ assessment of whether there is 
coherence between ENISA and other policies and 
activities of its stakeholders. 
 
The mandates, 
objectives and activities 
of the ENISA are: 
• complementary to the 
work carried out by 
national/European/ 
international 
stakeholders (do not 
duplicate)  
 
Sources of 
complementarity and 
synergy are 
systematically utilised 
Data sources: 
Public 
Consultation, in-
depth interviews 
Prospective 
 
*EQ45: Taking into account the new tasks (identified 
during the evaluation), will there be any risk of 
ENISA’s tasks and activities overlapping with those of 
other national, European or international bodies 
working? 
 
Please note that findings related to EQ29-34 will also 
be relevant to answer this question (EQ41).  
Findings from EQ22-26, and EQ29-34, and EQ36 
 
 
Since the prospective 
EQs are explorative it is 
not recommendable to 
define judgement criteria 
(as there is no justified 
basis). 
Data sources: 
Interviews and 
Public 
consultation 
EU ADDED VALUE 
                                               
136 This question has been reformulated based on comments from the Commission. The original question was: “Does the new scenario with increased frequency, sophistication and potential impact of cyber-threat 
trigger new needs from ENISA's constituency? To what extent could ENISA’s current mandate, tasks and/or capabilities address these needs?” Please note that the evaluator considers this question key in 
assessing upcoming and future needs.  
137 This question has been reformulated for clarity and comprehensiveness. The original question was: “To what extent are ENISA activities coherent with the strategy documents adopted in this policy field?” 
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Evaluation 
Question 
 
Sub-questions Indicators Judgement criteria Data sources 
EQ27: What would 
be the most likely 
consequences at 
the EU level of 
stopping ENISA? 
Retrospective 
 
*EQ10: To what extent has ENISA been more 
effective in achieving its results compared to other 
past, existing or alternative national or EU level 
arrangements?138EQ45: What has been the added 
value of having an EU cybersecurity agency such as 
ENISA over the period 2013-2016?139 
 
Extent to which stakeholders’ assess that the Agency 
has strengthened existing EU or national initiatives 
(volume effects)  
 
Extent to which stakeholders’ assess that the Agency 
has carried out new initiatives (initiatives not part of 
existing EU or national initiatives, such as new areas of 
research or training) (scope effects) 
 
Share of stakeholders/Member States which consider 
that actions could not have been carried out without 
the support of the Agencies (including examples of 
innovative actions) (potential scope or role effect). 
 
Share of stakeholders/Member States which report 
additional benefits derived from the products or 
services (comparison with baselines from previous 
evaluations where possible) (potential role or process 
effects).  
 
Comparison of the Agencies ability to deliver results 
(derived from EQ1 above) to the upcoming multi-
annual programmes.  
 
Stakeholders assessment of other similar organisations 
ability to deliver the needed results.  
EU added value is 
identified and 
acknowledged 
Data sources: 
Desk research, 
in-depth 
interview 
Prospective 
 
EQ28: How could ENISA increase its added value and 
its contribution towards the EU, the Member States 
and the private sector in the future, using the 
capabilities and competences already in place? 
 
EQ35: What would be the most likely consequences 
at the EU level of stopping ENISA's activities? 
 
*EQ44: If any new tasks for ENISA are identified 
(e.g. through EQ4 and EQ37), do these represent EU 
added value?140 
Cross-checking of whether the new challenges and 
tasks fit within the EU added value identified or not 
identified in the findings for EQ10, EQ27-28, and EQ35.  
Since the prospective 
EQs are explorative it is 
not recommendable to 
define judgement criteria 
(as there is no justified 
basis). 
Data sources: 
Interviews and 
Public 
consultation 
                                               
138 This question has been added by the evaluator. 
139 This question has been added by the evaluator based on comments received from the Commission to the Interim Report. It was not presented in the Roadmap for the evaluation of ENISA.  
140 This question has been added by the evaluator.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON ENISA’S GOVERNANCE, 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND WORKING 
PRACTICES 
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey which will take approximately 15 to 20 
minutes to complete. 
 
What is this about? 
This survey is carried out by Ramboll Management Consulting and Carsa in the context of the 
“Evaluation of ENISA 2013-2016” commissioned by DG CONNECT.  
 
Who should answer? 
The survey invites all ENISA staff and representatives to provide their assessments. 
Please note that this survey is strictly confidential - your identity will not be disclosed and the 
survey will be anonymous.  
 
How will this survey make a difference? 
The survey data will contribute to the evaluation of ENISA over the 2013-2016 period and the 
identification of recommendations for the future. We would therefore highly appreciate your 
feedback. 
 
Should you wish to read through the questionnaire prior to answering it, you may generate a 
printable version by clicking on this icon. You must, however, still respond to the survey 
online.  
 
 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
 
Please describe your main relationship with ENISA? 
(2)  ENISA Staff (including management) 
(3)  ENISA Management Board 
(4)  ENISA Executive Board 
(5)  National Liaison Officer 
(6)  Permanent Stakeholder Group 
 
Which department do you work for within ENISA? (optional) 
(1)  Stakeholder relations and administration 
(2)  Core Operations 
(3)  Other 
 
Which entity do you represent? (optional) 
(1)  The European Commission 
(2)  An EU Member State 
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(3)  An EFTA Country 
(4)  Other 
 
From which location do you work? (optional) 
(1)  Heraklion 
(2)  Athens 
 
How long have you been working for ENISA? (optional) 
(1)  <1 year 
(2)  1-3 years 
(3)  4-5 years 
(4)  6-10 years 
(5)  > 10 years  
 
ENISA'S ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP 
 
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding ENISA? 
 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
The size of the agency is 
appropriate for the work 
entrusted to ENISA and 
adequate for the actual 
workload. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The organisational solutions 
and procedures of ENISA are 
well adapted to the work 
entrusted to it and to the 
actual workload. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The staff composition is 
appropriate for the work 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
entrusted to ENISA and 
adequate for the actual 
workload. 
The recruitment and training 
procedures are appropriate 
for the work entrusted to 
ENISA and adequate for the 
actual workload. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The size of the agency is appropriate for the 
work entrusted to ENISA and adequate for the actual workload." 
________________________________________ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The organisational solutions and procedures 
of ENISA are well adapted to the work entrusted to it and to the actual workload." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The staff composition is appropriate for the 
work entrusted to ENISA and adequate for the actual workload." 
_____ 
 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The recruitment and training procedures are 
appropriate for the work entrusted to ENISA and adequate for the actual workload." 
_____ 
 
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding the efficiency and/or 
effectiveness of ENISA’s governance and management? 
 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
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 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
The current governance 
structure, with a Management 
Board, an Executive Board 
and the Permanent 
Stakeholder Group, is 
conducive to the effective 
functioning of the Agency (i.e. 
in terms of meeting 
its objectives). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The current governance 
structure, with a Management 
Board, an Executive Board 
and the Permanent 
Stakeholder Group, is 
conducive to the efficient 
functioning of the Agency (i.e. 
in terms of value for money). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The establishment of an 
Executive Board has led to a 
more efficient functioning of 
the Management Board. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA’s management 
practices are conducive to 
creating an effective 
organisation (i.e. in terms of 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
meeting its objectives). 
ENISA’s management 
practices are conducive to 
creating an efficient 
organisation (i.e. in terms of 
value for money). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA’s location enables it to 
effectively conduct its work 
(i.e. in terms of meeting its 
objectives). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA’s location enables it to 
conduct its work efficiently 
(i.e. in terms of value for 
money). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The current governance structure, with a 
Management Board, an Executive Board and the Permanent Stakeholder Group, is conducive to the 
effective functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The current governance structure, with a 
Management Board, an Executive Board and the Permanent Stakeholder Group, is conducive to the 
efficient functioning of the Agency (i.e. in terms of value for money)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The establishment of an Executive Board has 
led to a more efficient functioning of the Management Board." 
_____ 
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Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "ENISA’s management practices are 
conducive to creating an effective organisation (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "ENISA’s management practices are 
conducive to creating an efficient organisation (i.e. in terms of value for money)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "ENISA’s location enables it to effectively 
conduct its work (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "ENISA’s location enables it to conduct its 
work efficiently (i.e. in terms of value for money)." 
_____ 
 
 
ENISA'S EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 
 
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding ENISA? 
 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
ENISA’s working practices 
are efficient and make best 
use of available resources. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The internal capacity and 
capabilities of staff are well 
utilised in ENISA. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Internal management 
systems for planning, follow-
up and monitoring are 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
effective (i.e. in terms of 
meeting its objectives). 
Internal management 
systems for planning, follow-
up and monitoring are 
efficient (i.e. in terms of value 
for money). 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Knowledge and information 
sharing within ENISA are 
supported and encouraged. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The administrative systems in 
place to support ENISA’s 
operations are adequate and 
appropriate. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The quality control 
mechanisms in place ensure 
a high and consistent quality 
in ENISA’s work and 
publications. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "ENISA’s working practices are efficient and 
make best use of available resources." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The internal capacity and capabilities of staff 
are well utilised in ENISA." 
_____ 
   
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "Internal management systems for planning, 
follow-up and monitoring are effective (i.e. in terms of meeting its objectives)." 
_____ 
 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "Internal management systems for planning, 
follow-up and monitoring are efficient (i.e. in terms of value for money)." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "Knowledge and information sharing within 
ENISA are supported and encouraged." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The administrative systems in place to 
support ENISA’s operations are adequate and appropriate." 
_____ 
 
Please elaborate on your assessment of the statement "The quality control mechanisms in place 
ensure a high and consistent quality in ENISA’s work and publications." 
_____ 
 
COOPERATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
 
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statements below regarding ENISA’s cooperation with 
stakeholders? 
 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
ENISA's activities are 
coherent with the policies and 
activities of its stakeholders. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA has built strong and 
trustful relationships with its 
stakeholders when executing 
its mandate. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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 Not at all 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
The collaboration between 
the Permanent Stakeholder 
Group and ENISA has 
functioned well. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
The collaboration between 
the Permanent Stakeholder 
Group and ENISA has 
allowed for greater efficiency. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA is open to cooperating 
with a variety of stakeholders, 
across different levels and 
sectors, to ensure best 
results. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
ENISA has good systems and 
procedures in place for 
stakeholder consultation and 
management. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 
Is there anything else that you would like to add in relation to ENISA's governance, organisational 
structure and working practices? 
________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your contribution! 
 
 
Click Finish to close the consultation.  
 
Your answers have been saved. If you would like a printed copy of your answers, please click 
the print button. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON ENISA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CERTS/CSIRTS 
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey which will take approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
 
What is this about? 
 
This survey is carried out by Ramboll Management Consulting and Carsa in the context of the 
project “Evaluation of ENISA” commissioned by DG CONNECT. 
 
Who should answer? 
 
The survey invites CERTs / CSIRTs staff who have been sent a link to the survey to provide 
their assessments. 
 
Please note that this is a strictly confidential survey - your identity will not be disclosed and the 
survey will remain anonymous. 
 
How will this survey make a difference? 
 
The survey data will contribute to the evaluation of ENISA over the 2013-2016 period and the 
identification of recommendations for improvement. We would therefore highly appreciate your 
feedback. 
 
Should you wish to read through the questionnaire prior to answering it, you may generate a 
printable version by clicking on this icon. You must, however, still respond to the survey 
online. 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
 
Can you briefly describe your main responsibilities? 
(1)  Preventative Measures (e.g. Penetration Testing) 
(2)  Incident Response Team 
(3)  Post Incident Management (e.g. Disaster Recovery) 
(4)  Customer Relationship Management 
(5)  Policy Development 
(6)  Public Awareness 
(7)  Administration and Management 
(8)  Other 
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Please describe which other responsibilities you are referring to: 
_____ 
 
COHERENCE 
 
To what extent did ENISA proactively support cooperation among CERTs / CSIRTs during the 2013-
2016 period? 
(1)  Not at all 
(2)  To a limited extent 
(3)  To some extent 
(4)  To a high extent 
(5)  Do not know 
 
What else do you think could be done by ENISA to improve cooperation among CERTs / CSIRTs? 
________________________________________ 
 
To what extent did ENISA cover CERTs / CSIRTs' needs over the 2013-2016 period? 
(1)  Not at all 
(2)  To a limited extent 
(3)  To some extent 
(4)  To a high extent 
(5)  Do not know 
 
In your opinion, how important were ENISA’s capacity building activities (e.g. training, National 
Cybersecurity Strategy support, identification of good practices) in 2013-2016 for CERTs / CSIRTs’ 
development? 
(1)  Not at all 
(2)  Of limited importance 
(3)  Important 
(4)  Very important 
(5)  Do not know 
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To what extent will the new role foreseen for ENISA in relation to CERTs / CSIRTs as part of the NIS 
Directive enable ENISA to better cover CERTs / CSIRTs’ needs? 
(1)  Not at all 
(2)  To a limited extent 
(3)  To some extent 
(4)  To a high extent 
(5)  Do not know 
 
 
In concrete terms, what do you foresee ENISA doing as part of its new role as secretariat for the 
CSIRTs Network, as foreseen in the NIS Directive? 
________________________________________ 
 
 
What else do you think could be done by ENISA to better cover CERTs / CSIRTs' needs? 
_____ 
 
DEGREE OF COHERENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
The activities below were activities conducted by ENISA to support CERTs/CSIRTs over the 2013-
2016 period. In your opinion, to what extent were these activities coherent with and complementary to 
(i.e. not overlapping or duplicating) what CERTs/CSIRTs were doing? 
 
Not at all 
 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
Organising and managing 
large-scale cyber security 
exercises 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Creating tools and best 
practices 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Providing training courses (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Developing training 
methodologies 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Creating training and exercise (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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Not at all 
 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
material 
Developing publications (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Working towards cyber 
security cooperation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Providing guidance based on 
best practice in the area of 
operational community efforts 
(operational cooperation, 
information exchange, etc.) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Creating reports and 
roadmaps 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Organising workshops and 
conferences 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Supporting cooperation 
among CERTs/CSIRTs, 
within the CERTs/CSIRTs 
network 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Contributing to the dialogue 
between CERTs / CSIRTs 
and law enforcement and 
data privacy communities, in 
order to support consistent a 
EU-wide approach to NIS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Supporting the collaboration (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
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Not at all 
 
To a limited 
extent 
To some extent To a high extent Do not know 
between CERTs / CSIRTs 
and law enforcement 
communities, in responding to 
recent policy and technical 
developments in this area 
 
 
Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your contribution! 
 
Click Finish to close the questionnaire. Your answers have been saved. If you would like a 
printed copy of your answers, please click the print button.  
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This appendix presents the detailed assessment of activities of ENISA and other national and EU 
bodies prepared for the positioning exercise. These tables have been prepared based on findings 
from desk-based research and interviews with the concerned organisations. They provide an 
assessment on whether activities implemented by ENISA are also implemented by other EU or 
national bodies and if so, whether this represents a complementarity or an overlap.  
 
The following EU bodies/organisations have been covered in the positioning exercise: 
 CERT-EU (information confirmed by the organisation) 
 Europol – EC3 (based on desk research) 
 DG JRC (information confirmed by the organisation) 
 
At national level, three organisations were covered: 
 INCIBE – Spain (based on desk research) 
 National Cyber Security Centre – Netherlands (information confirmed by the organisation) 
 ANSSI – France (based on desk research) 
 
Note on methodology 
 
ENISA’s activities were mapped for the positioning exercise as presented in the table below. 
Table 30: Overview of positioning analysis framework 
Overarching theme ENISA’s activities Sub-activity 
To develop and maintain a high 
level of expertise of European 
Union actors, taking into 
account evolutions in network 
and information security 
Creation of good practices and 
recommendations on the security 
and resilience of 
Critical Infrastructures 
Transportation 
Health 
Energy (incl. Smart grids) 
Homes 
Finance 
Big Data 
Recommendations on aligning research 
programme(s) with policy in the specialised area 
of NIS 
Regular threat analysis reports Covering the themes described above (critical 
infrastructures, transportation, etc.) 
Annual overall threat analysis/landscape report 
Threat analysis reports specific for governments 
Threat analysis reports specific for SMEs 
Threat analysis reports specific on NIS issues 
Knowledge and methodology 
enhancement 
Increase in cryptographic knowledge 
Identifying critical communication networks, links, 
and components 
To assist the Member States and 
the European Union institutions 
and bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the legal and 
regulatory requirements 
of network and information 
security 
Good practices, reports and 
standardisation for legal and policy 
areas 
Provide an overview of the threat landscape for 
the legal framework 
Provide best practices for data protection legal 
framework 
Provide best practices for incident handling legal 
framework 
Contribute to the development and 
implementation of the NIS directive 
Provide good practices for cryptographic 
protection measures 
Provide guidance for harmonisation of legal 
framework and standards for the private sector 
Support policy discussion in thematic areas: 
-smart grids 
-IT security certification 
-finance 
-electronic communications 
To assist the Member States and 
the European Union institutions 
and bodies in enhancing 
capacity building throughout the 
European Union 
Good practices, white papers and 
guidelines 
on how to conduct risk assessment and handle 
incident tracking 
on how to conduct training and exercises  
directed towards vulnerable infrastructures 
related to NIS Directive needs 
for fostering cybersecurity culture in the private 
sector 
for national cybersecurity strategies 
Trainings Trainings and exercises for CERTs 
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On-request training for Member States and EU 
bodies 
Workshops to Assist and advise Member States on 
the secure use of cloud computing for 
e-government applications and services 
On-request support for Member States 
decision-making in the areas of privacy and trust 
Standardisation Harmonised Minimum Security Measures for 
Internet Service Providers 
Provide minimum Security Measures for Cloud 
Computing 
Direct support and assistance Provide guidance and support for the European 
Cyber Security Month 
Support the working groups of the NIS platform 
Direct support for CERTs strategic direction 
Assisting member states in building capabilities on 
national Private-Public-Partnerships (PPPs) 
Support and advise member states on the 
establishment and evaluation of national 
cybersecurity strategies 
Incident analysis Annual incident reports and recommendations on 
how to mitigate threats  
To enhance cooperation both 
between the Member States of 
the European Union and 
between related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross Member States cooperation 
building 
Workshops with 2 or more Member States 
Fostering discussion among 2 or more Member 
States through events  
Cybersecurity exercises with 2 or more Member 
States  
 
to the aim of this exercise was to compare ENISA’s services with those of CERT-EU, EC3, DG JRC, 
the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre, the French National Cybersecurity Agency and the 
Spanish National Institute for Cybersecurity. In order to do so a desk research was conducted and 
individuals in the concerned organisations were contacted to gather the missing information. A full 
assessment of overlaps and complementarities was provided by CERT-EU and a partial contribution 
was received from the DG JRC, Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre and the Spanish 
National Institute for Cybersecurity (providing detailed information on activities but with no 
assessment of overlaps or complementarities). For the remaining organisations (EC3 and the 
French ANSSI) best judgments were made regarding possible overlaps or complementarities given 
the limited information available online. 
 
Organisations were compared at the activity level based on an overall assessment of the 
differences or similarity observed between organisations. Finally, desk research findings were 
cross-checked with information obtained from the interviews. Based on this research 
complementarities and overlaps were identified.  
 
It is to be noted that even if no clear overlap was identified, the issue might remain that ENISA 
does not build on the existing competencies and activities of other organisations. For example, 
even if reports produced by ENISA do not cover exactly the same topics as reports produced by 
other organisations, it might be the case that there is room for more efficiency gains in ENISA not 
basing is work on the existing work done in other organisations on the topic. 
 
1. CERT-EU 
 
All information provided in the comments concerning CERT-EU’s activities was provided directly by 
CERT-EU through the positioning exercise and the interviews. 
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Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
Complementarity  CERT-EU contributes to ISACs related to 
critical infrastructure, transportation, 
health and other topics relevant to the 
thematic areas of focus of ENISA. They 
provide information about the technical 
developments in the threat landscape and 
offer informal security advice. They 
service therefore complements that of 
ENISA.   
 
As pointed out during an interview, there 
is a risk that CERT-EU and ENISA publish 
statements on issues already covered by 
one another but this risk does not 
represent an actual overlapping issue.  
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
Complementarity  CERT-EU provides highly technical reports 
aimed at its constituents and peers and 
include non-public information which is 
distributed on a need-to-know basis. 
ENISA’s reports contain only public 
information and are written for the public 
at large. They therefore complement each 
other.  
 
In addition, CERT-EU uses the reports 
produced by ENISA for their own monthly 
reports and feed into ENISA’s annual 
report.  
 
They try to have an operational 
cooperation and avoid any duplication of 
work. 
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
Complementarity CERT-EU provides limited advice to its 
constituents on how to identify critical 
communication networks, links and 
components. ENISA works for the public 
at large. They therefore complement each 
other.  
 
One interview pointed at the danger for 
overlap in the work CERT-EU and ENISA 
conduct on cryptography and 
vulnerabilities.141 
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Complementarity CERT-EU brought out guidelines for 
notifications of cyber-security incident 
response processes to Data Protection 
Officers, aimed at EU institutions, bodies 
and agencies but published as a white 
paper. They therefore aim at a different 
scope and audience than ENISA. 
To assist the member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
Good practices, white 
papers and guidelines for 
the government 
None CERT-EU publishes white papers on 
selected security issues of current interest 
on their website, which are publicly 
available.  
Trainings Complementarity CERT-EU provides very technical trainings 
and workshops to its constituency. The 
audience differs from that of the trainings 
delivered by ENISA.  
Standardisation None N/A 
Direct Support and 
Assistance 
Overlap While CERT-EU discusses best practices 
with other CERTs, they do not provide 
direct support and assistance. 
 
It appeared however that those who want 
to build a CERT go to CERT-EU for 
practical advice rather than to ENISA. 
There is a risk of overlap in the advice and 
expertise that both organisations provide 
them with. 
Incident Analysis Complementarity CERT-EU provides incident analysis 
reports to its constituency. These reports 
are however highly technical, confidential 
and exclusive to these constituents and 
                                               
141 We were not able to identify clear evidence for such overlaps in publicly accessible reports and have therefore  not taken into account 
the evidence coming from this one interview.  
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peers. ENISA’s incident analysis reports 
are public.  
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross Member States 
cooperation building 
Overlap CERT-EU organised workshops on Malware 
Information Sharing Platforms in which 
national and governmental CERTs 
participated.  
 
Nine interviews pointed at the fact that 
CERT-EU tends to act outside of its 
mandate on cooperation building, 
potentially overlapping with what ENISA is 
or should be doing. For example, CERT-EU 
should not be directly getting in touch 
with commercial organisations in Member 
States but does so through national 
CERTs.  
 
2. Europol – EC3 
 
Little information is accessible on EC3’s website. The assessment below was made by the 
evaluators but was not confirmed by EC3. 
 
Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
None N/A 
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
None N/A 
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
None N/A 
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Complementarity EC3 works together with ENISA to provide 
workshops which aim at defining a 
common taxonomy between CSIRTs and 
Law Enforcement and facilitate 
information sharing between the two 
communities.142 
EC3 developed a Handbook for Law 
Enforcement on the use of social media 
for prevention/awareness purposes.143 
To assist the member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
Good practices, white 
papers and guidelines for 
the government 
None N/A 
Trainings Complementarity EC3 supports training for the relevant 
authorities in Member States.144 It 
however provides trainings that are very 
focused on reacting to cybercrime by 
involving the national law enforcement 
authorities, therefore differing from what 
ENISA does.   
Standardisation None N/A 
Direct Support and 
Assistance 
Complementarity EC3 provides direct support in reducing 
cybercrime through its operational powers 
(e.g. arresting cyber criminals or taking 
down cybercrime forums).145  
Incident Analysis Complementarity EC3 does not provide publicly available 
incident analysis reports but has some 
publicly available tools to understand the 
different types of cyber threats and how 
individuals can avoid becoming victims to 
them.146 
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
Cross member states 
cooperation building 
Complementarity As noted previously, EC3 works together 
with ENISA to provide workshops which 
aim at defining a common taxonomy 
between CSIRTs and Law Enforcement 
and facilitate information sharing between 
the two communities.147 
                                               
142 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/events/5th-enisa-ec3-workshop 
143 https://policemediablog.com/2016/01/27/social-media-handbook-for-law-enforcement-europol-ec3/ 
144 https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/training-and-capacity-building 
145 https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2 
146 https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2 
147 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/events/5th-enisa-ec3-workshop 
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communities 
 
3. DG JRC 
 
All information provided in the comments concerning the DG JRC’s activities was provided directly 
by the DG JRC through the positioning exercise and the interviews. 
 
Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
General 
complementarity 
but some risk for 
duplication  
The DG JRC provides good practices and 
recommendations on critical 
infrastructures, transportation, energy 
and homes. These activities primarily 
come in form of a contribution to the 
Commission’s work and are in this sense 
complementary to ENISA’s work targeting 
Member States and a broader stakeholder 
group.  
 
E.g. contribution to  Commission work on 
Cooperative Intelligent Transport System 
(C-ITS), in particular with respect to 
security and privacy: participation in the 
C-ITS platform, contribution to its final 
report, to the preparation of the 
"European Strategy for C-ITS" 
Com(2016)-766, to the C-ITS common 
certificate and security policy,   
Interaction as Commission representative 
with the Technology subgroup of the 
Article 29 working party 
 
Preparation of a BREF (Best Available 
Techniques Reference Document) for the 
cyber-security and privacy of the 10 
minimum functional requirements of the 
Smart Metering Systems. Co-chairing with 
DG ENER of the WG2 (on cybersecurity 
and privacy) of the Smart Grid Task Force 
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
Complementarity  Through the ITIS project, DG JRC provides 
news bulletins on vulnerabilities and 
threats in the EU for the energy sector 
and also half year reports on foresight for 
emerging threats 
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
Risk of duplication The DG JRC has developed risk 
assessment methodologies reports that 
are available to the MS for implementation 
 
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Complementarity The DG JRC provides direct support to the 
European Commission in the development 
of good practices and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas.  
E.g. contribution to the recent review of 
the ePrivacy Directive and preparation of 
a proposed Regulation 
 
Starting, supporting DG CNECT with 
methodology and best practices insights, 
in the NIS Cooperation Group, for 
Essential Services identification and the 
criteria to use.  
Work on the preparation of a roadmap for 
the  security certification and labelling of 
ICT goods and services (part of 
COM(2016) 410 - Strengthening Europe’s 
Cyber Resilience System)  Request for DG 
CNECT to support the identification of 
essential services by MS. 
To assist the member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
Good practices, white 
papers and guidelines for 
the government 
Complementarity  The DG JRC has developed risk 
assessment methodologies reports that 
are available to the MS for implementation 
Trainings Complementarity The DG JRC does not provide training to 
CERTs. 
Three training activities until now for MS 
and for operators of critical infrastructures 
in the EU. These are done on requests 
Standardisation None N/A 
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Direct Support and 
Assistance 
None N/A 
Incident Analysis None N/A 
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross member states 
cooperation building 
Complementarity Workshops on: zero-day vulnerability EU 
governance, Transborders personal data-
breach exercise, data portability, 
encryption/decryption 
 
The DG JRC is supporting the EU Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection 
(CIIP) Action Plan by contributing to the 
organisation of pan-European cyber-
security exercises. This is organised in 
cooperation with ENISA. 
 
4. INCIBE – Spain 
 
Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
Complementarity INCIBE produces some guides aimed at 
public and private actors.148 These guides 
and the guides produced by ENISA do not 
have obvious overlaps and can be used in 
a complementary fashion by end-users.  
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
Overlap INCIBE compiles incidents notice and 
provides a number of incident analysis 
reports.149 While these might be in 
Spanish and with a particular national 
focus, it is unclear whether the actors 
looking at these analyses benefit from the 
additional analysis reports provided by 
ENISA.  
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
Overlap INCIBE helps companies in critical 
infrastructures to identify critical 
weaknesses.150 It is unclear what 
additional value ENISA is bringing to these 
companies when they provide help on 
identifying critical communication 
networks, links and components.  
 
There were no clear overlaps identified 
concerning other areas of knowledge and 
methodology enhancements. 
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Complementarity INCIBE cooperates with the Spanish 
government to produce standardised best 
practices which aim at contributing to the 
development and implementation of the 
NIS Directive. They have for example 
compiled all of the Spanish legislation 
which affects the area of cybersecurity.151 
ENISA brings in the EU aspect and helps 
INCIBE and the Spanish government by 
providing what they see as being the best 
practices based on experience across 
Member States.  
To assist the member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
Good practices, white 
papers and guidelines for 
the government 
Complementarity INCIBE produces a number of reports 
which aim at providing best practices, for 
example on how to conduct trainings and 
exercises152, how businesses should 
manage risks153. In addition, they work 
alongside the Spanish government on 
establishing national strategies related to 
the NIS Directive.154  
ENISA’s complementary role here is to 
link this effort with the good practices 
observed at the European level. 
Trainings Complementarity INCIBE provides trainings and exercises, 
including to CERTS and security 
forces155156. It seems that ENISA focuses 
                                               
148 https://www.incibe.es/protege-tu-empresa/guias 
149 https://www.certsi.es/servicios-operadores/notificaciones-y-analisis-adhoc 
150 https://www.certsi.es/servicios-operadores/detector-de-incidentes 
151 http://www.boe.es/legislacion/codigos/codigo.php?id=173_Codigo_de_Derecho__de_la_Ciberseguridad 
152 https://www.certsi.es/guias-y-estudios/estudios/taxonomia-ciberejercicios 
153 https://www.incibe.es/extfrontinteco/img/File/empresas/guias/Guia_gestion_riesgos/guiagestionriesgos.pdf 
154 https://www.incibe.es/sala-prensa/notas-prensa/nw-infoday-raul-riesco 
155 https://cybercamp.es/summer-bootcamp 
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more on capacity building trainings for 
CERTs and that INCIBE provides specific 
trainings (e.g. on fraud detection using 
machine learning and deep learning).157  
Standardisation None INCIBE does not seem to provide 
minimum security measures to internet 
service providers or for cloud computing 
in the same way ENISA does.  
Direct Support and 
Assistance 
Complementarity  INCIBE provides some support to the 
state on establishing and evaluating its 
National Cyber Security Strategy and 
contributes to the establishment of 
private-public partnerships in 
cybersecurity.158 It is however unclear how 
much of what they do is complementary 
or overlapping with ENISA’s activities. We 
did not identify any clear overlaps.  
Incident Analysis Overlap INCIBE repertories and analyses incidents 
happening in Spain.159 They also provide 
advice to companies on how to mitigate 
threats and identify their own 
weaknesses.160 It is therefore unclear what 
ENISA’s added value is in that regards.  
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross member states 
cooperation building 
Complementarity INCIBE organises workshops161 and helps 
foster discussion among member states162 
with the help and in coordination with 
ENISA.  
 
5. NCSC - Netherlands 
 
Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
Overlap The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre produces 
good practices for critical infrastructures 
and for the protection of home internet 
devices.163 It is not clear what the added 
value of good practices produced in these 
areas by ENISA would have in the 
Netherlands.  
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
Overlap The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre compiles 
incidents and provides regular threat 
analysis reports. These reports are in 
Dutch and seem to focus on the national 
level.164 It is however not clear what the 
added value of the reports provided by 
ENISA is for the Dutch actors.  
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
Complementarity The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre conducts 
research in cryptography.165 No clear 
overlap was spotted between the reports 
produced by the Dutch Cybersecurity 
Centre and the ones produced by ENISA.  
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Overlap  The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre produces 
a number of reports and white papers166 to 
support the government of the 
Netherlands on the topic of the 
cybersecurity legal framework. It is 
unclear how much ENISA is bringing in 
addition to the work already happening.  
To assist the member Good practices, white No The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre did not 
                                                                                                                                                   
156 https://www.incibe.es/formacion 
157 https://cybercamp.es/programa/agenda 
158 https://ecs-org.eu/documents/ecs-cppp-sria.pdf 
159 https://www.certsi.es/alerta-temprana/avisos-sci 
160 https://www.certsi.es/servicios-operadores/detector-de-incidentes 
161 https://www.incibe.es/en/enise 
162 https://www.incibe.es/sala-prensa/notas-prensa/el-instituto-nacional-ciberseguridad-representa-los-intereses-nacionales-el 
163 https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/factsheets/checklist-beveiliging-van-ics-scada-systemen.html 
https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/factsheets/factsheet-beveilig-apparaten-gekoppeld-aan-internet.html 
164 https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/Cybersecuritybeeld+Nederland 
165 https://www.ncsc.nl/binaries/content/documents/ncsc-nl/expertise--advies/onderzoek-innovatie-en-onderwijs/1/NCRSA%2BII.pdf 
166 https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/whitepapers 
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States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
papers and guidelines for 
the government 
report any activity in this category.   
Trainings Overlap The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre provides 
trainings and exercises such as the 
ISIDOOR exercise. Their audience includes 
some CERTs. There is therefore a risk of 
overlap here depending on the content of 
each training. 
Standardisation No The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre did not 
report any activity in this category.   
Direct Support and 
Assistance 
No The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre did not 
report any activity in this category.   
Incident Analysis Overlap The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre produces 
an annual cybersecurity report for the 
Netherlands167. It is unclear how useful 
the annual cybersecurity landscape report 
by ENISA is useful to the Netherlands. It 
might be good for cross-referencing and 
providing additional details.  
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross member states 
cooperation building 
Complementarity  The Dutch Cybersecurity Centre organises 
yearly conferences called the International 
One Conference168. They also organise 
cyber exercises with neighbouring 
countries. As such, they participate in the 
same effort as ENISA towards cooperation 
building without duplicating what ENISA 
does.  
 
6. ANSSI - France 
 
Category of Activity Sub-Category of 
Activities 
Overlap / 
Complementarity 
Comment / Example 
To develop and maintain a 
high level of expertise of 
European Union actors, 
taking into account 
evolutions in network and 
information security 
Good practices and 
recommendations 
Overlap There might be some overlaps in that 
ANSSI provides good practices for 
individuals169, industries170 and 
administrations171. While these good 
practices might be in French or focused on 
the French national context, there is a risk 
of duplication of work if ENISA produces 
similar good practices. 
Regular Threat Analysis 
Reports  
Overlap ANSSI regularly provides threat analysis 
to inform individuals, governments and 
enterprises of the threat landscape.172 It 
produces reports on the different 
techniques used by cyber criminals.173 
While these reports might be in French, if 
they are made publicly available, there is 
therefore a risk of overlap with what 
ENISA is doing, 
Knowledge and 
Methodology 
Enhancements 
Overlap ANSSI does quite a lot of work on 
cryptography.174 There is therefore a risk 
of overlap with what ENISA does in that 
regard. 
To assist the Member 
States and the European 
Union institutions and 
bodies in developing and 
implementing the policies 
necessary to meet the 
legal and regulatory 
requirements of network 
and information security 
Good practices, reports 
and standardisation for 
legal and policy areas 
Complementarity ANSSI provides advice to the French 
government on strategies to take and best 
practices to observe in order to foster 
cybersecurity in France.175 ENISA is 
however complementary to that work in 
that they support the development of EU 
policies and represent the interest of 
ANSSI and other CS agencies in dialogues 
among the EU institutions in supporting 
the implementation of EU legislation. This 
was noted during the interview with 
ANSSI as a new need identified by the 
French agency.  
To assist the member 
States and the European 
Good practices, white 
papers and guidelines for 
Overlap ANSSI has a number of good practices 
aimed at the public176 and the private 
                                               
167 https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/Cybersecuritybeeld+Nederland 
168 https://www.ncsc.nl/english/conference 
169 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/particulier/bonnes-pratiques/ 
170 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/bonnes-pratiques/ 
171 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/administration/bonnes-pratiques/ 
172 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/principales-menaces/ 
173 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2016/09/rapport_annuel_2015_anssi.pdf 
174 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/actualite/crypto-le-webdoc/ 
175 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2016/09/rapport_annuel_2015_anssi.pdf 
176 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/particulier/bonnes-pratiques/ 
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Union institutions and 
bodies in enhancing 
capacity building 
throughout the European 
Union 
the government sectors.177 They also work with the 
government to define strategies related to 
the NIS Directive needs.178 There is 
therefore a risk of overlap with what 
ENISA is doing. 
Trainings None N/A 
Standardisation Overlap ANSSI aims at enforcing standards 
through the creations of qualifications and 
certifications in France.179 There is 
therefore a risk of overlap with what 
ENISA does.  
Direct Support and 
Assistance 
Complementarity  ANSSI is a campaign coordinator for the 
European Cyber Security Month.180 It also 
provides direct support and assistance to 
the French government.181 As such, it is 
complementary with what ENISA does. 
Incident Analysis None N/A 
To enhance cooperation 
both between the Member 
States of the European 
Union and between 
related network and 
information security 
communities 
Cross member states 
cooperation building 
Complementarity ANSSI works in collaboration with ENISA 
on organising and attending events which 
aim at increasing cooperation among 
member states.182 
                                               
177 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/bonnes-pratiques/ 
178 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2016/09/rapport_annuel_2015_anssi.pdf 
179 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/produits-certifies/ 
180 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/actualite/anssi-ready-for-the-2016-european-cybersecurity-month-escm/ 
181 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2016/09/rapport_annuel_2015_anssi.pdf 
182 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/actualite/stronger-together-anssi-successfully-took-part-in-pan-european-exercice-cyber-europe-16/ 
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STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Independence / neutrality. ENISA is an 
independent agency without political or 
commercial bias. Its independence is 
supported by its location in Heraklion and 
Athens giving it less involvement in the 
everyday politics in cybersecurity in 
Brussels.183 
Lack of a more strategic, long-term vision. 
ENISA has difficulties in executing a long-term 
vision due to regulatory constraints and 
overlapping mandates (other agencies/bodies 
claiming to have expertise and ownership in 
cybersecurity).184  
ENISA’s work programme is influenced by the 
interests of Member States, although its flexibility 
has been broadened by Art.14, it’s not enough.185 
186  
 
Capacity building assistance. ENISA has a 
good track record / experience organizing 
trainings, cybersecurity exercises, 
development of manuals, studies trying to 
reach a broad sector (Member States, private 
actors, European Union institutions and 
agencies187). The aim of this capacity building 
activity is to develop the capabilities of the 
agents, providing them with the necessary 
tools to prevent, detect and handle incidents.188 
Agencies reporting best practices on the cyber 
domain could be encouraged.189 
Limited visibility of ENISA. As a result of weak 
communication, marketing and/or branding, 
ENISA is not very present, i.e. it has not 
managed to carve out its own space within the 
cybersecurity policy landscape.190 
Maintaining the network / coordination 
role191. ENISA is involved in addressing 
existing fragmentation at national, European 
and international level192. It acts as a pole to 
gather and exchange information and best 
practices among Member States, EU and 
international players. ENISA is also involved in 
fostering cooperation with the private sector 
and encourages the setup of PPP as a way to 
increase the operational capabilities in the 
sector. It also bolsters the establishment of 
cyber threat reporting channels as a way to 
Office location in Heraklion and Athens. 
ENISA’s location impacts its capabilities / 
capacities in terms of recruiting high-level experts 
(difficulties for spouses to integrate and limited 
international schooling options) and 
connectedness to influence cybersecurity policy in 
Brussels due to the distance to decision makers in 
the EU institutions.  An option would be to have a 
liaison office.195 
 
                                               
183 See interviews 
184 See interviews 
185 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
186 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
187 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
188 See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004. 
189 Experts discussions 
190 See interviews 
191 See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004. 
192 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
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gather information and disseminate 
expertise.193  
Furthermore, being part of the EC3 board 
assures ENISA involvement in other NIS 
related issues of cybercrime.194  
Member States support: ENISA has cyber 
resilience capability and supports the fostering 
of Member States’ effectiveness in this area.196 
197, 198 
It also, plays a role assisting the national 
CERTs (from their set-up to their daily 
activities)199. Its role as CERT coordination 
should be enhanced.200  
Inadequate staff composition and human 
resources policies.201 ENISA’s staff lacks the 
technical expertise to act as a reference in 
cybersecurity in policy. Next to a lack of 
computing specialists, there is a lack of carreer 
opportunities within the Agency. More junior staff 
members tend to move on causing capability loss 
of the Agency.   
 
Horizontal policy expertise. ENISA has 
expertise and experience in strengthening 
detection and prevention of cybersecurity 
threats in different country contexts giving it 
more horizontal expertise. One of its main 
activities is to assist the development and 
implementation of NIS related policies and 
laws, trying to strengthen the importance of 
cybersecurity as an EU policy priority.202  
Limited size and low financial resources.203 
The budget allocated for cybersecurity is low if 
compared with other areas or with the resources 
spent in other countries on this issue.204 
 
 
Recognised relationships with its 
stakeholders. ENISA’s stakeholders judge 
their relationship with ENISA to be trustful and 
effective.  
Recruitment and training procedures.  
Recruitment and training procedures of ENISA are 
considered not appropriate or only appropriate to 
a limited extent to manage ENISA’s workload. 
Additional comments revealed that the 
recruitment process is considered too slow and 
therefore not being adapted to the cybersecurity 
domain.205 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
195 See interviews 
193 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
194 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee 
196 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
197 See ENISA (2016) Evaluation Roadmap 25/07/2016. 
198 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
199 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee. 
200 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee 
201 See interviews 
202 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
203 Ibid. 
204 See Fahey, E. (2014) ‘EU’S Cybercrime and Cyber Security Rule-Making: Mapping the Internal and External Dimensions of EU 
Security’. European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 46-60. 
205 See ENISA survey 
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OPPORTUNITIES  THREATS 
Synergies & risk management culture206.  
There is a growing need to explore and ensure 
synergies between operators as to assure 
concerted and collaborative NIS policy 
actions207. Cooperation is also important in the 
public-private dimension. Improvement 
regarding information sharing could help the 
creation of a coherent risk management 
culture aligned with existing crisis 
mechanisms. ENISA could work to ensure 
effective cooperation and prompt information 
sharing between EU institutions and different 
agencies, national government and the private 
sector. Without the involvement of the private 
sector it will be difficult to identify the relevant 
threats.208 
Insufficient sharing of information - lack of 
data. Stakeholders in the private sector are 
reluctant to share information regarding NIS 
incidents209. The fact that reporting is not 
mandatory for public authorities does not 
encourage the private sector to do so on a 
voluntary basis. In addition, some private 
companies lack training in cybersecurity issues210. 
Incentives for information disclosure are not 
attractive. Some sectors are more eager to 
cooperate than others (financial vs 
telecommunications). 
Member States are also averse to disclose 
relevant information to ENISA, in particular, 
where national security is concerned. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus among 
Member States’ understanding of the cyber 
domain211 212 
ICT standardization, certification and 
harmonisation. ENISA should encourage 
harmonisation regarding threat assessments 
(threats, threat tools and vulnerabilities). In 
order to create digital trust, ENISA should seek 
to introduce a European ICT labelling for 
cybersecurity products. This would help foster 
the integration of the Single Market, create 
trust and protect credentials. Harmonisation of 
different national legislation should be sought 
at EU level in order to have an effective 
cybersecurity protection.213  
Fragmentation and coordination.  
Fragmentation is an issue regarding operational 
capabilities214 (e.g. ENISA has no operational 
power and therefore cannot intervene to fix NIS 
issues)215.  
In addition, there is a diverse set of agencies 
dealing with different issues in the cyber incident 
landscape. Coordination amongst different 
agencies is sometimes not only difficult, but also 
distorts the visibility and hinders accessibility of 
the European response to threats and demands of 
stakeholders.  For instance, one Member State 
representative claimed that “his organisation did 
                                               
206 See European Commission (2013). SWD (2013) 31 final; COM (2013) 48 final: Commission Staff Working Document-Executive 
Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning measures to ensure a high level of network and information security across the Union. 
207 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
208 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
209 See European Commission (2013). SWD (2013) 31 final; COM (2013) 48 final: Commission Staff Working Document-Executive 
Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning measures to ensure a high level of network and information security across the Union. 
210 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
211 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
212 See Carrapico, H., Barrinha, A. (2017). The EU as a coherent (cyber)security actor? 
213 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee 
214 See ENISA (Jan 2016). ENISA Strategy 2016-2020, Catalogue number TP-04-16-453-EN-N; ISBN: 978-92-9204-170-0 
215 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
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not work together with ENISA and that if they 
came across ENISA’s work, it was by 
coincidence”216. There is a need to disseminate 
ENISA’s work. Furthermore, a clear distribution of 
competences within the different agencies could 
help to strengthen EU capacity to react.217 Some 
experts suggest that if similar functions are 
identified at ENISA, EC3 or CERT-EU they should 
be merged.218 
Awareness raising and capacity building. 
Public awareness on cyber threats should be 
enhanced. ENISA could enhance its discourse 
and awareness strategy and provide additional 
guidance, training regarding management of 
cyber threats.219  
ENISA could also use its expertise in cyber 
resilience to strengthen pan-European cyber 
incident exercises and examine computer 
security incident response teams.220 There is a 
need to assist and develop national cyber 
resilience capability and ENISA should continue 
its works in the domain, helping for instance 
the development of national contingency plans 
and organizing regular emergency exercises 
and setting alarms to detect attacks on critical 
infrastructures.221  
Cooperation with Member States - capability 
gaps.   
The priorities set by national governments in 
cybersecurity vary significantly among Member 
States. Member States’ cyber capacities and 
capabilities are uneven222 223 not only at 
preparedness level, but also at policy. Divergent 
legislation, priorities and coordination problems 
can lead towards Single Market fragmentation, 
lack of effectiveness of the European response 
and interoperability problems when incidents 
spread across borders.224 The new Cooperation 
Group set up by NIS Directive, aims to overcome 
this weakness aiming to strengthen cooperation 
among Member States and offering advice on 
security issues.225  
Stakeholder engagement.  
Reinforce links with industry stakeholders226. 
Broader cybersecurity ecosystem.  
Sharing of information, practices among 
Lacking capacities to respond to changing 
technological landscape and corresponding 
new vulnerabilities229, such as:  
 Data theft of corporate information: 
                                               
216 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee. 
217 See ENISA (2016) Evaluation Roadmap 25/07/2016. 
218 See Fahey, E. (2014) ‘EU’S Cybercrime and Cyber Security Rule-Making: Mapping the Internal and External Dimensions of EU 
Security’. European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 46-60. 
219 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee. 
220 Ibid. 
221 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
222 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
223 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
224 See European Commission (2013). SWD (2013) 31 final; COM (2013) 48 final: Commission Staff Working Document-Executive 
Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning measures to ensure a high level of network and information security across the Union. 
225 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
226 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
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operators  instrumental role of ENISA.227 
EU agencies are one of the principal channels 
to engage with the private sector.228  
emergence of “corporate insider”  
 Economic espionage and state sponsored 
activities 
 Overall data loss or destruction 
 Malicious apps (malware) 
 Hijacking-interception of information 
 Nefarious activity: identity fraud, denial 
of service, malicious code, rouge 
certificates, failure of business process 
 Online fraud-point  
Cyber-attack methods have become more 
pervasive230  low-end, low to medium tech. 
Furthermore, cyber-attackers’ profile, methods, 
and aims are diverse. It is not possible do draw 
an accurate portrait.   
In addition, states are not only subject to cyber-
attacks but are also performing them. The EU is 
lacking a method to detect and disseminate 
information about threats and attacks.231 
Multi-perspective and holistic approach.  
There is a need for comprehensive security 
policies. Broader engagement from industry 
and the community should be envisaged, as 
well as the use of dual capabilities (e.g. civil-
military cooperation)232. Civil society 
perspective should also be taken into 
account.233  
If incident report becomes mandatory for other 
sectors, there can be new opportunities for 
ENISA to support Member States in building 
more resilience against cyber-attacks. Without 
carefully defined and orchestrated security 
rules and procedures, it is impossible to 
Internet of Things (IoT). Interconnectivity 
between devices implies that there is a larger 
vulnerable surface.235 The boundary of the 
companies is disappearing as everything is 
connected, and thus finding loopholes to enter is 
easier. Securing the supply chain is still 
challenging.236 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
229 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
227 See ENISA (2015). Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Software Defines Networks/ 5G: ISBN: 978-92-9204-161-8, DOI: 
10.2824/67261. 
228 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
230 See ENISA (2015). CYBER 7: Seven messages to the edge of Cyber-Space; Catalogue Number: TP-04-15-745-EN-C; ISB: 978-92-
9204-133-5. 
231 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
232 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry. 
233 The Kosciuszko Institute- European CyberSecurity Journal (2015), Volume 1, Issue 1. Strategic Perspectives on Cybersecurity 
Management and Public Policies 
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imagine a functional and reliable software-
defined networking infrastructure.234  
Consumer protection. 
Safeguard online environment providing 
highest possible freedom and security 
(fundamental rights, freedom of expression, 
personal data and privacy). 
Talent Gap. There are not enough cybersecurity 
skilled workers  There is a need to broaden the 
pool of talent. 237, 238 
Cross-border coordination. As most of the 
incidents arise from cross border activity, 
ENISA could strengthen its coordination role at 
EU level.239 240 The EU level is best placed to 
supervise and respond to cyber-attacks, in 
order to help close the capability gaps that are 
identified at national level.241  
Lack of funding and prioritisation of 
cybersecurity at enterprise level. There is not 
enough available funding for private companies to 
secure their infrastructure242, 243 Private companies 
also often do not set cybersecurity as a clear 
priority (statement from experts) – lack of 
interest to invest in cybersecurity.244  
 
The NIS Directive has helped to develop a 
coherent and less fragmented vision of 
cybersecurity at EU level.245 
NIS Directive - additional tasks, but no extra 
funding.246 The NIS Directive imposes many 
additional tasks on the Agency without cuts on 
responsibilities assigned before the NIS Directive. 
At the same time, no increase in the resources 
occurred. There is a risk that ENISA will not be 
able to deliver high quality outputs on all the 
tasks entrusted to it.  
 Data processing and analysis. Difficulties arise 
to identify consequences and lessons learned 
once an incident has occurred. This is due to the 
fact that normalisation of data and processes is 
                                                                                                                                                   
235 See ENISA (2015). CYBER 7: Seven messages to the edge of Cyber-Space; Catalogue Number: TP-04-15-745-EN-C; ISB: 978-92-
9204-133-5. 
236 Georgian Institute of Technology (2016). 2016 Emerging Cyber Threats Report. 
234 European Commission (2015). COM (2015) 192 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions regarding “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe” 
6/05/2015. 
237 European Commission (2015). COM (2015) 192 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions regarding “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe” 
6/05/2015. 
238 The Kosciuszko Institute- European CyberSecurity Journal (2015), Volume 1, Issue 1. Strategic Perspectives on Cybersecurity 
Management and Public Policies 
239 See European Commission (2013). JOIN (2013) 1 final: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace 
240 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry 
241 See IPOL Study (2015). Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. Study for the 
LIBE Committee. 
242 See Accenture and HfS Research (2016). The State of Cybersecurity and Digital Trust 2016. 
243 See European Commission (2016). COM (2016) 410 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience 
System and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry 
244 See Carrapico, H., Barrinha, A. (2017). The EU as a coherent (cyber)security actor? 
245 See Christou, G. (2014). The EU’s Approach to Cyber Security. EUSC EU China Security Cooperation: performance and prospects. 
Policy paper series. Available at 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~susyd/EUSC/documents/EUSC%20Cyber%20Security%20EU%20Christou.pdf 
246 See interviews 
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problematic, as impacts cannot be measured or 
identified easily. Thus, comparability becomes 
arduous. Moreover, testing cannot offer 
guarantee of success.247  
Lack of data is also an issue as a large number 
of cyber incidents in the EU go unnoticed due to 
unwillingness to disclose information.248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
247 See Bendiek, A. (2012) ‘European Cyber Security Policy’, SWP Research Paper No13. Available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paperdetail/article/european_cyber_security_policy.html Accessed 28 
February 2017. 
248 The Kosciuszko Institute- European CyberSecurity Journal (2015), Volume 1, Issue 1. Strategic Perspectives on Cybersecurity 
Management and Public Policies 
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